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Abstract
This thesis consists of three essays examining different aspects relevant to the
banking sectors of developing economies. The first two essays focus on Emerging
Europe a region with one of the highest foreign bank presence in the world - to
study the impact of foreign bank ownership and bank organizational structure on
the cost of financial intermediation and terms of loan contracts. The last essay
focuses on Kenya which is home to M-Pesa the mobile-phone based money trans-
fer and financing service initially launched in Kenya in 2007 and subsequently
in other emerging countries such as Albania, Romania, India, Egypt and several
other African countries - to examine its impact on the performance and outreach
of commercial banks.
The first essay investigates the impact of foreign bank entry, home and host
country conditions on net interest margins (NIMs), using a newly collected panel
dataset with ownership information for 265 banks operating in nine Southeast
European countries over the period 1995-2011. As the banking sector of many
emerging markets and in particular the European transition economies have been
dominated by foreign banks understanding the impact of such reforms on host
country banking sectors is important for designing supportive policies. We do not
find evidence of foreign bank entry having a beneficial effect for host countries in
terms of reducing the cost of financial intermediation in the long run, as foreign
banks change their behaviour over time. We show that foreign banks have initially
lower NIMs compared to domestic banks, however this effect weakens the larger
the foreign presence and the more established foreign banks become. We find
that home country regulation and supervision have an effect on bank behaviour,
with foreign banks coming from countries with stricter regulation having higher
NIMs in host countries.
The second essay studies the impact of institutions on bank organizational hier-
archy. Studying the internal organizational structure of banks is important as it
determines the type of information acquired and used in lending decisions and
consequently the type of borrowers banks lend to. This is important not only
for bank’s loan portfolio composition and their financial soundness but also for
xiii
borrower’s ability to access funds on favourable terms and the overall financial
system stability and economic development. Using a unique bank-level survey
dataset covering 32 countries and 611 banks, we introduce a new and direct
measure of organizational hierarchy and exploit the distinctive feature of multi-
national banks which face different institutional environments in the countries
they operate. We find that the same parent bank is more likely to grant decision-
making authority to its foreign affiliates operating in countries with stronger
institutions compared to those operating in weaker institutional environments.
Combining the bank- with firm-level data we further find that a strong institu-
tional environment which favours a decentralized organizational structure leads
to better lending terms to SMEs decentralized banks grant loans with longer
maturities, lower interest rates and are less likely to require collateral compared
to their centralized counterparts. These findings further our understanding of
bank organizational structure as a channel through which law affects lending.
In the last essay we use the advent of the mobile money innovation in Kenya in
2007 as an interesting laboratory to investigate the impact of a financial inno-
vation on the performance and outreach of commercial banks. Providing more
insights about this link is important as it helps inform the debate among policy-
makers and regulators on the impact of a non-traditional source of competition
on the service provision of formal financial institutions. Given that financial in-
clusion is a major problem in developing countries, detailed micro-level evidence
on this issue is important for promoting household welfare. Combining the 2006,
2009 and 2013 FinAccess household surveys with bank financial statement and
branch penetration data at the county level we find that banks more exposed
to the competitive pressure induced by the mobile money innovation improved
their performance and expanded their outreach towards households traditionally
excluded by formal financial institutions. Additional results further show that
households report less supply side barriers to financial access in counties more
exposed to the advent of the mobile money innovation. These results highlight
the importance of increasing the contestability of banking markets in order to
promote financial inclusion and a more competitive banking sector.
xiv
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This introductory chapter will give an overview of the research area this thesis
belongs to, will place the specific research questions in the context of the theo-
retical and empirical literature and will present the key findings of the research
highlighting the main contributions of the thesis.
1.1 Background
The banking sectors of many developing economies have undergone considerable
reforms aiming at developing a competitive and efficient financial system in order
to facilitate economic growth and financial system stability. Although the pace
and the extent of the reforms varied across countries a common objective has
been reversing the negative consequences of the repressive financial policies in-
herited from the previous regimes. In Eastern Europe, for instance, the transition
from centrally-planned to market-oriented economies entailed the replacement of
socialist banks who acted mainly as bookkeepers for the planned allocation of re-
sources with modern banks whose role is to efficiently channel funds to its most
productive uses. Similar transformations took place in other parts of the devel-
oping world such as Latin America, Asia or Africa. In Sub-Saharan Africa, for
instance, financial sector reforms aimed at dealing with the negative outcomes
from the post-independence era characterized by the creation of government-
1
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owned banks and a large number of other banks and non-bank financial institu-
tions most of them unsound, with strong political connections. In general, as a
consequence of a long period of government intervention the banking sectors of
these countries were characterized by lack of competition, lack of risk manage-
ment practices for monitoring and evaluating the creditworthiness of borrowers,
wide interest spreads as an indication of inefficient intermediation of funds, lack
of interest in lending to local customers and expanding access to finance as well
as unsound lending practices motivated by political considerations. This, coupled
with a poor regulatory environment resulted in several banking crisis. In light
of these fragilities, financial sector reforms included internal structural changes
such as restructurings and consolidations of unviable financial institutions, pri-
vatisations, the liberalization of interest rates, regulations strengthening bank’s
capital bases as well as opening up to foreign competition in order to reduce
the role of state-owned banks, introduce new know-how and expertise as well as
recapitalize the banking sector. In addition, technological innovation has been
an important driving force for expanding access to finance and introducing new
sources of competition which have changed the landscape of traditional banking
and have facilitated the reform process.
These reforms raise a number of questions regarding the structure of the bank-
ing system, its competitiveness, the availability and quality of financial services
provided to firms and households and ultimately the economic development. De-
spite the potentially beneficial role that these reforms are intended to play, they
also introduce new challenges for regulators and supervisors to guard against
fragilities and risks that consumers might be exposed to. Arguments in favour
include the transformation of poorly performing state-influenced banks into well-
capitalized banks, with new risk management procedures able to price risks more
realistically, allocate funds more efficiently, that make use of new technologies
to offer their services and operating in a competitive environment with an im-
proved regulatory framework. Arguments against point to the new challenges
that may arise from increased foreign bank presence, increased competition from
non-bank institutions and consolidations in the banking industry. In particular,
larger banks created as a result of consolidations and foreign-owned banks are
2
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often accused of cherry picking the best customers leaving unattended small and
medium size enterprises which require local knowledge and building personal re-
lationships. Furthermore, the large presence of foreign banks in these countries
makes them prone to imported fragilities from abroad posing the need for su-
pervisors and regulators from home and host countries to expand cooperation
and the information exchange as highlighted by the recent financial crisis. Fi-
nally, the advent of non-bank institutions (such as mobile phone operators) as
financial service providers has given rise to the issue of whether to regulate them
under banking laws and regulations to ensure that the schemes present little risk
to customers and are trustworthy or to offer a more supportive regulatory envi-
ronment in order not to put a heavy regulatory burden on initiatives aimed at
facilitating the provision of financial services to all market segments, including
those neglected by traditional banks.
Against this background, this thesis examines the impact of financial system
reforms in developing countries on the quality and availability of financial services
provided by their banking systems in order to provide policy recommendations for
the future. This is especially important for developing countries with bank-based
financial systems which have under-developed capital markets and rely mainly
on bank financing.
1.2 Research questions and motivation
The first question addresses the impact of foreign bank entry on the cost of finan-
cial intermediation as measured by net interest margins (NIMs). The motivation
for focusing on NIMs (measured as the difference between interest income and
interest expense over total earning assets) is the fact that this indicator is a com-
monly accepted measure of how costly bank intermediation services are for the
society. High NIMs are usually associated with inefficient allocation of resources
as they discourage savings with low returns on deposits and increase financing
costs for borrowers with high interest rates on loans. Given the evidence that fi-
nance is important for driving economic growth (Beck, Levine and Loayza (2000);
3
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Levine (1997)) and alleviating poverty (Levine (2005)) understanding whether
the reform process more specifically, the liberalisation of the banking sector has
achieved the intended effect of reducing the cost of financial intermediation is
important for identifying policy areas that have a first-order effect on creating a
legal and macroeconomic environment conducive to the efficient operation of the
banking sector.
We aim to answer the following questions: (i) Do foreign banks operate with
lower NIMs compared to domestic banks and has foreign bank entry lead to an
overall reduction of NIMs in host countries? (ii) Does the mode of foreign bank
entry (acquisition vs. greenfield entry) matter for NIMs? and (iii) Do home
country conditions such as parent bank NIM and the home country regulatory
environment impact the NIMs of foreign bank in host countries?
Theoretically the effects of foreign bank entry have been modelled as informa-
tion asymmetry problems between incumbent (domestic banks) and new entrants
(foreign banks). Domestic banks poses an incumbency advantage in terms of ac-
quiring information about existing borrowers, whereas foreign banks poses better
screening technology for evaluating the creditworthiness of new applicants. In
other words domestic banks are better at dealing with soft information, whereas
foreign banks have an advantage in processing hard information (Dell’Ariccia and
Marquez (2004); Detragiache, Tressel and Gupta (2008)). If foreign banks enter
through acquisition they inherit a customer base with all the related informa-
tion about them, which is not the case when entering via greenfield investment.
Claeys and Hainz (2014) argue that the incumbency (informational) advantage of
domestic banks is lower when entry is made via acquisition as these banks inherit
information about the existing customer base on top of the screening advantage
they possess. Domestic banks thus demand a higher interest rate to compen-
sate for this informational disadvantage, which allows foreign banks to demand
a higher interest rate as well. Thus, when entry is made via acquisition the com-
petition is less intense and the interest rates are higher compared to greenfield
investments. Van Tassel and Vishwasrao (2007) also imply that greenfield entry
leads to more competition and lower interest rates in host markets.
4
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Empirical studies have found mixed results. Some studies find that foreign bank
entry has contributed to a reduction of NIMs mainly due to increased bank com-
petition (Barajas, Steiner and Salazar (2000); Martinez Peria and Mody (2004))
while others find a positive association between foreign bank entry and bank mar-
gins due to market power and macroeconomic instability (Chirwa and Mlachila
(2004)). A third group of studies find no significant impact of foreign bank en-
try on bank margins (Beck and Hesse (2009); Brown, Maurer, Pak and Tynaev
(2009); Dabla-Norris and Floerkemeier (2007)) or a mixed impact depending on
the level of economic development of host countries (Claessens, Demirguc-Kunt
and Huizinga (2001); Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999)). In terms of modes of
foreign bank entry the empirical literature has generally found support for the hy-
pothesis predicting a lower interest margin of greenfield compared to acquisition
banks (Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2011); Martinez Peria and Mody (2004)).
These studies have generally treated foreign banks as a homogeneous group re-
gardless of the characteristics of their parent banks or home country conditions.
There is however evidence that foreign banks are sensitive to home country fac-
tors. Accounting for this heterogeneity is important for countries dealing with
majority foreign-owned banking sectors in order to guide regulatory reform in
this area. A number of papers have found that foreign bank lending reflects
conditions of parent banks in different macroeconomic environments. De Haas
and Van Lelyveld (2010) find that foreign banks with financially strong parents
expand their lending faster. The impact of home country conditions is even more
pronounced in crisis times. Peek and Rosengren (1997) show how the sharp de-
cline of Japanese stock prices was transmitted to the United States resulting in
a decline in lending by US branches of Japanese parent banks. Schnabl (2012)
uses the Russian crisis of 1998 as a negative liquidity shock and finds that after
the shock international banks reduce lending to Peruvian banks which in turn
reduce lending to Peruvian firms. Evidence from the 2007-2008 financial crisis
(Cetorelli and Goldberg (2011); De Haas and Van Horen (2013); Popov and Udell
(2012)) has also shown that foreign banks act as transmitters of their home coun-
try conditions. Furthermore, there is evidence that globally active banks have an
incentive to engage in regulatory arbitrage in order to maximize profits (Houston,
5
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Lin and Ma (2012); Ongena, Popov and Udell (2013)). The aim of this essay is
to provide evidence on the consequences of uneven regulation between home and
host countries for the behaviour of foreign banks in host countries.
The second essay examines how the institutional environment affects bank orga-
nizational hierarchy (i.e. centralized vs. decentralized organizational structures)
and how that in turn affects loan terms to SMEs. The motivation for focusing on
the determinants and consequences of bank organizational hierarchy is that the
level of decision-making authority impacts the amount and type of information
(hard versus soft) that enters the decision-making process and consequently the
type of borrowers served as well as the terms under which these borrowers obtain
financing. This has an impact on bank performance, its portfolio composition,
SME financing and ultimately on local economic development. The widespread
entry of foreign banks in developing countries has raised many concerns that
because of their complexity and large hierarchical distance between host coun-
try subsidiaries and home country headquarters, foreign banks cannot effectively
lend to small and opaque borrowers compared to domestic banks which are usu-
ally less hierarchical. The aim of this essay is to examine whether a certain type
of bank organizational structure is more prevalent in a particular institutional
environment and what the implications are for SME financing arrangements.
Theoretically, the hierarchical distance between information-collecting officers
and decision-making centres can change incentives for the production and use
of information and lead to worse credit outcomes. At the centre of all theo-
retical models is the idea that in more hierarchical organizations information
sharing between hierarchical layers becomes difficult. Two groups of theories
put forward different explanations. Incentive-based theories (Aghion and Tirole
(1997); Stein (2002)) emphasise the role of ex-ante incentives for the production
of information. In hierarchical (centralized) structures the incentives of lower
hierarchical levels to produce information are diminished as they have to trans-
fer this information to higher hierarchical levels for decision-making. Given that
they cannot utilize this information themselves and given the possibility that
their decision may be overruled (i.e. their information disregarded) by the prin-
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cipal, they have less incentive ex-ante to invest time and effort in producing it.
This is even more pronounced for soft information which is not directly verifiable
and not easily transferred between hierarchical layers. Communication cost the-
ories (Becker and Murphy (1992); Bolton and Dewatripont (1994); Crawford and
Sobel (1982); Dessein (2002); Radner (1993)) emphasise communication and co-
ordination costs between different hierarchical layers arising from the tendency of
informed agents to add noise and strategically manipulate the information which
can lead to suboptimal decisions if their objectives are sufficiently divergent from
those of the uninformed principal. Overall, these theories imply that in choosing
an organizational structure there is a trade-off between information and control.
Decentralized organizational structures utilize the information collected by lower
hierarchical layers however it entails a loss of control for the principal.
Empirically, studies directly testing these theories are scarce as it has been diffi-
cult to operationalize concepts such as hierarchical structure or authority. Stud-
ies have often used indirect measures of organizational hierarchy such as foreign
ownership, bank size or bank complexity. Studies using bank size as a measure
of organizational hierarchy (Berger, Miller, Petersen, Rajan and Stein (2005);
Berger and Udell (1996); Cole, Goldberg and White (2004); Strahan and Weston
(1998)) generally find that large banks tend to lend more to large firms with
good financial history and rely mainly on hard information when making their
loan approval decisions. Another strand of literature has used distance be it cul-
tural, geographical, organizational or institutional between banks and borrowers
to measure its impact on lending to different market segments. The intuition is
that more hierarchically organized banks such as foreign and large banks are more
distant from local information and are therefore at a disadvantage when lending
to small and opaque borrowers. Studies have generally found support for this pre-
diction showing that foreign banks tend to shy away from soft-information based
loans (De Haas, Ferreira and Taci (2010); Mian (2006); Popov and Udell (2012))
or target the same clientele as domestic banks but with transaction-based lending
technologies (Beck, Ioannidou and Schaefer (2014)). The bank-borrower closeness
becomes even more valuable during crisis times when information asymmetries
are more severe, as there is evidence that banks which had prior established re-
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lationships with borrowers continued to lend to SMEs during the recent financial
crisis (Beck, Degryse, De Haas and Van Horen (2014); De Haas and Van Horen
(2013)).
Few studies that use direct measures of bank organizational hierarchy rely either
on single country data, or use proprietary data from a single bank. Canales
and Nanda (2012) create direct measures of bank decentralization based on the
degree of autonomy that branch managers have over various lending decisions.
They find that decentralized banks give larger loans to soft-information (small)
firms. Other studies use bank proprietary data focusing on the direct allocation
of authority (Agarwal and Hauswald (2010); Liberti and Mian (2009); Qian,
Strahan and Yang (2015); Skrastins and Vig (2014)) and generally find that
higher hierarchical layers rely more on objective hard information and less on
subjective information. The aim of this essay is by using direct measures of bank
organizational hierarchy on a cross-country setting to investigate the role of the
institutional environment in shaping the organizational structure of banks and
the implications for small business lending.
The third essay focuses on a different aspect of financial sector developments,
namely the advent of M-Pesa - a financial innovation that allows users to trans-
fer money fast and at a low cost using simple short messaging service (SMS)
technology that has changed not only the way households manage their finances
but also the landscape of traditional banking. Specifically, we investigate the
impact of the competitive pressure induced by the advent of a non-bank entrant
on the performance and outreach of commercial banks. The focus on the ser-
vice provision of formal financial institutions is important as financial exclusion
(i.e. lack of access to traditional banking services) is considered an important
impediment to growth in developing countries ((see Schumpeter, 1912; King and
Levine, 1993; Levine, 1997)). At the micro level, access to basic savings and
credit services helps individuals smooth consumption and invest in productive
activities such as entrepreneurship and education. At the macro level, access to
finance is strongly predictive of future economic growth. Yet, barriers to basic
financial services exist, especially among the world’s poor. Market imperfections
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such as transaction costs, information asymmetries or an inadequate contractual
environment limit the supply of financial services and lead to involuntary ex-
cluded population segments. It is therefore not surprising that there have been
numerous policy efforts to expand outreach starting from microfinance lending,
state-led bank branch expansion programs, agency banking as well as the in-
troduction of new products and technological innovations that foster financial
inclusion. The aim of this paper is to assess whether one such innovation mobile
money had spill over effects in terms of encouraging commercial banks to become
more inclusive while remaining profitable in the process.
Theoretically the impact of competition on bank performance and outreach is
ambiguous. Theories predicting a negative relation between bank competition
and performance rely on general economic theory emphasising inefficiencies aris-
ing from market power. The structure-conduct-performance hypothesis (Bain
(1951)) predicts that higher concentration in the banking system lowers the cost
of collusion thereby allowing banks to earn above competitive profits. The ef-
ficient structure hypothesis (Demsetz (1973)) posits that it is the efficiency of
banks rather than their market share or concentration that explains their supe-
rior performance. On the other hand, the quiet life hypothesis (Hicks (1935))
posits that banks enjoy the advantages of market power by incurring inefficien-
cies rather than reaping monopolistic rents, implying a negative relation between
competition and bank performance. With regards to the relation between com-
petition and banking sector outreach the market power hypothesis (Klein (1971))
argues that market power is detrimental for consumer welfare as it allows banks
to charge a price above marginal costs and ration credit. Alternatively, the in-
formation hypothesis (Petersen and Rajan (1995)) posits that more competitive
banking sectors make it more difficult for banks to invest in relationship building
as the best customers have more options to opt out leaving the bank to bear
the initial cost of building the relationship, which leads in a reluctance to engage
with less transparent customers.
Empirical studies have found support for both views. Regarding bank perfor-
mance studies have found a positive relation between competition and bank per-
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formance (Berger and Hannan (1998); Delis and Tsionas (2009); Schaeck and
Cihak (2008)) supporting the quiet life hypothesis and the need to increase the
contestability of banking markets in order to improve bank efficiency. Others
have found a negative relation between competition and bank performance re-
jecting the quiet life hypothesis (Berger (1995); Koetter, Kolari and Spierdijk
(2012); Maudos and Fernandez de Guevara (2007)). With regards to access
to finance studies have found support for both the market power hypothesis
(Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (2004); Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Mar-
tinez Peria (2008); Love and Martinez Peria (2014)) and the information hy-
pothesis (Berlin and Mester (1999); Cetorelli and Gambera (2001); Petersen and
Rajan (1994)).
These studies mainly focus on developed country banking sectors which have
different specificities compared to developing countries. Developing countries
are plagued by information asymmetries, a weak institutional framework and
lack of basic infrastructure necessary for banking which calls for different solu-
tions to the financial exclusion problem. Moreover, all of these studies focus on
interbank competition as opposed to competition from non-traditional sources
such as telecommunication companies. Commercial banks have a roughly similar
business model in terms of customers they target and are therefore less likely to
push the access frontier towards less formally included population segments. The
aim of this paper is to examine whether the advent of M-Pesa as a new non-bank
entrant in the financial landscape of Kenya, has changed the way traditional com-
mercial banks operate. More specifically, we test whether banks more exposed
to the advent of M-Pesa (as measured by a bank-level exposure index) expanded
their outreach towards more opaque market segments, traditionally excluded by
commercial banks and whether they remained profitable in the process.
1.3 Data
The thesis makes use of different data sources starting from hand-collected bank
ownership data, proprietary bank-, firm- and household-level survey data, bank
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financial statement and branch penetration data as well as publically available
macroeconomic and regulatory indices. The first two essays focus on Emerging
Europe - a geographical area typically used when examining issues relating with
foreign bank entry. The focus on this geographical area is important for several
reasons: first, the asset share of foreign-owned banks in the region is among the
highest of any banking sector in the world; second, despite a large presence of
foreign-owned banks and banking sector reforms, although considerable progress
has been made, these countries still exhibit high costs of financial intermediation
and an inadequate credit supply to the SME sector which because of their opacity
and under-developed capital markets rely mainly on bank financing; third, recent
data-collection efforts in the region have made possible a thorough investigation
of the impact of different bank business models and ownership structures on the
availability and quality of financial services.
To address the questions posed in the first essay we collect time-varying bank
ownership data for 265 banks operating in nine South-east European countries:
Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montene-
gro, Romania and Serbia over the period 1995-2011. For each bank and for
each year we know whether the bank is foreign- or domestic-owned. For foreign
banks we know the mode of entry (greenfield vs. acquisition), the country of
origin as well as the name of the parent bank. Unlike Claessens and Van Horen
(2014), we define ownership and country of origin based on ultimate (indirect)
rather than immediate (direct) ownership. Identifying the ultimate ownership
is more time-consuming as it requires tracking the ownership chain all the way
up to the principal owner however it is a better representative of the ultimate
decision-making authority within a banking group. The ownership data is then
supplemented with financial statement data from BankScope, macroeconomic
data from the World Development Indicators database as well as banking regu-
lation and supervision variables from the indices compiled by Barth, Caprio and
Levine (2013) based on the Banking Regulation and Supervision Survey carried
out by the World Bank.
For the second essay we combine two main databases: bank-level data from
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the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance Survey (BEPS) II with firm-
level data from the fifth round of the EBRD-World Bank Business Environment
Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS). BEPS II was carried out by a team
of specialized consultants who administered a common questionnaire through a
face-to-face interview with the bank’s CEO across 32 countries in Eastern Eu-
rope, Central Asia and southern and eastern Mediterranean and a total of 611
banks. The main purpose of the survey is to provide information on bank lending
activities, funding and risk management strategies, bank lending technologies as
well as the competitive and regulatory environment. BEEPS is a joint initia-
tive of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World
Bank Group. The survey was first undertaken in 1999-2000 and subsequently
in 2002, 2005, 2008-2009 and the most recent fifth round used in our analyses
in 2011-2013. The fifth round of the survey (BEEPS V) covered around 15,600
enterprises in 30 countries. The main purpose of the survey is to provide in-
formation on the extent to which different aspects of the business environment
represent obstacles to firm growth. In addition the survey provides detailed in-
formation on firm characteristics and their financing arrangements. These data
are supplemented with bank ownership information, bank financial statement in-
formation from BankScope, regulatory and macroeconomic indicators from the
Doing Business, Worldwide Governance Indicators and the World Development
Indicators database.
The third essay focuses on Kenya - a country which has been at the forefront of
efforts to expand access to finance. The focus on Kenya is important for several
reasons. First, the Kenyan financial landscape witnessed a financial innovation
the money transfer platform M-Pesa - that has drawn global attention and has
had transformative effects on the way households manage their finances as well
as on the service provision of the formal financial sector. Second, as in many
developing countries despite efforts to increase financial inclusion and financial
sector development, the number of households who are excluded from even the
basic financial services remain high, albeit declining. Third, the data collection
effort of the Financial Sector Deepening Trust of Kenya (FSD Kenya) in 2006,
2009 and 2013 provides detailed household-level survey data on access and usage
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of financial services by product type and institution type before and after the
advent of M-Pesa, which, together with bank financial and branch penetration
data allows us to provide micro-evidence that can inform policy debates on ways
to promote financial inclusion.
1.4 Main findings and contributions
The first essay examines the impact of foreign bank entry on NIMs taking into ac-
count both home and host country factors. We find that during the first years of
banking sector liberalization foreign banks operate with lower NIMs compared to
domestic banks, whereas at more advanced stages of reform this difference weak-
ens and foreign banks start operating with higher NIMs. This effect is stronger for
foreign greenfield banks as they have an efficiency advantage compared to foreign
acquisition banks which may inherit low quality loan portfolio or an inefficient
organizational structure. Furthermore greenfield banks have an informational
disadvantage as they lack proprietary customer information which gives them an
incentive to target the most transparent segments of the market which by being
more competitive provide lower NIMs. Greenfield banks may later tilt their port-
folio composition towards more opaque market segments as they operate longer
in the market and acquire more proprietary information, hence their higher NIM
during the second sample period. Finally, when incorporating home-country fac-
tors into the analysis we find that foreign banks coming from home countries
with stricter regulation on bank activities and capital requirements operate with
higher NIMs in host countries compared to their domestic counterparts. This is
consistent with the idea that foreign banks compensate for the more limited profit
opportunities at home by operating with higher NIMs abroad. These results con-
tribute to the foreign bank entry literature: first, we exploit the heterogeneity of
foreign banks due to their home country conditions and find that stricter home
country regulation has a strong positive association with foreign bank NIMs in
host countries; second, we make use of the newly collected time-varying panel
dataset of bank ownership allowing us to explore the dynamics of foreign banks’
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NIMs and the time span required for the change of ownership to affect bank
NIMs and find that foreign banks change their behaviour during different stages
of financial sector reforms. The results also contribute to the multinational bank
profitability literature by showing that the cost of financial intermediation in host
countries is a function of both domestic and multinational factors.
The second essay examines the impact of the institutional environment on the
level of decentralization of bank lending activities and its impact on SME loan
contracts. We find that a strong institutional environment favours a decentralized
organizational structure. The results confirm the hypothesis that strong insti-
tutions reduce information asymmetries and make monitoring lower hierarchical
levels easier thereby lowering both the within bank and the bank-borrower dis-
tance. Strong institutional environments (as measured by the quality of contract
enforcement, availability of credit information and the efficiency of the bank-
ing regulator) which favour decentralized organizational structures lead to better
lending terms for SMEs decentralized banks are less likely to require collateral,
give longer maturity loans and charge lower interest rates than their centralized
counterparts. The results contribute to the literature on organizational structure
and information production in two ways: first, by introducing a new and di-
rect measure of bank organizational hierarchy. Studies using bank size or foreign
ownership as a proxy, implicitly assume that banks have a homogeneous organiza-
tional structure across all market segments i.e. SME, retail and large corporates,
masking important differences on the intensity of information required for differ-
ent market segments, hence the appropriate level of decision-making authority;
and second, by showing, for the first time in the literature across a large sample
of countries that cross-country differences in the institutional environment have
a significant impact on bank organizational hierarchies. The results also add to
the law and finance literature by revealing a channel through which law impacts
lending, namely, the hierarchy of bank lending decisions.
The third essay examines the impact of the competition induced by a non-bank
entrant on the service provision of formal financial institutions. We find that
banks more exposed to the advent of M-Pesa tilted their portfolio composition to-
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wards more opaque market segments i.e. households with no permanent dwelling
and lower asset holdings. We also show that they remained profitable in the
process - a higher exposure index is positively associated with bank ROA and
negatively related with their overhead costs. Overall, these results support the-
ories predicting a positive relation between competition and bank performance
and outreach. The results advance the competition-access to finance literature
in several ways: first, to the best of our knowledge we are the first to link the
advent of M-Pesa to the service provision of formal financial institutions. Pre-
vious studies have investigated the impact of M-Pesa on household welfare or
firm performance but evidence on the impact on commercial banks is lacking.
There are also studies looking at the impact of interbank competition on bank
performance and firm access to finance, whereas the focus here is on the com-
petitive pressure induced by a non-bank entrant and the household rather than
the firm market segment; second, the focus on a single country Kenya, home to
the financial innovation which has drawn global attention and has later spread
to many other developing countries is important as it allows us to abstract from
regulatory and institutional heterogeneity and focus on the effect of local market
competition only; third, we have detailed data at the county level allowing us
to provide micro-evidence on the impact of competition on financial inclusion.
Studies using aggregate measures of outreach might mask important variation in
access and use of financial services at the local level.
1.5 Conclusion
Overall, the thesis presents new evidence on the impact of financial sector reforms
on the availability and quality of financial services in developing economies. Be-
sides the academic contribution the results presented in this thesis have policy
implications by advancing our knowledge on ways to make the financial system
more inclusive and affordable for all market segments. We show that foreign bank
entry which was regarded as one of the necessary steps to introduce fresh cap-
ital and know-how to the post-transition banking systems had a heterogeneous
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impact on the cost and the availability of credit in host countries depending on
the home country regulatory environment and the business model (i.e. central-
ized vs. decentralized organizational structures) adopted by commercial banks.
Countries dealing with majority foreign-owned banking sectors should consider
the origin of foreign banks as well as the business model they operate with so
as to design supportive policies and create a regulatory environment that pro-
motes financial intermediation. Furthermore, this research shows that banking
sector competition need not come from traditional commercial banks only, rather
competition from non-bank entrants can be as effective if not more effective in
expanding access to basic financial services to a wide spectrum of the population
including the lower end of the market.
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. The next chapter presents
the first essay on the impact of foreign bank entry on host country net interest
margins. The third chapter presents the second essay on the impact of the insti-
tutional environment on bank organizational hierarchy. The third essay on the
impact of the competition induced by the advent of a mobile money innovation
on the performance and outreach of commercial banks is presented in chapter
four. Chapter five summarizes the main findings and contributions of the thesis,
gives policy implications of the results and suggests areas for future research.
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Foreign bank entry and net
interest margins: evidence from
Southeast Europe
2.1 Introduction
In this paper, we investigate the impact of foreign bank entry on the cost of
financial intermediation in domestic (host) markets. We focus on the net interest
margin (NIM) as a high differential between deposit and lending interest rates
is commonly associated with decreased credit availability and inefficient finan-
cial intermediation.1 High NIMs may hinder the efficient allocation of resources
and reduce the effectiveness with which the financial system channels funds from
borrowers to lenders, more so for emerging economies with under-developed cap-
ital markets that rely mostly on bank financing. This may in turn slow down
economic growth as there is ample evidence about the importance of finance for
economic development (Levine (1997, 2005)). The literature has associated high
1NIM is a measure of the ex post (realized) bank interest spread. The ex ante spread would
be the difference between the contractual rates charged on loans and rates paid on deposits.
The ex post spreads, or margins, are the actually received interest revenue minus the interest
costs on deposits. Margins are usually lower than spreads because of the lost interest on non-
performing loans. Data about ex ante rates is less readily available and if it is, it comes from
different sources (i.e. not comparable) and at the aggregate level, therefore the use of ex post
spreads is preferred (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999)).
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NIMs with inefficient banks exploiting dominant positions in their host markets,
as well as an inefficient regulatory environment (Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga
(1999); Demirguc-Kunt, Laeven and Levine (2004)). In this context, the entry
of foreign banks becomes relevant, although their role in domestic economies re-
mains controversial. Arguments in favour rely on the premise that foreign bank
entry may improve access to international capital markets; enhance the availabil-
ity and quality of financial services by increasing competition and transferring
of know-how and expertise (Bruno and Hauswald (2014)). In addition, foreign
banks’ presence may improve the regulatory framework, overall financial system
development and economic growth. Arguments against posit that foreign bank
entry may facilitate capital outflows; foreign banks may service only the most
profitable market segments and increase banking system fragility (Giannetti and
Ongena (2009); Gormley (2010)). Although the impact of increased foreign pres-
ence is controversial in the academic literature, one key step of many emerging
markets’ reform process involves the privatization of state-owned banks and the
opening of the financial sector to foreign investors. The rapid expansion of for-
eign bank presence in recent years has raised many questions about the costs and
benefits of this process for domestic banks, borrowers and governments. This
process has been even more remarkable in transition economies. The proportion
of assets owned by foreign banks increased from virtually zero in the early 1990s
to 73.5 % in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and 84.7 % in South East Eu-
rope (SEE).2 This can be attributed to two related phenomena. First, the desire
of these transition countries to qualify for EU membership was a strong catalyst
for reform and improvements in bank regulation and supervision. Second, the
prospects of EU membership, made these under-banked markets attractive to
foreign investors.
Despite the growing trend among transition economies to allow greater foreign
2CEE countries are: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia.
These countries became EU member states in 2004 (Fourth Enlargement, Part 1). SEE coun-
tries are: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro,
Romania and Serbia. Bulgaria and Romania became EU member states in 2007 (Fourth En-
largement, Part 2), whereas Croatia joined the EU in 2013. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina
and Kosovo have applied for EU membership; Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are official
candidate countries.
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bank entry, the question of whether this process lead to an overall reduction
of NIMs in domestic markets remains controversial. In this paper we study
the impact of foreign bank entry on the cost of financial intermediation in SEE
countries (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia,
Montenegro, Romania and Serbia). SEE countries experienced considerable po-
litical, economic and financial sector reforms over the past two decades as they
moved from centrally planned to market oriented economies. A particularly dif-
ficult aspect of the transition process was the transformation of their banking
systems. After more than two decades of reforms, although considerable progress
has been made, SEE countries are still lagging behind Western European coun-
tries. The SEE banking system is small, both in absolute terms and in relation
to its GDP. The average credit to GDP ratio in 2011 amounted to 63% in SEE,
compared to 168% in the EU-15 countries.3 Furthermore, SEE has an even lower
intermediation in the private sector: the average private sector credit to GDP
ratio in 2011 was 54% compared to 152% in the EU-15 countries. In addition,
the SEE banking sector has high liquidity and capitalization ratios, while the
level of non-performing loans has often been a cause of concern. In terms of
market structure, the number of banks operating in the SEE banking sector is
large compared to its size. As of 2011, there were 217 banks operating in SEE
countries. The total number of banks has however declined over the years and
the sector is moderately concentrated.4 Notwithstanding the successful reforms5,
and the substantial presence of foreign banks, the region is characterised by very
high NIMs. Average NIMs over the period 1998-2008 amounted to 6.75% in SEE,
compared to 6.17% in Latin America, 4.01% in Central and Eastern Europe and
to 3.84% in the EU-15.6 This empirical observation motivates us to examine the
3The EU-15 refers to the number of member countries in the European Union prior to
the accession of ten countries on 1 May 2004. The EU-15 is still used to define the ’old’ EU
member states and comprises the following countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden,
United Kingdom.
4A detailed overview of the SEE banking sector is provided by Bonin, Hasan and Wachtel
(2009).
5The EBRD index of banking sector reform shows that most SEE countries have a score
of 3, which indicates substantial progress in liberalizing interest rates and allocating credit
to private enterprises, privatizing the banking sector, establishing of bank solvency and of a
framework for bank supervision and regulation.
6Figures from BankScope.
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impact of foreign bank entry of NIMs in SEE. In particular, we aim to answer
the following questions: (i) Do foreign banks operate with lower NIMs compared
to domestic banks? (ii) Has foreign bank entry lead to an overall reduction of
NIMs in domestic markets? (iii) Does the mode of foreign bank entry matter?
and (iv) Do home country conditions matter?
To answer these questions we collect detailed information on bank ownership for
265 banks operating in nine SEE countries over the period 1995-2011. The SEE
region presents a considerable degree of heterogeneity in terms of progress towards
EU membership: Bulgaria and Romania became EU member states in 2007;
Croatia joined the EU in 2013. Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo have
applied for EU membership while Macedonia, Montenegro and Serbia are official
candidate countries. These differences should allow us to tease out the variation
in NIMs associated with differences in home-country regulatory environments. In
addition, this data set is particularly suited to investigate the impact of foreign
bank entry for several reasons. First, the banking sector of the SEE area has
attracted among the highest foreign bank presence in the world (on average,
across the region, around 80 per cent of bank assets is foreign owned). Second,
we hand-collected ownership information for all banks in the sample, and for
foreign banks we also collected information about the mode of entry, the country
of origin and the name of the parent bank. This allowed us to match the home
and host country characteristics, as well as parent bank and foreign affiliate
characteristics to analyze which entry modes (acquisition vs. greenfield) and
which home country characteristics impact the relation between foreign bank
ownership and NIMs in host countries. This latter information is supplemented
with balance sheet and income statement data from BankScope, making it one of
the most comprehensive data sets of bank ownership for the sample of SEE banks.
Accounting for these differences will allow us to more precisely disentangle the
relationship between foreign bank ownership and NIMs in host countries. Third,
the long sample period allows us to exploit the time-series dimension of foreign
bank entry, by focusing on the evolution of NIMs in two different periods: the
first one characterized by the rapid expansion of foreign bank presence and the
second one with a banking sector almost saturated in terms of foreign bank entry
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with a high percentage of banking assets owned by foreign banks. Finally, the
high degree of heterogeneity in the country origin of foreign banks allows us to
identify if home country conditions influence foreign bank NIMs. Specifically, we
collect information of the regulatory and supervisory standards in the home and
host countries, as there is evidence that these influence the behaviour of foreign
banks.
Our results show that foreign banks’ behaviour changes over time. When for-
eign banks enter a host country, they initially do so with lower NIMs compared
to their domestic counterparts. However, as they become more established and
the foreign presence in a host country increases, so do foreign bank NIMs. As a
consequence, over time, we do not find evidence of foreign bank entry having a
beneficial effect for host countries in terms of reducing the cost of financial inter-
mediation. These results are consistent with the analysis of the mode of entry:
up to 2004 foreign banks entered the SEE market via greenfield investment, after
which acquiring existing banks became more common. We find that while entry
both via acquisitions and greenfield is associated with foreign banks operating
with significantly lower NIMs than domestic banks in the first part of the sample
period, only entry via greenfield remains significant in the second part of the sam-
ple period. However, the relation with NIMs becomes positive, indicating a shift
towards higher margin lending, possibly to SMEs. We also find evidence that
foreign banks from countries with more restrictions on bank activities and own-
ership that limit diversification opportunities have higher NIMs in host countries
compared to domestic banks. This might indicate possible regulatory arbitrage,
as bank seek profit opportunities to compensate forgone profits and higher reg-
ulatory costs at home. This is particularly relevant in emerging markets, as the
process of financial liberalization often (but not always) implies a more lenient
regulatory structure. However, we also find evidence of regulatory spillovers:
stricter supervisory standards at home, possibly extending to the supervision of
foreign subsidiaries, seem to translate into lower NIMs in host countries. This
may suggest that stronger home country supervision can limit risk-taking abroad
if foreign banks are supervised by authorities in the country of origin.
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Our analysis contributes to the literature along different directions. First, we
exploit the heterogeneity of foreign bank entry and home country conditions, to
investigate whether this impacts NIMs in host countries. Second, by using the
newly hand-collected panel data set of bank ownership we are able to explore the
dynamics of foreign banks’ NIMs over a relatively long transition period, encom-
passing relevant regulatory changes, as well as changes in market structure and
industry characteristics. Our paper also adds to the strand of the literature on
multinational bank profitability by analyzing the cost of financial intermediation
in host countries as a function of both domestic and multinational factors. Fi-
nally, our study also relates to the strand of literature on the impact of distance
on bank activities, such as loan rationing (Petersen and Rajan (2002)), lend-
ing constraints (Mian (2006)), and loan rates (Degryse and Ongena (2005)) by
considering the impact of geographical and institutional distance between home
and host countries. More generally, we contribute to the debate of weather the
rapid expansion of foreign banks has been beneficial for host countries in terms
of reducing the cost of financial intermediation and generating economic growth.
In addition, we contribute to the debate on EU integration, by investigating pos-
sible cross-border spillover effects of bank regulation through the behaviour of
foreign banks in host countries. A successful EU integration will depend on the
degree to which reforms have contributed to a sound financial sector which will
in turn fund a sustainable growth and ensure economic convergence. The general
framework for evaluating the success of financial sector reforms in SEE, more
specifically the liberalization of the banking sector to foreign entry, relies largely
on the evaluation of the impact this process has had on reducing the gap between
the economic development of EU and new or potential EU member states.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 reviews the relevant
literature. Section 2.3 describes the data and the methodology. Section 2.4
presents the results. Section 2.5 shows several robustness tests. Finally, Section
2.6 concludes.
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2.2 Literature Review
Studies analyzing the determinants of bank NIMs date back to the pioneering
work of Ho and Saunders (1981). In their model they view the bank as a risk-
averse dealer that faces uncertainty regarding the flow of deposits and loans.
The bank will demand a positive interest spread for providing immediacy of ser-
vices in the face of this uncertainty. The model shows that the optimal interest
spread is a function of: the degree of bank risk-aversion, the average transaction
size, the degree of competition in the market and the variance of interest rates.
Subsequent work has extended their analysis in several ways. In McShane and
Sharpe (1985) the source of interest rate risk is situated in the uncertainty of
the money market. Allen (1988) allows for different types of credits and deposits
and shows that pure interest margins may be reduced as a result of diversifica-
tion of bank services and products. Angbazo (1997) in addition to interest rate
risk includes default risk and investigates whether risks are heterogeneous across
banks of different size. Starting from these models several studies have empiri-
cally investigated NIM determinants including different countries, time periods
and different explanatory variables. However, only recently has research focused
on the impact of foreign bank entry on NIMs. As foreign bank entry has been
more pronounced in emerging economies, such studies have mostly focused on
these countries.
Theoretically, the relation between foreign bank entry and NIMs in host countries
has been modelled as an information asymmetry problem between incumbent
(domestic banks) and new entrants (foreign banks). Incumbent banks have better
soft information, while foreign banks are better at processing hard information
(Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004)). The main channels through which foreign
bank entry influences interest margins in host countries are the spillover channel
and the competition channel (Goldberg (2007); Lehner and Schnitzer (2008)).
The spillover effect results from the transfer of better screening technology, better
utilization of resources and know-how from foreign to domestic banks. This will
decrease the cost of financial intermediation (NIMs). The competition channel
results from an increase in the number of banks in the domestic banking market
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as a result of opening up the market to foreign entry. Foreign bank entry will
increase the number of banks if it is done via greenfield investments as opposed to
foreign acquisition and will lower NIMs more strongly (Claeys and Hainz (2014)).
This literature identifies the following testable prediction.
H1: Foreign bank entry lowers NIMs in host countries.
Studies that empirically investigate this issue find mixed results. For Latin Amer-
ican countries, Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find that foreign banks are able
to charge lower spreads than domestic banks, however, they do not find consistent
evidence regarding the direct impact of foreign bank participation on domestic
bank spreads. For CEE countries, Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008) find that
foreign bank entry has contributed to the reduction of interest margins. Other
studies have found a less favourable effect of foreign bank entry for NIMs in host
countries. Claessens et al. (2001) using bank-level data from 80 countries find
that foreign banks in developed countries have lower interest margins than domes-
tic banks, whereas the opposite is true for foreign banks in developing countries.
Similarly, Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga (1999) find that foreign ownership is as-
sociated with higher interest margins, especially in developing countries. These
mixed empirical results can be due either to different sample periods correspond-
ing to different stages of foreign bank entry, different control variables or to
treating foreign banks as a homogeneous group. The importance of treating for-
eign banks as a heterogeneous group has been highlighted by a number of studies
investigating the modes of foreign bank entry (Claeys and Hainz (2014); Degryse,
Havrylchyk, Jurzyk and Kozak (2012)) and the behaviour of foreign banks as a
function of both domestic and multinational factors (Claessens and Van Horen
(2012); Williams (2003)). Accounting for this heterogeneity will allow us to more
precisely disentangle the relationship between foreign bank ownership and NIMs
in host countries.
Theory suggests that the behaviour of foreign banks in host countries depends
on whether banks enter domestic markets via greenfield investment or by ac-
quiring existing domestic banks. Banks entering by acquiring existing domestic
institutions may inherit inefficient organizational structures and a low quality
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loan portfolio, but they also obtain information on existing customers and bank
personnel. Greenfield banks have higher efficiency advantage and higher infor-
mational disadvantage compared to domestic banks and banks entering via ac-
quisition (Degryse et al. (2012)). The ultimate impact on host market NIMs
will depend on which effect dominates the other. Martinez Peria and Mody
(2004) find that greenfield banks were able to charge lower spreads compared to
banks that entered through acquisition. Havrylchyk and Jurzyk (2011) find that
greenfield banks have higher profitability relative to other banks, but this higher
profitability stems from lower costs rather than from higher interest margins.
This literature identifies the following testable prediction:
H2: The mode of foreign bank entry (acquisition vs. greenfield) has a significant
impact on foreign bank NIMs.
Another source of foreign bank heterogeneity comes from the country of origin
of the foreign bank. Based on the multinational bank profitability literature, we
use two groups of home country factors: parent bank NIMs and home country
regulatory conditions.The relation between parent bank profits and profits in the
host country can be ambiguous. Williams (2003) argues that more profitable
parent banks can devote more resources to foreign subsidiaries and they do so
only if they expect to earn a higher return than they would in the home country.
Furthermore, a more profitable parent bank signals a more stable foreign bank
in the eyes of depositors resulting in a lower cost of deposited funds. Therefore
a positive association between parent bank profitability and the profitability of
their affiliates abroad is expected. Alternatively, parent banks operating in com-
petitive home countries where the opportunity for high bank margins is low, may
be willing to invest resources in foreign subsidiaries where higher profit margins
are expected to compensate for the low margins at home. This would yield a
negative relation between parent bank profitability and the profitability of the
host nation affiliate. Kosmidou, Pasiouras and Tsaklanganos (2007) find that
the profitability of the parent bank has a robust and positive impact on the prof-
its of Greek banks abroad. Williams (2003) on the other hand, does not find
support for the hypothesis that parent NIM is positively related to Australian
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bank profits. Finally, Chen and Liao (2011) find that foreign banks are more
profitable than domestic banks when the parent bank in the home country is
highly profitable.
H3: Parent bank NIMs have a significant impact on foreign bank NIMs in host
countries.
The second group of factors relate to home country regulatory conditions. A
number of studies have shown that the performance of foreign banks depends
on the characteristics of their home countries. Berger, DeYoung, Genay and
Udell (2000) find that the relative cost and profit efficiency of foreign vs. do-
mestic banks depends on home and host country conditions. They test two
main hypotheses: the global advantage hypothesis and the home field advan-
tage hypothesis and find support for the limited form of the global advantage
hypothesis. According to this hypothesis only efficient institutions from home
countries with certain favourable market or regulatory conditions can operate
more efficiently than their domestic counterparts. These favourable home coun-
try conditions may include a more competitive home market forcing banks to use
more advanced technologies, an active market for corporate control that prevents
investments abroad that reduce shareholder value, access to an educated labour
force able to employ new technologies and risk management techniques. Further-
more, home countries with favourable regulatory or supervisory conditions may
be able to enjoy stronger safety net guarantees that will allow them to make high
risk-high return investments. Alternatively, home countries with relatively tough
supervision or regulation may give their banks operating abroad an advantage
by certifying their quality or reducing counterparty risk. Lensink, Meesters and
Naaborg (2008) find that on average foreign banks are less cost efficient than do-
mestic banks. However, taking home country conditions into account they find
that higher quality of the institutions in the home country reduce foreign bank
inefficiency. Claessens and Van Horen (2012) find that foreign banks in develop-
ing countries tend to perform better when from a high income country and when
regulation in the host country is relatively weak. Furthermore, they find that for-
eign banks from home countries with similar regulation and the same language as
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the host country perform better. These studies focus either on bank profitability
or efficiency and do not explicitly account for the cost of financial intermedia-
tion in host countries. A recent paper by Ongena et al. (2013) finds that bank
regulation is associated with cross-border spillover effects through the lending
(risk-taking) behaviour of multinational banks. The question we are interested is
whether regulation at home affects bank NIMs abroad. The proposition we test
is the following:
H4: Home country regulatory and supervisory conditions have a significant im-
pact on foreign bank NIMs in host countries.
2.3 Data and Methodology
In this section we illustrate our data sources and provide a discussion of our
dataset.
2.3.1 Foreign banks in SEE countries
As we wish to determine the impact of foreign bank entry on NIMs in SEE coun-
tries, we start by building a database of commercial banks operating in Albania,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, Roma-
nia and Serbia over the period 1995-2011. We include all commercial banks active
in at least one year over the period 1995-2011 in one of the nine SEE countries.
We exclude savings houses, microcredit organisations, entities established by the
government for the purpose of promoting the development of the economy (such
as for e.g. the Croatian Bank for Reconstruction and Development). The final
sample consists of a total of 265 banks, divided by countries as follows: Albania
(14 banks); Bosnia-Herzegovina (33 banks); Bulgaria (34 banks); Croatia (59
banks); Kosovo (7 banks); Macedonia (21 banks); Montenegro (12 banks); Ro-
mania (42 banks) and Serbia (43 banks). The 2515 bank-year observations over
the sample period 1995-2011 are shown by year in Table 2.2. The total number of
banks has steadily increased up to 2003 after which the number remains stable or
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declines. This is consistent with the fact that the dominant form of foreign bank
entry up to 2004 was via greenfield investment, after which acquiring existing
banks became more popular.7
The next step required coding bank ownership. To this end, we examined each
bank individually, for each year it was active over the sample period. Sometimes
more than one data source had to be used for tracking the ownership of a single
bank. The starting point was the Bankscope database, which provides ownership
history at each closing date for a certain number of banks and years (usually
the most recent years). For banks and years where this information was not
available other sources were used, including individual banks’ annual reports and
websites, central banks’ publications, parent banks’ websites and reports as well
as databases such as Zephyr and Factiva for information on bank mergers and
acquisitions. Following the standard practice in the literature, a bank is coded
as foreign (fb) if 50% or more of its shares are owned by foreigners (Claessens
et al. (2001)).
We also identify the country of origin as follows: if a bank is foreign owned (as
defined above), the nationality of the foreign shareholder with the highest per-
centage ownership is used as the country of origin. This foreign shareholder can
be the largest shareholder of the whole company or the largest shareholder among
foreign shareholders only. In both cases its nationality is used as the country of
origin of the bank. Unlike Claessens and Van Horen (2014), we define ownership
and country of origin based on ultimate (indirect) rather than immediate (direct)
ownership. For example, if a bank in Bulgaria is 70% foreign owned (30% do-
mestic), of which 20% is owned by an Italian subsidiary in Austria as the largest
foreign shareholder, the bank will be coded as foreign with Italy as the country
of origin. This is so, despite the fact that the percentage share ultimately owned
by Italian shareholders (20%) is lower than domestic ownership (30%).
Foreign banks are further categorised by mode of entry: banks that entered the
7Appendix 2C shows the number of banks and total assets. This information is provided
by the respective central banks. The coverage ratios vary by countries and years, however, on
average Bankscope provides about 85% coverage of the SEE banking system, which allows us
to make valid inferences about the region
28
2.3. Data and Methodology
host country by acquiring existing banks (fb acq) versus those that entered via
greenfield investment (fb green). Finally, for each foreign bank the name of the
parent bank is recorded.
Of the 2515 bank-year observations in our sample, 1289 observations (51.25%)
are foreign banks. The number of foreign banks has rapidly increased over the
years, as has the share of the foreign banks in the total banking assets. Foreign
bank share (foreignshare) increased from 6.34% in 1997 to 81.6% in 2011. The
most rapid increase in foreign bank share occurred up to 2004, after which foreign
bank participation in the domestic banking sector of the countries under analysis
levelled off at a high level (around 80%). This gives us an interesting opportunity
to investigate the behaviour of foreign banks in two financial sector environments,
one in which financial liberalization is at its infancy and foreign bank presence is
limited but increasing rapidly, and the other in which foreign bank presence has
become predominant.8
2.3.2 Net Interest Margins in SEE countries
Our main variables of interest are the bank NIMs, measured as the ex post (real-
ized) bank interest spread (the difference between the contractual rates charged
on loans and rates paid on deposits, net of the lost interest on non-performing
loans). Bank specific information (balance sheet and income statement data) are
from Bankscope.9
Table 2.3 shows average values of NIMs over time, average net interest margins
are reported for all banks, and separately for foreign and domestic banks. Look-
ing at the whole SEE region, NIMs remain persistently high until recent years.
The average bank NIM was 6.2% for the period 1995-2011; the average NIM of
foreign banks was 5.47% and that of domestic banks, 6.91%. While foreign bank
8In addition to relying on the visual inspection of the time series plots to detect the change
in the trend of the foreign bank presence we conduct a more formal structural break test based
on the modified Chow test. As anticipated we find that the break date occurs in 2004. The
details of the Chow test are given in Appendix 2A.
9To avoid double counting bank financial information unconsolidated statements are used.
When unconsolidated statements were not available consolidated ones were used, whereas for
parent banks financial information is taken from their consolidated statements.
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NIMs were substantially lower than domestic banks in the 1990s and early 2000s,
these difference reduce from 2005 onwards, possibly indicating greater market
integration and a shift in the activities of foreign banks.
Overall, SEE bank profitability has been low over the sample period, with Mon-
tenegro and Serbia displaying negative average Return on Asset values (net in-
come over total earning assets). NIMs were the main components of banks’ net
income, more so for domestic banks than for foreign banks, as illustrated in Table
2.4, with the region average equalling 6.2%. Country differences are apparent:
Serbia has the highest level of bank NIMs with an average of 8.2%, followed by
Romania with 7.6%. Albania, on the other hand, has the lowest average NIM,
3.7%, followed by Croatia with 4.8%. Serbian banks not only have the highest
spreads, both for interest and non-interest income, but also have high overhead
costs and loan loss provisions, indicating an inefficient banking system, with high
margins, high costs and low asset quality.
Looking at the difference between domestic and foreign banks in terms of income
composition, on average, foreign banks have lower NIMs and lower overhead costs
and loan loss provisions. However, foreign banks are also on average less profitable
than domestic banks. This is in line with the finding of Claessens et al. (2001),
who argue that foreign banks may be willing to accept a lower profitability to
the extent that their cost of capital is lower compared to that of domestic banks
or to the extent that they can benefit from a foreign tax credit.
Next, we look more closely at which banks have entered the SEE market over
the sample period and match them with their respective host countries.10 Fig-
ure 2.1 shows the map of home and host countries: the SEE banking sector is
mainly owned by banks from EU countries, Turkey and the United States. These
countries of origin represent different levels of economic development, regulatory
environments and geographical and cultural proximity to host countries. This
heterogeneity may imply different incentives for the behaviour of foreign banks
in host countries.
10Although foreign banks originate from a number of different countries, in this part of the
analysis we consider only home countries whose banks are present in two or more countries in
the SEE region.
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Table 2.5, Panel A illustrates the number of banks which have entered each of
the SEE countries (foreign banks) and the respective countries of origin (home
countries). It also shows the average differences in NIM between the parent bank
(in the home country) and the foreign bank (the subsidiary in the host country)
as well as average differences between home and host country NIMs. Table 2.5,
Panel B shows the number of foreign subsidiaries each home country has set up
during the sample period and in how many different host countries in the SEE
region. It also shows the average differences in NIM between the parent bank (in
the home country) and the foreign subsidiaries (in the different host countries)
as well as average differences between NIM at the country level.
Looking at the number of entries, Bulgaria, Croatia and Romania have attracted
the highest number of foreign banks from a larger number of countries. This is
in line with the fact that these three countries have become EU member states
during the sample period. At the country level, the average NIM in Albania is
only marginally higher than the average NIM in the home countries (+0.35%). In
all other SEE countries, the average NIM is higher than in the countries of origin,
with Kosovo, Romania and Serbia having the highest differences. Similarly, at
the bank level (that is the difference in NIMs between the parent bank and the
foreign subsidiaries), foreign banks going to Albania do not charge substantially
higher NIMs than they would in their home countries (+0.74% on average).
Foreign banks going to Kosovo, Romania and Serbia, on the other hand, charge
NIMs much higher than they do in their home countries. In the remaining SEE
countries, foreign banks NIMs are, on average, between 1-3 percentage points
higher than those of their parent bank.
Looking at foreign expansion from the countries of origin, we notice that Austrian
and Italian banks have been the most active in the SEE region, closely followed by
Germany and Greece. Not only banks originating from these countries have set
up the highest number of subsidiaries in the region, but they have also expanded
in a large number of countries. For example, Austrian banks are present in all
the nine countries in our sample. This might be explained by geographical and
cultural proximity and close trade relations.
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When we consider differences in NIMs at the country level, in all countries of
origin (except from Turkey) the NIMs are lower than the average in the SEE
countries. In Turkey, the average NIM is 2.78% higher than in the SEE countries
where Turkish banks are present. This might be explained by country specific
conditions, whereby the Turkish banking sector is more inefficient, in terms of
NIMs, than the SEE countries. This is also reflected in the fact that Turkish sub-
sidiaries abroad have substantially lower NIMs than their parent banks (-1.30%).
In addition, Hungarian banks have lower NIMs in SEE countries than they have
at home (parent bank). This could be explained by the fact that, similar to
Turkish banks, Hungarian banks might have to offer better rates than domes-
tic (host countries) banks to obtain market share as they might be perceived
as risky and therefore lack the competitive advantage of banks originating from,
for example, Italy, France and the US, which have the highest NIM differentials
between parent bank and foreign subsidiary.
2.3.3 Regulation and supervision
The analysis of the dynamics of NIMs has highlighted a considerable heterogene-
ity among countries, both in the SEE region and in terms of country of origin.
To better understand the effect of the impact of country specific characteristics
on banks’ intermediation function, we focus on the impact of bank regulation
and supervision in home and host countries. To this end, we collect informa-
tion on regulatory and supervisory variables which have been identified in the
literature as relevant in the setting of bank rates and therefore affecting bank
NIMs. Our aim is to identify how differences in home-host country regulation
and supervisory practices can impact bank behaviour.
We draw on the database compiled by Barth et al. (2013) based on the Banking
Regulation and Supervision Survey (BRSS) carried out by the World Bank. We
build six different indices reflecting the regulatory conditions at different points in
time, based on specific survey questions. Given that the country level regulatory
data is collected in four survey exercises (1999, 2002, 2006 and 2011) as described
in Barth et al. (2013), we match the data for the regulatory variables as follows:
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the 1999 survey data is used for the period 1995-2001; the end-2002 data for the
period 2002-2005; the end-2006 data for the period 2006-2010 and the end-2011
data for the last year, 2011. This should allow us to map the relevant changes
during the sample period, both for the country of origin (home) and host country
of foreign banks. The advantage of using the Barth et al. (2013) version of the
dataset, as opposed to the raw data from the surveys, is that the authors have
corrected any inconsistencies between the four rounds of the survey, have filled in
missing values where possible and have aggregated several questions into useful
indices. The survey questions behind the indices used in this study are shown
in Appendix 2B. All indices are normalized to take values in the interval [0, 1].
This normalization also has the intuitively appealing property of a percentage
interpretation on initial analysis.
In choosing the indices we focus on those aspects of regulation and supervision
that theory highlights as affecting bank behaviour. More specifically we focus on
three indicators of bank regulation (Activity restrictions, Ownership restrictions
and Capital regulations) and three indicators of bank supervision (Official super-
visory power, External auditing and Transparency). The extant literature finds
that various aspects of regulation and supervision can be important determinants
of bank performance. Table 2.6 illustrates the average value for the indices in the
host and selected home countries. These indices indicate a large cross-country
variation, which needs to be put into context of the different characteristics of
banking systems (in terms of size, type of institutions, competitive conditions,
etc.) as well as differences in the organization of bank regulatory and supervisory
institutions.
2.3.3.1 Activity restrictiveness
Activities restrictions (act restr) measure the degree to which national regula-
tions restrict banks from engaging in (a) securities activities (underwriting, bro-
kering, dealing in securities and all other aspects of the mutual fund industry),
(b) insurance activities (underwriting and selling insurance) and (c) real estate
activities (real estate investment, development and management). Higher values
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indicate more restrictions on banks in performing these activities. Bank own-
ership restrictions (ownership restr), measures the degree to which banks and
nonbanks may combine to form financial conglomerates. This index captures the
extent to which national regulations restrict (a) banks from owning non-financial
firms, (b) non-financial firms from owning banks as well as (c) nonbank financial
firms from owning banks. Both act restr and ownership restr specify the scope
of permissible bank activities. Some countries restrict banks to a narrow range
of activities, others allow them to engage in a broad array; these differences can
affect banks’ ability to diversify revenue streams. There are conflicting views on
the impact of activity restrictions on bank behaviour. Regulations which limit the
range of activities banks can engage in may limit the exploitation of economies
of scale and scope in obtaining information about borrowers, building reputa-
tional capital and providing different services (Barth, Caprio and Levine (2004);
Laeven and Levine (2009)). Conversely, regulations allowing banks to engage in
a broad range of activities might intensify moral hazard (Boyd, Chang and Smith
(1998)) and lead to the creation of large and complex entities which are difficult
to monitor (Laeven and Levine (2009)) providing more opportunities for banks to
increase risk taking. Demirguc-Kunt et al. (2004) find that activity restrictions
increase net interest margins while Barth et al. (2001) report mixed results for
their impact on margins and overheads. The impact of activity restrictiveness on
bank NIMs remains therefore unclear.
2.3.3.2 Capital regulation
Capital regulation (cap reg) measures the nature of capital in terms of policies
concerning the definition of capital banks must hold beyond cash or government
securities as well as regulations that govern the sources of regulatory capital.
This index does not measure statutory capital requirements, instead it measures
the rules and policies used in assessing and verifying the degree of capital at risk
in a bank. If bank capital requirements are seen as a mechanism to align the
incentives of bank owners with depositors and other creditors, the more capital
at risk they are required to hold the more prudent they should become in their
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lending behaviour. This would imply a negative relation between the capital
regulatory index and bank NIMs, as more prudent lending behaviour should
imply lower lending rates to less risky projects. On the other hand, several
studies (Saunders and Schumacher (2000)) show that banks which are required
to hold more capital tend to demand higher NIMs to lower the cost of holding
more equity. Finally, Barth et al. (2004) suggest that capital regulation do not
seem to have a clear impact on bank margins, although they find that more
stringent capital regulations are associated with lower levels of non-performing
loans.
2.3.3.3 Official supervisory power
Official supervisory power (sup power) measures the degree to which a country’s
bank supervisory agency has the authority to obtain sufficient information from
banks to assess their financial soundness and to impose changes to banks’ be-
haviour, if necessary. It measures whether a country’s supervisory authority has
the power to take specific actions to prevent and correct problems. To the extent
that a powerful supervisory agency has the incentive and expertise to overcome
market failures due to imperfect information as argued in Beck et al. (2006)
and Barth et al. (2013), it boosts bank efficiency, hence it should lead to lower
NIMs. However as Beck et al. (2006) argue, if bank supervisors use their power
for private or political benefits rather than overcoming market failures they will
contribute to bank inefficiency, hence higher NIMs. In addition, Barth et al.
(2004) show that the presence of more powerful government supervisors is linked
to higher levels of non-performing loans.
2.3.3.4 Private monitoring
Transparency measures the extent to which regulatory policies encourage private
monitoring. For example, the extent to which supervisory agencies require banks
to disseminate comprehensive information about their activities can influence the
quality of private sector scrutiny by forcing information disclosure. Similarly, the
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degree to which regulation holds bank directors legally liable for erroneous or mis-
leading information can influence the quality of information that banks provide
to investors, which impacts investor’s ability to monitor and govern the banks.
Similar to the transparency index, the strength of external audit (ext audit) mea-
sures the extent to which regulations facilitate external governance of banks. For
instance, the degree to which supervisory agencies require banks to obtain certi-
fied audits can influence the quality of information disclosed, hence the quality of
external governance. Private sector monitoring can be more efficient than official
supervision of banks, as supervisors do not have an ownership stake in banks,
which can lead to different incentives when monitoring and disciplining banks.
Barth et al. (2013) find that private monitoring of banks in terms of strength
of external audit and information disclosure is positively associated with bank
operating efficiency, which should imply lower NIMs. Similar results are found by
Delis, Molyneux and Pasiouras (2011) who report that regulations and policies
that promote private monitoring have a positive impact on bank performance.
2.3.4 Control variables
Other factors are likely to impact bank NIMs, such as differences in bank level
characteristics, market structure and macroeconomic variables.
2.3.4.1 Bank-specific factors
The literature identifies a comprehensive set of bank specific characteristics that
are likely to significantly affect spreads, including size, leverage, capitalisation.
We include proxies for size (share); equity ratio (equityratio); liquidity (liquidity)
and cost to income ratio (cti).
A common factor used in the empirical analyses of bank NIMs is the liquidity
ratio (liquidity). Banks with high liquidity ratios face an opportunity costs since
they have to forego holding higher-earning assets. They may in turn pass this
opportunity cost to borrowers increasing the interest rate spreads. Martinez Peria
and Mody (2004) and Brock and Rojas Suarez (2000) find that liquidity has a
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positive and significant impact on bank spreads. A second variable is the equity
ratio (equityratio). As holding high equity ratios is costly for banks, they are likely
to demand higher interest margins, hence inducing a positive relation between
equity ratios and NIMs. Similarly, banks with higher equity ratios are perceived
as less risky, with a low risk of insolvency which reduces the cost of borrowed
funds hence boosts margins. In contrast, a negative relation between equity
ratios and NIMs is expected if the equity ratio is taken as a proxy for bank’s
risk aversion (Poghosyan (2013)). More risk-averse banks with high equity ratios
tend to invest in safer assets which yield lower returns hence a reduction in
bank interest margins. Saunders and Schumacher (2000) find that banks tend to
lower the cost of holding more equity (regulatory or endogenously determined)
by demanding higher NIMs. Bank size as proxied by market share (share) is
another relevant factor. There are conflicting hypothesis regarding the impact
of this variable on bank NIMs. Banks with a high market share may be able
to exercise market power and charge higher loan rates (Relative Market Power
hypothesis). On the other hand, banks with high market share can benefit from
economies of scale and transfer this benefit to their customers in the form of
lower spreads. The loan loss provision ratio (llp tea) captures the quality of the
loan portfolio and is expected to be positively related to NIMs as a poor loan
quality induces banks to charge customers a premium for these loans. Several
studies find a positive association between the non-performing loan ratio and
NIMs. Degryse et al. (2012) for instance, find that banks with higher credit
risk, as measured by the deviations from the median non-performing loans, are
more likely to charge higher lending rates. Other studies, however, do not find a
significant relation (Martinez Peria and Mody (2004)) or find a negative relation
(Brock and Rojas Suarez (2000)) between non-performing loans and NIMs, the
latter being explained as a result of inadequate provisioning for loan losses by
banks in some countries. Bank efficiency (cti) is another variable impacting bank
NIMs. Most studies include efficiency variables as controls and find significant
correlation with NIMs.
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2.3.4.2 Market structure factors
Important factors in determining bank NIMs are the market conditions in which
banks operate. The theoretical predictions relating NIMs and the bank mar-
ket structure stem from the extensive literature studying the impact of concen-
tration on bank profitability (Berger (1995)). Most studies use the paradigm
of Structure-Conduct-Performance to explain the positive association between
profitability and concentration. In the context of the NIM-market structure rela-
tionship, this predicts a negative association between levels of concentration and
NIMs. Martinez Peria and Mody (2004) find a significant positive association
between concentration and spreads. They interpret high concentration levels as
implying less competition in the banking sector. Research however shows that
concentrated markets are not necessarily uncompetitive (Beck (2008); Matutes
and Vives (1996)). The primary measure of market structure used in our speci-
fications, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (hhi).11
2.3.4.3 Macroeconomic factors
Macroeconomic indicators commonly used in empirical analyses of NIMs are the
GDP growth rate, inflation and real interest rates.12 The relation between GDP
growth rates (gdpgrowth) and NIMs can be ambiguous. High GDP growth rates
imply more investment opportunities for banks which may in turn increase the
deposit rate to attract more funds for these new investment opportunities; in
contrast, during times of declining GDP rates loan quality deteriorates forcing
companies to borrow at higher rates, hence a negative expected relationship be-
tween GDP growth and interest spreads (Bernanke and Gertler (1989)). The
impact of inflation (inflation) on interest spreads depends on which of the bank
costs or revenues increase faster than the other. Perry (1992) points out that the
influence of inflation on bank margins depends on whether inflation is anticipated
or not. If inflation is not fully anticipated and banks react slowly to adjusting
11Alternative measures of market structure, including the CR-3 ratio, as well as the Lerner
Index and the Rosse-Panzar H-statistics are used for robustness checks.
12Macroeconomic variables are from the World Development Indicators database. Table 2.1
provides detailed variable definitions and their sources.
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the interest rates, bank costs may increase faster than revenues hence reducing
bank margins (Brock and Rojas Suarez (2000); Demirguc-Kunt and Huizinga
(1999)). Finally, the real market interest rates (real ir) represent opportunity
cost for banks and are expected to be positively associated with NIMs. So if the
marginal cost of funds increases (decreases) the bank margins will also increase
(decrease).
Table 2.7 illustrates the descriptive statistics for our variables and shows the pair-
wise correlation matrix for the variables used in the estimations. From Table 2.7
we can see that foreign banks have higher market share (share) and higher liquid-
ity ratios (liquidity), whereas their equity ratio (equityratio) is lower compared
to domestic banks. In terms of efficiency measures, foreign banks appear less
efficient than domestic banks based on the cost to income ratio (cti). In terms of
sample periods, all banks had higher NIMs during the first sample period (1995-
2004). Compared to the first period all banks have increased their liquidity,
while the equity ratio and the loan loss provisioning ratio (llp tea) have declined.
Macroeconomic and market structure indicators also show variation between the
two subsamples. Overall, summary statistics evidence different characteristics
between foreign and domestic banks, which may partly explain their different
NIMs.
2.3.5 Methodology
The relationship between foreign bank ownership and NIMs in host countries is
evaluated using the following specification:
NIMitc = α0 + α1fbict + θ
′
jXict + µ
′
kYct + ω
′
nZct + εict (2.1)
where, NIMitc is the net interest margin of bank i in country c and at time t.
fbict is the ownership dummy variable equal to one if the bank is foreign-owned
and zero otherwise. Xict is a vector of bank-specific variables: liquidity ratio
(liquidity), the equity ratio (equityratio), the loan loss provision ratio (llp tea),
bank market share (share) and the cost to income ratio (cti). Yct is a vector of
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two country variables describing the overall banking industry, namely its degree
of market concentration as measured by the Herfindahl-Hirschman index (hhi)
and the share of foreign over total bank assets (foreignshare). Zct is a vector
of country macroeconomic variables: the rate of GDP growth (gdpgrowth), the
inflation rate (inflation) and the real interest rates (real ir).
We estimate the model using OLS with both country and year fixed effects. In
this way we compare foreign and domestic banks within a given host country.
The coefficient α1 compares the NIMs of foreign and domestic banks within a
country.
To investigate the impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on NIMs, in a second
step, we decompose our main variable of interest, the foreign ownership dummy
(fb), into two dummy variables corresponding to two different modes of foreign
entry: foreign greenfield banks (fb green) and foreign acquisition banks (fb acq).
The specification takes the following form:
NIMitc = α0 + α1fb acqict + α2fb greenict + θ
′
jXict + µ
′
kYct + ω
′
nZct + εict (2.2)
where, fb acqict is a dummy variable equal to one if a foreign bank entered the
market acquiring an existing bank, and zero otherwise and fb greenict is a dummy
variable equal to one if a foreign bank entered the market via greenfield invest-
ment, and zero otherwise. The remaining variables are the same as in equation
(2.1).
Finally, to evaluate the impact of home country factors on NIMs in host countries,
we estimate the following specification:
NIMitc = α0 + α1fbict + α2fbict ∗ Fct + θ′jXict + µ
′
kYct + ω
′
nZct + εict (2.3)
where, Fct represents home country factors. We include parent bank NIMs
(NIM parent) and home country regulatory indices as described in section 2.3.3.
The coefficient α2 measures whether a particular home country attribute signifi-
cantly impacts foreign bank NIMs compared to domestic banks in host countries.
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2.4 Results
This section presents the results of our multiple regression analysis. In particular,
Subsection 2.4.1 looks at the impact of foreign bank entry on NIMs. Subsection
2.4.2 investigates whether the mode of entry (greenfield versus acquisition) does
matter in explaining the cost of financial intermediation, while Subsection 2.4.3
focuses on the role of home-country characteristics.
2.4.1 Foreign ownership
Table 2.8 shows the results of estimating our baseline specification (Equation
2.1). The coefficient on the foreign bank dummy variable (fb) is not significant
when we consider the full sample period (column 1) but it is negative and sig-
nificant in the first sub-sample period 1995-2004 (column 2) and positive and
significant in the second sub-sample 2005-2011 (column 3). These results seem
to suggest that foreign banks change their behaviour over time. At the begin-
ning of the foreign bank entry process, foreign banks operate with lower NIMs
than domestic banks, consistently with our preliminary analysis and with several
emerging market studies.13 However, as the presence of foreign banks increases,
foreign banks operate with higher NIMs than their domestic counterparts. Our
results are confirmed when we interact our foreign bank dummy variable with
the time trend (column 4): foreign banks operate with lower NIM than domestic
banks but over time the gap between foreign and domestic NIM goes down.
In the last column of Table 2.8, we interact our foreign bank dummy variable
(fb) with a proxy of foreign bank presence at the country level (foreignshare) to
see whether the NIM charged by foreign banks also depends on the ownership
composition of the overall banking industry. Foreign bank entry can force do-
mestic banks to become more efficient or give up some of the revenues they were
able to realize before; hence a reduction in the overall level of bank spreads in
host countries. Alternatively, foreign bank entry may force domestic banks to
tilt their loan portfolios towards less transparent market segments, where they
13Martinez Peria and Mody (2004); Claeys and Vander Vennet (2008), among others.
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have informational advantages and can charge higher interest rates, making the
overall impact on host country bank NIMs less clear cut.
The results of column 5 in Table 2.8 show that foreignshare alone (as measured by
the share of total banking assets in the hand of foreign owners) has a positive and
statistically significant coefficient on NIMs, suggesting that on average foreign
bank presence increases the average NIM of the banking sector. Moreover the
interacted term between fb and foreignshare is again positive and significant,
suggesting that when the overall presence of foreign banks increases they start
charging higher rates leading to higher NIMs than their domestic counterparts
(notice that the interacted coefficient is larger than the coefficient of fb alone).
Overall this evidence suggests that in the long term foreign bank entry does not
have the beneficial effect of reducing intermediation costs.
2.4.2 Mode of foreign bank entry
Table 2.9 shows the results from estimating equation (2.2) and provide evidence
consistent with the one shown in the previous table. The mode of foreign entry
seems to have no impact on NIMs when we consider the full sample (column
1). When looking at the two sub-sample periods separately, we find that both
foreign acquisition and foreign greenfield banks operate with significantly lower
NIMs than domestic banks in the first sample period (column 2), with foreign
greenfield having a stronger effect (about 1.0% lower than those for domestic
banks, compared with a 0.6% differential between foreign acquisition and domes-
tic banks). However, in the second sample period, only foreign entry through
greenfield remains significant but with positive sign, suggesting that in the long
run foreign entry is associated with increasing NIMs, consistent with Degryse
et al. (2012).
This evidence is confirmed when we interact the mode of entry with a time trend
(column 4) or with the foreign bank presence (column 5).
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2.4.3 Home-country characteristics
In this section we incorporate home-country factors into the analysis. In partic-
ular, we test whether parent bank NIMs (Table 2.10) and characteristics of the
country of origin of foreign banks, like regulatory indicators (Table 2.11), have
an effect on NIMs charged by foreign banks in the host country.
Table 2.10 shows the results from estimating equation (2.3) with parent bank
NIMs as the main variable of interest. We find that foreign banks have lower
NIMs than their domestic counterparts but foreign banks whose parent banks
charge higher NIMs at home, operate with higher NIMs than domestic banks
in host countries (column 1). The interaction term is particularly strong in the
later sample period (column 3). Our findings are consistent with Kosmidou et al.
(2007) and Chen and Liao (2011) who find a strong positive relation between the
profitability of the parent bank and the profitability of their subsidiaries/branches
abroad. The positive relation may indicate that more profitable parent banks (i.e.
with high NIMs) enter host countries because they can realize higher margins
than in their home markets and possibly attract cheaper funding because of
reputational benefits.
In Table 2.11, we interact our foreign bank dummy variable (fb) with home
country regulatory indicators. Because some of the home country regulatory in-
dices are highly correlated they have been included in the specification one at a
time. The control variables are the same as the ones reported in previous tables.
The coefficients of the interaction terms with the restrictiveness of bank activ-
ity (act rest) and bank ownership index (ownership restr) and with the capital
regulatory index (cap reg) are positive and significant (and larger than the coeffi-
cient of fb alone), indicating that foreign banks whose countries of origin impose
stricter restrictions on bank activities and stricter capital regulation operate with
larger NIMs compared to their domestic counterparts (Panel A). This evidence
is consistent with the idea that foreign subsidiaries compensate the more lim-
ited profits opportunities in the country of origin, due to extensive restrictions
imposed, by charging high NIMs in host countries. Another plausible explana-
tion for the positive association of stricter home country regulation and foreign
43
Chapter 2. Foreign bank entry and NIMs: evidence from SEE
bank NIMs in host countries is the argument put forward by Berger et al. (2000)
that home countries with relatively tough regulation reduce the counterparty
risk or certify the quality of their banks operating abroad. This allows them to
get access to cheaper funding relative to other foreign banks, hence their higher
margins. Similar results were reported by Ongena et al. (2013) who find that
home-country regulation is associated with higher risk-taking and lower lending
standards abroad.
On the other hand, the coefficients of the interaction term with the two other
indices (sup power) and (ext audit) are negative, suggesting that foreign banks
charge lower NIMs than domestic banks when the countries of origin have stricter
external audit and supervisory powers.14 This evidence may suggest that stronger
home country supervision can limit risk-taking activities also in the host country
as long as foreign subsidiaries keep being under the control and scrutiny of home
country supervisors.
Overall our results show the importance of taking into account both host and
home country factors when analysing the determinants of bank NIMs. More-
over, they suggest that there are cross-border regulatory spillovers through the
behaviour of foreign banks in host countries. As emerging market regulation and
supervision can be more lenient when countries are embarking in periods of fi-
nancial liberalisation, foreign banks may engage in regulatory arbitrage in order
to maximize their profits.
2.4.4 Control variables
Important insights about factors influencing NIMs can be gained from the con-
trol variables included in the specifications. Banks with higher liquidity ratios
(liquidity) have higher NIMs. Higher liquidity ratios impose a cost on banks as
they forego investing in more profitable investments which cost they are able to
14Whether this leads to welfare gains is unclear. As a result of stricter regulation at home
foreign banks may become more prudent and target the most transparent market segments
only, which provide lower margins, aspect which we can only speculate on but not test due to
lack of loan portfolio composition data.
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pass on to their customers by increasing margins. The findings are consistent
with Martinez Peria and Mody (2004), Brock and Rojas Suarez (2000) and oth-
ers. The equity ratio (equityratio) is both positively and significantly related to
NIMs. As with liquidity ratios, holding a high equity ratio is costly for banks,
which makes them seek higher interest margins. Furthermore, well capitalized
banks are seen as less risky, attracting lower deposit rates hence boosting the
net interest margins. The loan loss provisioning ratio (llp tea) has also shown
a strong positive association with NIMs. As expected, high loan loss provision
ratio is an indicator of the low quality of the loan portfolio, which includes riskier
but more profitable lending, which in turn reflects into higher NIMs. Bank ef-
ficiency is a significant determinant of NIMs. Results show that banks with
higher cost to income ratios (cti) have lower NIMs. With regards to bank mar-
ket structure, results show that it has a significant impact on NIMs: the primary
measure of market structure used in our specifications, the Herfindahl-Hirschman
index (hhi), is significantly associated with lower NIMs. This result supports the
efficient-structure hypothesis according to which banks with larger market shares
i.e. operating in more concentrated banking systems may be more efficient and
gain from economies of scale thus reducing NIMs. Finally, among macroeconomic
variables the GDP growth rate (gdpgrowth) and the rate of inflation (inflation)
are the most important determinants of NIMs.
2.5 Robustness
In this section we address some concerns regarding the robustness our results.
First, we address a possible endogeneity problem. Second, we show that our
results still hold when we use alternative measures for bank efficiency and market
structure.
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2.5.1 Endogeneity concern
An obvious concern with studies that investigate foreign bank entry is that the
decision to enter the host country can be endogenous. Foreign banks may decide
to enter countries where NIMs are particularly high, as the profit opportunities
are higher in these markets. Conversely, foreign banks may view high NIMs mar-
kets as riskier and be more prone to enter the markets with the lower NIMs.
Therefore, the direction of the bias caused by endogeneity is a priori not clear.
One way to address this problem is to rely on the instrumental variables (IV)
approach. The challenge is to find valid instruments that are highly correlated
with the bank decision to enter a foreign market and that influence NIMs through
foreign bank presence only and not through other channels. We consider three
instruments to model the decision of a foreign bank to enter a country at the first
stage: the population size of the host country as a measure of market size (pop-
ulation), a measure of financial freedom (financial freedom) and finally whether
the host country is EU member (eu member). The rationale behind the first
instrument is that foreign bank entry is significantly associated with the size of
the host country. As Abiad, Detragiache and Tressel (2010) argue, foreign banks
entering small countries have an advantage as they need a relatively small in-
vestment to gain a significant market share in host countries. In addition by
investing in several countries they can diversify their exposure to specific country
risks. Foreign banks may also be inclined to enter larger countries as the oppor-
tunities for economies of scale are much higher. Therefore, a significant relation
between population and foreign bank entry is expected.
The second instrument, financial freedom, is the Heritage Foundation’s index
which measures, among others, the restrictiveness of bank regulation and super-
vision, the ease of foreign bank entry and the extent to which their operations
are restricted in host countries. The identification strategy is similar to that of
Jayaratne and Strahan (1996) who use the relaxation of bank branch restrictions
in the US as an instrument to show that the quality of bank lending is positively
related to economic growth.15 It seems plausible that regulation on foreign bank
15A similar identification strategy is used by Giannetti and Ongena (2009), Bruno and
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entry alone should not affect the NIMs in host countries, satisfying the exclusion
assumption. In a similar vein, we include the dummy variable indicating whether
the host country is member of the EU. The rationale is that foreign banks are
more likely to enter countries that are institutionally similar.
We have run our IV regression analysis using various combinations of the three
instruments, all three at the same time, or a combination of two instruments
at a time, or each instrument individually. We confirm all the results of our
main analysis without IV, when we use the financial freedom index and the EU
member dummy as instruments for foreign bank entry. Results are reported in
Table 2.14, columns 1-3.
In addition to country-level instruments we also consider bank-level instruments
which can impact the decision of banks to acquire a particular bank in the host
country. We use the ratio of net loans to total assets (loan ta) as an indication
of banks ability to transform deposits into loans and the return on average assets
(roaa) as an indication of bank performance. Studies on the microeconomic de-
terminants of cross border bank acquisitions (Lanine and Vander Vennet (2007);
Poghosyan and de Haan (2010)) find that foreign banks decision to acquire banks
in host countries is driven by the intermediation activity and performance of the
target bank. Although we cannot completely rule out that these indicators do
not have a direct impact on bank NIMs we carry out several tests to check the
validity of the instruments used. The Kleibergen-Paap LM statistics rejects in all
specifications the null hypothesis of under-identification (p-value < 0.01). The
Kleibergen-Paap Wald F-statistics exceeds in all specifications the critical values
of Stock and Yogo (2005), i.e. the null hypothesis of weak instruments is rejected.
We confirm all our results when adding these bank-level instruments. Results are
reported in Table 2.14, columns 4-6.
Hauswald (2014), Ongena et al. (2013).
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2.5.2 Alternative measures of bank efficiency and market
structure
We also run a set of robustness tests using alternative measures of bank effi-
ciency, market structure and foreign bank presence. First, we use the overhead
costs to total earning assets ratio (overh tea) as an alternative eficiency measure.
Given that related literature shows that the traditional cost ratios are not suit-
able measures of bank efficiency and that methods such as Data Envelopment
Analysis (DEA) deliver better insights into bank efficiency and productivity, we
also use the non-parametric DEA approach and calculate scale efficiency (scale)
and technical efficiency (technical). Results, shown in Table 2.12, remain quali-
tatively unchanged with these alternative measures of bank efficiency.
Second, our results are robust to different measures of market structure. As
reported in Table 2.13, we obtain very similar results if we use the three bank
concentration ratio (cr3 ), the Lerner index or the Panzar-Rosse H-statistics.
In conclusion, our results seem not to be driven by the endogeneity of foreign
bank entry and are robust to different measures of bank efficiency and market
structure.
2.6 Conclusion
In this paper we investigate the impact of foreign bank entry on net interest mar-
gins in South East Europe over the period 1995 -2011. During this time frame,
SEE countries experienced considerable political, economic and financial sector
reforms, as they moved from centrally planned to market oriented economies.
One of the key financial liberalisation policies during the transition period was
increasing the presence of foreign investors, which lead to the proportion of assets
owned by foreign banks to increase from virtually zero in the early 1990s to over
80% by 2011. However, whether the presence of foreign banks has been beneficial
for the local economies remains controversial. Theory presents conflicting predic-
tions on the role of foreign banks in emerging markets and the empirical evidence
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is equally inconclusive. Our analysis contributes to the literature along different
directions. We hand collect a new data set of bank ownership, which allows us to
explore the dynamics of foreign banks’ NIMs over the transition period. We care-
fully match parent banks with foreign affiliates and home and host countries, to
exploit the heterogeneity of foreign bank entry and home country conditions and
evaluate the resulting impact on NIMs in host countries. Finally, our study also
relates to the strand of literature on the impact of distance on bank activities.
We show that foreign banks initially enter host countries’ banking markets with
lower NIMs compared to domestic incumbents. However, we also find evidence
that foreign banks change their behaviour over time and tend to increase their
margins during the later stages of foreign bank entry. This finding is particularly
significant for greenfield entry.
We also find that regulatory conditions in the home country influence bank be-
haviour. Foreign banks from countries with more stringent restrictions on bank
activities have higher NIMs compared to domestic banks; this can be explained
by banks seeking increased profit opportunities on activities which are restricted
in their country of origin. This might also indicate that banks tend to engage
in regulatory arbitrage. As home country regulation becomes more stringent,
banks shift riskier activities abroad. This is particularly significant for emerg-
ing markets undergoing financial liberalization, as reforms might entail a more
lenient regulatory structure that can be exploited by large multinational banks
seeking profit opportunities in a less regulated environment. However, we also
find evidence of regulatory spillovers: stricter supervisory standards at home,
possibly extending to the supervision of foreign affiliates, seem to translate into
lower NIMs in host countries. This may suggest that stronger home country
supervision can limit risk-taking abroad if foreign banks remain under the super-
vision of the country of origin. This has particular relevance in a EU context as
regulatory authorities are implementing a more stringent and unified supervisory
framework. Our findings seem to suggest that the process of EU integration has
lead to positive regulatory spillovers, particularly driven by a combination of in-
creased supervisory power and private sector monitoring. Indeed the countries
that have attracted the highest number of foreign bank entry are those countries
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which have become EU member states during the sample period, which had to
adhere to the EU regulatory framework.
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Tables
Table 2.1: Variable Definitions and Sources.
Variable Definition Source
Bank characteristics
NIM (Interest Income-Interest Expense)/Total Earning Assets Bankscope
fb A dummy variable equal to 1 if the bank is at least 51% foreign
owned.
Hand collected
fb acq A dummy variable equal to 1 if at least 51% of the bank is
owned by foreign investors which entered the market acquiring
an existing bank.
Hand collected
fb green A dummy variable equal to 1 if at least 51% of the bank is owned
by foreign investors which entered the market by establishing a
new bank.
Hand collected
share Share of total assets held by each bank to the country’s total
bank assets.
Bankscope
liquidity Cash and due from other banks including the central bank over
total assets
Bankscope
equityratio Total equity (bank capital plus reserves) over total assets Bankscope
llp tea The ratio of loan loss provisions over total earning assets Bankscope
overh tea The ratio of overheads over total earning assets Bankscope
cti Cost to income ratio Bankscope
technical Technical Efficiency estimated using DEA own calculations
scale Scale efficiency estimated using DEA own calculations
Banking sector characteristics
foreignshare Share of assets held by foreign banks. Hand collected
hhi Sum of the squared bank market shares (total assets). Bankscope
cr3 Share of total assets held by the top 3 banks in the system. Bankscope
lerner A non-structural measure of competition as measured by the
Lerner index.
Bankscope
hstat A non-structural measure of competition as measured by the
Panzar Rosse H-stat.
Bankscope
Macroeconomic variables
gdpgrowth Gross Domestic Product growth rate. World Development
Indicators
inflation Consumer Price Index growth rate. World Development
Indicators
real ir The real market interest rate. World Development
Indicators
trend A variable capturing the time trend over the sample period
(1995-2011) taking the values from 1 to 17.
own calculations
Banking regulation and supervision
act restr Index relating to restrictions on bank activities. Barth et al (2013)
ownership restr Index relating to restrictions on bank ownership. Barth et al (2013)
cap reg Index relating to bank capital requirements. Barth et al (2013)
sup power Index relating to bank supervisory powers. Barth et al (2013)
ext audit Index relating to the effectiveness of the bank external audit. Barth et al (2013)
transparency Index relating to the measure of bank transparency. Barth et al (2013)
IVs
financial freedom A measure of the restrictiveness of bank regulation and super-
vision, the ease of foreign bank entry and the extent to which
their operations are restricted in host countries.
Heritage Founda-
tion
population The population size of the country at the time of foreign bank
entry.
World Development
Indicators
eu member =1 if the host country was an EU member at the time of foreign
bank entry.
europa.eu
loan a Net loans to total assets ratio. Bankscope
roaa Return on average assets=Net income/average total assets. Bankscope
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Table 2.3: Average NIMs over time.
Variables NIM-all banks NIM-domestic banks NIM-foreign banks ∆ NIM
1995 0.062 0.063 0.036 0.027
1996 0.089 0.095 0.028 0.067
1997 0.071 0.074 0.062 0.012
1998 0.082 0.087 0.066 0.02
1999 0.08 0.087 0.067 0.02
2000 0.068 0.073 0.061 0.011
2001 0.061 0.071 0.05 0.021
2002 0.056 0.066 0.045 0.021
2003 0.061 0.069 0.053 0.016
2004 0.064 0.072 0.057 0.014
2005 0.06 0.065 0.056 0.009
2006 0.056 0.061 0.053 0.007
2007 0.053 0.054 0.053 0.001
2008 0.058 0.06 0.057 0.003
2009 0.062 0.054 0.065 -0.011
2010 0.045 0.048 0.044 0.004
2011 0.049 0.045 0.051 -0.006
1995-2011 0.062 0.069 0.055 0.014
This table shows the evolution of average NIMs of all banks, foreign and domestic banks over
time. It also shows the average difference in NIMs between domestic and foreign banks over
time. The last row 1995-2011 shows aggregate values for the entire sample period.
Table 2.4: Average NIMs and Profits by countries and bank ownership type (1995-2011).
Country NIM NII OC LLP Taxes NI
Albania 3.70% 1.20% 3.50% 0.70% 0.30% 0.70%
Bosnia-Herzegovina 5.80% 5.60% 7.80% 2.50% 0.10% 0.60%
Bulgaria 5.00% 6.50% 8.30% 2.10% 0.50% 1.30%
Croatia 4.80% 2.80% 5.20% 1.40% 0.30% 0.80%
Kosovo 6.70% 2.40% 5.80% 1.40% 0.40% 1.50%
Macedonia (FYROM) 6.70% 4.60% 8.10% 2.50% 0.30% 0.60%
Montenegro 6.20% 4.80% 8.50% 2.50% 0.10% -0.20%
Romania 7.60% 5.70% 16.90% 1.80% 0.80% -6.10%
Serbia 8.30% 13.30% 14.60% 5.60% 0.10% 1.60%
All countries-by ownership
All countries 6.20% 6.00% 9.70% 2.40% 0.40% -0.20%
Domestic banks 6.90% 7.80% 9.70% 3.30% 0.50% 1.40%
Foreign banks 5.50% 4.20% 9.70% 1.70% 0.30% -1.80%
This table shows the decomposition of bank Net Income (after tax) according to the following
accounting identity: Net Income (NI) ≡ Net interest income (NIM) + Noninterest Income (NII)
- Overhead Costs (OC) Loan Loss Provisions (LLP) - Taxes. The figures are shown over Total
Earning Assets.
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Table 2.5: Home and Host Countries.
Host Country N. of foreign
banks
N. of home
countries
Foreign-
Parent NIM
Host-Home
Country NIM
Panel A
Albania 12 8 0.74% 0.35%
Bosnia 18 6 1.76% 2.49%
Bulgaria 23 10 2.47% 1.62%
Croatia 31 5 1.97% 1.81%
Kosovo 5 4 4.91% 4.48%
Macedonia 8 7 3.54% 3.63%
Montenegro 9 7 2.85% 3.30%
Romania 38 9 5.07% 4.01%
Serbia 22 9 4.24% 5.56%
Home Country N. of foreign
banks
N. of host
countries
Foreign-
Parent NIM
Host-Home
Country NIM
Panel B
Austria 34 9 2.32% 3.72%
France 15 8 4.37% 4.06%
Germany 21 8 2.97% 3.20%
Greece 23 6 1.79% 3.64%
Hungary 7 5 -1.67% 1.88%
Italy 34 6 5.70% 2.82%
Netherlands 3 2 2.50% 4.39%
Slovenia 13 6 2.20% 4.72%
Turkey 9 4 -1.30% -2.78%
USA 10 3 4.90% 2.12%
This table shows, in Panel A, the number of banks which have entered each of the SEE countries
(foreign banks) and the number of countries of origin (home countries). It also shows the average
differences in NIM between the parent bank (in the home country) and the foreign bank (in the
host country) as well as average differences between NIM at the country level. In Panel B, it
shows the number of foreign banks each home country has set up during the sample period and
in how many different host countries in the SEE region. It also shows the average differences in
NIM between the parent bank (in the home country) and the foreign bank (in the host country)
as well as average differences between NIM at the country level.
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2.6. Conclusion
Table 2.6: Regulation and Supervision in Home and Host Countries.
Host Country Regulation Superivision
act restr own. restr cap reg sup power ext audit transp.
Albania 0.57 0.59 0.14 0.72 0.77 0.41
Bosnia-
Herzegovina
0.56 0.54 0.33 0.84 0.93 0.46
Bulgaria 0.6 0.42 0.58 0.71 0.99 0.75
Croatia 0.43 0.31 0.24 0.72 1 0.87
Kosovo 0.86 0.79 0.62 0.86 0.89 0.44
Macedonia 0.62 0.53 0.24 0.76 0.73 0.59
Montenegro 0.4 0.43 0.6 0.16 0.48 0.5
Romania 0.82 0.46 0.27 0.63 0.75 0.43
Serbia 0.61 0.34 0.49 0.34 0.62 0.55
Average 0.6 0.43 0.35 0.64 0.86 0.62
Home Coun-
try
Regulation Superivision
act restr own. restr cap reg sup power ext audit transp.
Austria 0.25 0.33 0.54 0.73 0.99 0.49
Italy 0.75 0.64 0.23 0.44 0.54 0.87
Greece 0.55 0.34 0.34 0.66 0.9 0.81
Germany 0.21 0.36 0.5 0.53 0.85 0.55
France 0.44 0.35 0.53 0.5 0.83 0.68
Slovenia 0.68 0.48 0.58 0.85 1 0.96
Turkey 0.66 0.37 0.38 0.9 1 0.84
United States 0.76 0.72 0.41 0.86 0.75 0.75
Hungary 0.73 0.44 0.74 0.91 1 0.86
Netherlands 0.25 0.25 0.49 0.48 0.9 0.83
Average 0.49 0.43 0.44 0.65 0.84 0.72
This table shows the average values for three indicators of bank regulation (Activity restric-
tions, Ownership restrictions and Capital regulations) and three indicators of bank supervision
(Official supervisory power, External Auditing and Transparency), based on the Regulation
and Supervision Survey (BRSS) carried out by the World Bank and the database compiled by
Barth et al. (2013).
55
Chapter 2. Foreign bank entry and NIMs: evidence from SEE
T
ab
le
2.
7
:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
a
n
d
co
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
m
a
tr
ix
.
V
a
ri
a
b
le
s
A
ll
b
a
n
k
s
F
o
re
ig
n
b
a
n
k
s
D
o
m
es
ti
c
b
a
n
k
s
M
ea
n
D
iff
.
(1
9
9
5
-2
0
0
4
)
(2
0
0
5
-2
0
1
1
)
M
ea
n
D
iff
.
O
b
s
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
O
b
s
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
O
b
s
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
F
o
r.
v
s
D
o
m
.
O
b
s
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
O
b
s
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
(9
5
-0
4
)
v
s
(0
5
-1
1
)
D
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
N
IM
2
4
8
7
0
.0
6
2
0
.0
5
4
1
2
8
3
0
.0
5
5
0
.0
5
2
1
1
9
9
0
.0
6
9
0
.0
5
6
0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
1
2
9
1
0
.0
6
8
0
.0
5
5
1
1
9
6
0
.0
5
5
0
.0
5
3
-0
.0
1
3
*
*
*
In
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
s
B
a
n
k
ch
a
ra
ct
er
is
ti
cs
F
b
2
5
1
5
0
.5
1
3
0
.5
1
2
8
9
1
0
1
2
2
1
0
0
-1
1
3
1
8
0
.3
7
8
0
.4
8
5
1
1
9
7
0
.6
6
1
0
.4
7
4
0
.2
8
3
*
*
*
fb
a
cq
2
5
1
5
0
.2
7
7
0
.4
4
8
1
2
8
9
0
.5
4
1
0
.4
9
9
1
2
2
1
0
0
-0
.5
4
1
*
*
*
1
3
1
8
0
.1
5
1
0
.3
5
8
1
1
9
7
0
.4
1
6
0
.4
9
3
0
.2
6
5
*
*
*
fb
g
re
en
2
5
1
5
0
.2
3
5
0
.4
2
4
1
2
8
9
0
.4
5
9
0
.4
9
9
1
2
2
1
0
0
-0
.4
5
9
*
*
*
1
3
1
8
0
.2
2
7
0
.4
1
9
1
1
9
7
0
.2
4
5
0
.4
3
0
.0
1
8
S
h
a
re
2
5
1
5
0
.0
5
2
0
.0
8
7
1
2
8
9
0
.0
5
9
0
.0
8
7
1
2
2
1
0
.0
4
3
0
.0
8
5
-0
.0
1
6
*
*
*
1
3
1
8
0
.0
5
2
0
.0
9
6
1
1
9
7
0
.0
5
3
0
.0
7
7
0
.0
0
1
L
iq
u
id
it
y
1
9
1
0
0
.2
1
8
0
.1
5
5
9
7
6
0
.2
3
4
0
.1
5
1
9
3
0
0
.2
0
1
0
.1
5
6
-0
.0
3
3
*
*
*
1
0
4
0
0
.1
6
6
0
.1
3
6
8
7
0
0
.2
8
1
0
.1
5
3
0
.1
1
5
*
*
*
E
q
u
it
y
ra
ti
o
2
5
1
5
0
.1
9
1
0
.1
8
1
2
8
9
0
.1
6
3
0
.1
9
5
1
2
2
1
0
.2
2
0
.1
5
6
0
.0
5
7
*
*
*
1
3
1
8
0
.2
1
7
0
.1
6
3
1
1
9
7
0
.1
6
2
0
.1
9
2
-0
.0
5
5
*
*
*
ll
p
te
a
2
3
8
2
0
.0
2
4
0
.0
7
3
1
2
3
9
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
3
2
1
1
3
9
0
.0
3
3
0
.0
9
9
0
.0
1
6
*
*
*
1
2
2
7
0
.0
3
1
0
.0
9
3
1
1
5
5
0
.0
1
7
0
.0
4
1
-0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
C
ti
2
4
8
8
0
.0
9
7
0
.4
9
3
1
2
8
1
0
.0
9
7
0
.6
5
4
1
2
0
2
0
.0
9
7
0
.2
2
0
1
2
9
4
0
.0
9
2
0
.2
0
8
1
1
9
4
0
.1
0
3
0
.6
7
9
2
.4
1
1
N
IM
p
a
re
n
t
1
0
9
7
0
.0
3
1
0
.0
2
7
1
0
9
7
0
.0
3
1
0
.0
2
7
3
8
5
0
.0
3
0
.0
2
7
7
1
2
0
.0
3
1
0
.0
2
6
0
.0
0
1
M
a
rk
et
st
ru
ct
u
re
fo
re
ig
n
sh
a
re
2
5
1
5
0
.5
9
7
0
.3
0
9
1
3
1
8
0
.3
8
9
0
.2
8
7
1
1
9
7
0
.8
2
6
0
.0
9
7
0
.4
3
7
*
*
*
H
h
i
2
5
1
5
0
.1
4
6
0
.0
8
3
1
3
1
8
0
.1
6
2
0
.0
9
8
1
1
9
7
0
.1
2
8
0
.0
5
8
-0
.0
3
4
*
*
*
M
a
cr
o
ec
o
n
o
m
ic
G
d
p
g
ro
w
th
2
4
9
5
0
.0
3
7
0
.0
4
4
1
2
9
8
0
.0
4
4
0
.0
4
5
1
1
9
7
0
.0
2
9
0
.0
4
1
-0
.0
1
4
*
*
*
In
fl
a
ti
o
n
2
4
7
3
0
.1
9
3
0
.9
5
8
1
2
7
6
0
.3
2
3
1
.3
2
1
1
9
7
0
.0
5
4
0
.0
3
7
-0
.2
6
9
*
*
*
re
a
l
ir
2
3
9
6
0
.0
5
5
0
.1
1
8
1
2
0
8
0
.0
5
7
0
.1
6
2
1
1
8
8
0
.0
5
4
0
.0
3
4
-0
.0
0
3
H
o
m
e
C
o
u
n
tr
y
R
eg
u
la
ti
o
n
a
ct
re
st
r
1
2
4
7
0
.4
9
3
0
.2
4
9
4
9
7
0
.4
4
6
0
.2
6
5
7
5
0
0
.5
2
4
0
.2
3
3
0
.0
7
9
*
*
*
o
w
n
er
sh
ip
re
st
r
1
2
4
5
0
.4
3
2
0
.1
8
9
4
9
5
0
.3
6
8
0
.2
2
8
7
5
0
0
.4
7
4
0
.1
4
4
0
.1
0
6
*
*
*
ca
p
re
g
1
2
5
4
0
.4
4
2
0
.2
5
2
4
9
4
0
.4
6
7
0
.2
4
7
7
6
0
0
.4
2
6
0
.2
5
5
-0
.0
4
0
*
*
*
su
p
p
o
w
er
1
2
8
6
0
.6
4
7
0
.1
8
7
4
9
7
0
.6
5
7
0
.1
8
7
7
8
9
0
.6
4
0
.1
8
7
-0
.0
1
7
ex
t
a
u
d
it
1
2
7
9
0
.8
4
1
0
.2
1
5
4
9
7
0
.8
1
0
.2
6
9
7
8
2
0
.8
6
2
0
.1
6
8
0
.0
5
2
*
*
*
tr
a
n
sp
a
re
n
cy
1
2
7
9
0
.7
2
4
0
.2
3
6
4
9
7
0
.6
0
1
0
.2
2
4
7
8
2
0
.8
0
2
0
.2
1
0
.2
0
1
*
*
*
P
a
n
el
A
.
D
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s.
-
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
d
es
cr
ip
ti
ve
st
a
ti
st
ic
s
fo
r
th
e
va
ri
a
b
le
s
u
se
d
.
O
b
s.
d
en
o
te
s
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
o
f
o
b
se
rv
a
ti
o
n
s;
S
td
.
D
ev
.
th
e
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
on
;
S
u
m
m
ar
y
st
at
is
ti
cs
ar
e
sh
ow
n
fo
r
th
e
w
h
ol
e
sa
m
p
le
,
a
s
w
el
l
a
s
se
p
a
ra
te
ly
fo
r
b
a
n
k
ow
n
er
sh
ip
ty
p
es
a
n
d
tw
o
sa
m
p
le
p
er
io
d
s.
M
ea
n
d
iff
er
en
ce
te
st
s
a
re
b
as
ed
on
th
e
t-
te
st
w
it
h
eq
u
al
va
ri
an
ce
s.
*
in
d
ic
at
es
si
gn
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
ve
l.
*
*
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
ve
l.
*
*
*
a
t
th
e
1
%
le
ve
l.
T
a
b
le
2
.1
co
n
ta
in
s
va
ri
a
b
le
d
efi
n
it
io
n
s.
56
2.6. Conclusion
T
a
b
le
2
.6
-
(C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
1
0
1
N
IM
1
2
fb
-0
.1
31
4*
**
1
3
fb
ac
q
-0
.0
93
6*
**
0.
60
39
**
*
1
4
fb
gr
ee
n
-0
.0
55
8*
**
0.
54
11
**
*
-0
.3
43
6*
*
*
1
5
sh
ar
e
-0
.0
91
6*
**
0.
08
67
**
*
0.
17
24
**
*
-0
.0
7
9
7
*
*
*
1
6
li
q
u
id
it
y
0.
12
15
**
*
0.
10
61
**
*
0.
12
21
*
*
*
-0
.0
0
4
9
-0
.0
0
1
1
1
7
eq
u
it
y
ra
ti
o
0.
29
58
**
*
-0
.1
57
8*
**
-0
.1
52
9
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
4
6
-0
.2
0
8
4
*
*
*
-0
.1
0
6
9
*
*
*
1
8
ll
p
te
a
0.
19
47
**
*
-0
.1
10
7*
**
-0
.0
45
3*
*
-0
.0
8
2
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
4
6
-0
.0
2
1
6
0
.0
6
0
4
*
*
*
1
9
ct
i
-0
.0
61
1*
**
0.
08
50
**
*
0.
02
6
0
.0
7
2
6
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
5
8
*
*
*
0
.0
6
7
8
*
**
0
.0
1
7
7
-0
.0
2
4
1
1
10
N
IM
p
ar
en
t
0.
15
50
**
*
.
-0
.2
39
2
*
*
*
0
.2
3
9
2
*
*
*
0
.0
3
1
5
-0
.0
4
9
0
.0
7
0
0
*
*
-0
.0
3
4
5
0
.0
2
6
1
1
11
fo
re
ig
n
sh
ar
e
-0
.1
94
3*
**
0.
35
60
**
*
0.
32
05
**
*
0
.0
8
1
4
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
3
1
0
.2
5
5
9
*
*
*
-0
.1
9
7
4
*
*
*
-0
.1
6
1
9
*
*
*
0
.0
4
7
3
*
*
0
.0
0
3
5
12
h
h
i
0.
00
7
-0
.0
50
1*
*
-0
.1
07
9
*
*
*
0
.0
5
4
8
*
*
*
0
.3
8
0
2
*
*
*
-0
.1
7
3
3
*
**
-0
.0
0
3
1
-0
.0
1
2
-0
.0
0
9
3
0
.1
3
3
2
*
*
*
13
gd
p
gr
ow
th
-0
.0
45
2*
*
-0
.0
31
9
-0
.0
47
1
*
*
0
.0
1
2
3
0
.0
5
7
9
*
*
*
0
.0
2
3
3
0
.0
2
5
9
-0
.0
3
2
-0
.0
3
1
1
0
.0
0
7
9
14
in
fl
at
io
n
0.
04
86
**
-0
.0
68
3*
**
-0
.0
76
1*
*
*
0
.0
0
0
2
-0
.0
0
0
3
-0
.0
1
8
7
0
0
.2
4
8
1
*
*
*
-0
.0
4
8
5
*
*
*
-0
.0
2
2
9
15
re
al
ir
0.
00
63
-0
.0
04
8
0.
01
37
-0
.0
2
0
2
0
.0
5
5
0
*
*
*
-0
.0
8
5
1
*
*
*
0
.0
1
7
9
-0
.1
5
3
3
*
*
*
0
.0
1
3
3
0
.0
7
2
1
*
*
16
ac
t
re
st
r
0.
05
36
*
.
0.
17
92
**
*
-0
.1
7
9
2
*
*
*
-0
.0
5
4
5
*
0
.0
8
1
1
*
*
-0
.0
0
1
4
0
.0
5
7
1
*
*
0
.0
2
3
8
0
.0
4
5
1
17
ow
n
er
sh
ip
re
st
r
0.
08
98
**
*
.
0.
13
12
*
*
*
-0
.1
3
1
2
*
*
*
0
.0
1
7
3
0
.1
7
0
6
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
4
8
0
.0
5
6
3
*
0
.0
1
2
3
0
.0
1
6
6
18
ca
p
re
g
-0
.0
18
7
.
-0
.0
38
5
0
.0
3
8
5
-0
.0
2
4
3
-0
.0
4
6
2
-0
.0
2
4
7
0
.0
0
4
6
0
.0
5
1
5
*
0
.0
3
5
6
19
su
p
p
ow
er
-0
.0
19
3
.
-0
.0
14
6
0
.0
1
4
6
-0
.0
1
8
4
-0
.1
1
1
0
*
*
*
0
.0
9
8
0
*
*
*
0
.0
2
1
3
0
.0
0
5
6
0
.0
3
0
3
20
ex
t
au
d
it
-0
.0
76
8*
**
.
0.
05
04
*
-0
.0
5
0
4
*
0
.0
6
4
9
*
*
0
.0
3
6
4
-0
.0
0
5
5
-0
.0
2
7
6
-0
.0
0
7
8
0
.0
2
7
5
21
T
ra
n
sp
ar
en
cy
0.
02
81
.
0.
22
88
*
*
*
-0
.2
2
8
8
*
*
*
-0
.0
1
1
0
.1
9
4
3
*
**
-0
.0
1
8
5
0
.0
6
3
5
*
*
-0
.0
2
1
5
0
.0
2
0
3
P
a
n
el
B
.
C
o
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
M
a
tr
ix
.
T
h
is
ta
b
le
sh
ow
s
p
ai
r-
w
is
e
co
rr
el
a
ti
o
n
co
effi
ci
en
ts
b
et
w
ee
n
va
ri
a
b
le
s.
*
in
d
ic
a
te
s
si
g
n
ifi
ca
n
ce
a
t
th
e
1
0
%
le
ve
l.
*
*
a
t
th
e
5
%
le
ve
l.
**
*
at
th
e
1%
le
v
el
.
57
Chapter 2. Foreign bank entry and NIMs: evidence from SEE
T
a
b
le
2
.6
-
(C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
11
12
13
1
4
1
5
1
6
1
7
1
8
1
9
2
0
2
1
11
fo
re
ig
n
sh
ar
e
1
12
h
h
i
-0
.2
70
6*
**
1
13
gd
p
gr
ow
th
-0
.0
83
2*
**
0.
03
48
*
1
14
in
fl
at
io
n
-0
.2
16
8*
**
0.
09
79
**
*
-0
.1
37
6*
*
*
1
15
re
al
ir
0.
03
54
*
0.
03
60
*
0.
13
76
**
*
-0
.7
6
3
8
*
*
*
1
16
ac
t
re
st
r
0.
17
08
**
*
-0
.0
13
-0
.0
30
4
-0
.0
2
4
2
-0
.0
0
0
2
1
17
ow
n
er
sh
ip
re
st
r
0.
31
72
**
*
-0
.0
34
3
-0
.0
78
9*
**
-0
.0
4
1
8
0
.0
0
9
6
0
.6
0
6
3
*
*
*
1
18
ca
p
re
g
-0
.0
80
9*
**
0.
03
98
0.
03
6
-0
.0
0
1
4
0
.0
1
7
4
-0
.0
8
6
6
*
*
*
-0
.2
8
0
9
*
*
*
1
19
su
p
p
ow
er
-0
.0
77
1*
**
0.
01
82
0.
03
46
0
.0
2
0
8
-0
.0
0
6
8
-0
.0
0
3
5
-0
.2
3
8
8
*
*
*
0
.3
9
2
1
*
*
*
1
20
ex
t
au
d
it
0.
09
13
**
*
-0
.0
57
8*
*
0.
04
93
*
-0
.0
2
4
6
-0
.0
0
1
6
-0
.3
3
3
0
*
*
*
-0
.4
5
0
7
*
*
*
0
.2
5
5
6
*
*
*
0
.5
9
5
2
*
*
*
1
21
T
ra
n
sp
ar
en
cy
0.
36
39
**
*
-0
.0
93
1*
**
-0
.0
45
8
-0
.1
0
3
2
*
*
*
0
.0
3
2
1
0
.5
6
3
2
*
*
*
0.
4
3
8
9
*
*
*
-0
.2
3
6
3
*
*
*
0
.0
6
3
8
*
*
-0
.1
1
2
4
*
*
*
1
58
2.6. Conclusion
Table 2.8: The impact of foreign bank ownership on bank NIMs.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1995-2011) (1995-2004) (2005-2011) Trend in-
teract.
Foreign
Share
Inter.
fb -0.003 -0.008*** 0.004* -0.015*** -0.010*
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.005) (0.005)
fb*trend 0.001***
(0.000)
trend -0.002**
(0.001)
fb*foreignshare 0.012*
(0.007)
foreignshare 0.022**
(0.011)
share -0.000 -0.008 -0.012 -0.006 -0.004
(0.012) (0.017) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
liquidity 0.045*** 0.039* 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.045***
(0.010) (0.021) (0.011) (0.010) (0.011)
equityratio 0.116*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.116*** 0.117***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017)
llp tea 0.065*** 0.080*** 0.055 0.063*** 0.065***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.043) (0.018) (0.018)
cti -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
hhi -0.079*** -0.064 -0.114* -0.074*** -0.070**
(0.027) (0.050) (0.064) (0.027) (0.027)
gdpgrowth -0.155*** -0.164** -0.038 -0.156*** -0.141**
(0.058) (0.079) (0.051) (0.059) (0.057)
inflation -0.002 -0.002 0.134*** -0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.048) (0.003) (0.003)
real ir -0.008 -0.001 -0.001 -0.008 -0.021
(0.030) (0.034) (0.050) (0.030) (0.031)
Constant 0.082*** 0.059 0.051*** 0.086*** 0.080***
(0.024) (0.039) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1694 860 834 1694 1694
R-sq 0.324 0.343 0.417 0.327 0.329
This table shows regression results of the impact of foreign bank ownership on host country
NIMs while controlling for bank specific, market structure and macroeconomic factors. The
dependent variable is bank NIM. Table 2.1 contains definitions of all variables. The model is
estimated using OLS with both country and year fixed effects. All the estimations are made
for the whole sample (1995-2011), for the first sample period only (1995-2004) and for the
second sample period only (2005-2011). Robust standard errors appear in brackets. * indicates
significance at the 10% level. ** at the 5% level. *** at the 1% level.
59
Chapter 2. Foreign bank entry and NIMs: evidence from SEE
Table 2.9: The impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on bank NIMs in host countries.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
(1995-2011) (1995-2004) (2005-2011) Trend in-
teract.
Foreign
Share
Inter.
fb acq -0.003 -0.006** 0.003 -0.015*** -0.003
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.006)
fb green -0.002 -0.010*** 0.005** -0.016** -0.014**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.007) (0.006)
fb acq*trend 0.001***
(0.000)
fb green*trend 0.001**
(0.001)
trend -0.002**
(0.001)
fb acq*foreignshare 0.001
(0.007)
fb green*foreignshare 0.019**
(0.008)
foreignshare 0.023**
(0.011)
share 0.001 -0.011 -0.010 -0.004 -0.003
(0.012) (0.017) (0.010) (0.011) (0.012)
liquidity 0.045*** 0.038* 0.051*** 0.046*** 0.044***
(0.010) (0.021) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
equityratio 0.116*** 0.114*** 0.115*** 0.116*** 0.116***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.026) (0.017) (0.017)
llp tea 0.065*** 0.079*** 0.055 0.063*** 0.065***
(0.018) (0.020) (0.043) (0.018) (0.018)
cti -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
hhi -0.079*** -0.065 -0.116* -0.075*** -0.068**
(0.027) (0.050) (0.064) (0.027) (0.028)
gdpgrowth -0.155*** -0.165** -0.039 -0.156*** -0.140**
(0.058) (0.079) (0.051) (0.059) (0.057)
inflation -0.002 -0.002 0.133*** -0.001 -0.003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.048) (0.003) (0.003)
real ir -0.008 -0.001 0.001 -0.008 -0.022
(0.030) (0.034) (0.051) (0.030) (0.031)
Constant 0.081*** 0.062 0.051*** 0.085*** 0.080***
(0.024) (0.039) (0.014) (0.024) (0.023)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 1694 860 834 1694 1694
R-sq 0.324 0.343 0.417 0.327 0.330
This table shows regression results of the impact of the mode of foreign bank entry on host
country NIMs while controlling for bank specific, market structure and macroeconomic factors.
The dependent variable is bank NIM. Table 2.1 contains definitions of all variables. The model
is estimated using OLS with both country and year fixed effects. All the estimations are made
for the whole sample (1995-2011), for the first sample period only (1995-2004) and for the
second sample period only (2005-2011). Robust standard errors appear in brackets. * indicates
significance at the 10% level. ** at the 5% level. *** at the 1% level.
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Table 2.10: The impact of parent bank NIMs on bank NIMs in host countries.
(1) (2) (3)
(1995-2011) (1995-2004) (2005-2011)
fb -0.006*** -0.009*** -0.002
(0.002) (0.003) (0.003)
fb*NIM parent 0.155*** 0.035 0.229***
(0.043) (0.080) (0.047)
NIM parent 0.000 0.000 0.000
(.) (.) (.)
share -0.002 -0.008 -0.014
(0.012) (0.017) (0.010)
liquidity 0.046*** 0.039* 0.052***
(0.010) (0.021) (0.011)
equityratio 0.117*** 0.115*** 0.119***
(0.017) (0.021) (0.026)
llp tea 0.065*** 0.080*** 0.059
(0.018) (0.020) (0.042)
cti -0.000*** -0.000*** -0.000***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
hhi -0.076*** -0.064 -0.120**
(0.027) (0.050) (0.061)
gdpgrowth -0.154*** -0.165** -0.013
(0.059) (0.079) (0.050)
inflation -0.002 -0.002 0.144***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.045)
real ir -0.008 -0.001 0.017
(0.030) (0.034) (0.048)
Constant 0.082*** 0.059 0.048***
(0.023) (0.039) (0.014)
Country FE Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes
N 1694 860 834
R-sq 0.329 0.343 0.443
This table shows regression results of the impact of parent bank NIMs on foreign bank NIMs
in host countries while controlling for bank specific, market structure and macroeconomic
factors. For completeness parent bank NIM (NIM parent) is also included in addition to its
interaction with the foreign bank dummy variable (fb*NIM parent) however it does not yield
any estimations because NIM parent takes values (varies) only among foreign banks and stays
constant (has a value of zero) for domestic banks. NIM parent can therefore be omitted from
the estimations without affecting the rest of the results. The dependent variable is bank NIM.
Table 2.1 contains definitions of all variables. The model is estimated using OLS with both
country and year fixed effects. All the estimations are made for the whole sample (1995-2011),
for the first sample period only (1995-2004) and for the second sample period only (2005-2011).
Robust standard errors appear in brackets. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** at the
5% level. *** at the 1% level.
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2.6. Conclusion
Figures
Figure 2.1: Host and home countries.
The map shows nine South-east European countries as host countries (in dark grey) and the
home countries of foreign banks operating in this region (in light grey). The size of the circles
shows the relative importance of home countries in the total South-east European banking
system. The larger the circle the higher the number of foreign banks in SEE coming from that
country.(Note: United States also belongs to home countries, although it does not appear on
the map).
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Appendices
Appendix 2A. Testing for structural breaks in foreignshare variable.
The Chow test (Chow (1960)) pre-supposes that we know the date at which the structural
break occurs. More realistically, in our case the exact structural change can happen at years
shortly before or after the year 2005 suggested by the visual inspection of the time series plot.
Because we cannot state with accuracy the year of the structural change, a modified Chow test-
the Quandt likelihood ratio (QLR) statistics is used (also known as the sup-Wald statistics)
(Quandt (1960)). The QLR statistic is a modified Chow test which tests for breaks at all pos-
sible dates within a sub-sample range, and then using the largest of the resulting F-statistics
to test for a break at an unknown date. Since the QLR statistics is the largest of many F-
statistics, its critical values are obtained from a special distribution which is different from that
of an individual F-statistic. This distribution depends on the number of restrictions, i.e. the
number of coefficients (including the intercept) that are allowed to break (change) under the
alternative hypothesis as well as on the subsample range over which the F-statistics are com-
puted. A common choice is a 15% trimming, which means that the F-statistics are computed
for break dates within the central 70% of the sample. The critical values for different trimming
percentages, number of restrictions and significance levels are given in Stock and Watson (2012)
Table 14.6 and Andrews (2003). In our case the critical value with 15% trimming, 2 degrees
of freedom (one lag and the intercept) and 5% significance level is F25% = 5.86. Results are
shown in Table 2A. We note that the largest of the F-values is realized in 2004 and exceeds the
5% critical value, suggesting that this is an estimator of the break date.
Table 2A. QRL test for break in Foreignshare series with 15% trimming.
Year QLR statistics
1995 .
1996 .
1997 2.8443
1998 3.9448
1999 10.9186
2000 4.819
2001 5.4693
2002 4.3989
2003 4.6363
2004 385.2596
2005 5.9758
2006 7.6145
2007 5.2487
2008 4.8765
2009 .
2010 .
2011 .
Figure 2A. QRL test for break in Foreignshare series.
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Chapter 3
Organizational Hierarchy and
Institutions
3.1 Introduction
In his theory of the firm, Coase (1937) argues that the optimal structure of a firm
depends on its institutional environment. Subsequent work in this literature have
tried to understand how informational and agency problems between managers
and their employees shape the nature of information acquisition and the kinds of
activities that a firm can efficiently undertake (Bolton and Dewatripont (1994);
Aghion and Bolton (1997); Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1999); Stein (2002);
Dewatripont and Tirole (2005)). The central idea in this literature is that in
more hierarchical production processes information flows between different levels
of hierarchies become difficult. These models apply naturally to the banking in-
dustry where lending activities are very sensitive to information sharing. Despite
the theoretical emphasis, not much is known about the impact of institutions on
bank organizational structures. One of the reasons for a lack of empirical work
is data availability. Bank internal organizational structures are very difficult to
observe in practice. It is even more difficult to obtain this data for a cross-section
of countries.
In this paper we investigate how the legal and institutional environment in a
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country affects bank organizational structures using a unique bank-level survey
dataset. The dataset contains information on the hierarchy of bank lending de-
cisions, lending techniques used by banks, risk management procedures as well
as their perceptions of the institutional environment they operate in. The use
of this data makes it possible to distinguish the behaviour of banks operating
in countries with different financial and institutional environments. To further
sharpen the analysis we focus on foreign affiliates of the same parent bank oper-
ating in countries with different financial and institutional environments, thereby
implicitly controlling for factors common to all affiliates of the same parent bank.
This offers a cleaner test of the impact of institutions on the choice of bank or-
ganizational structures.
Studying bank internal organizational structures is important for both academics
and policy makers alike. The level of decision-making authority has an impact on
the type of information acquired and used in lending decisions and consequently
on the type of borrowers banks lend to. This has an impact on bank performance,
the kinds of risks banks are exposed to as well as the overall stability of the
banking sector and the local economic development. The results of this paper
present the first empirical evidence on the role of institutions in shaping the
internal organization structure of banks.
A priori it is not clear whether weak financial and legal institutions will favour
a centralized (i.e. more hierarchical) or a decentralized organizational struc-
ture. The theory of hierarchical control (Williamson (1967)) suggests that as the
organization becomes more hierarchical it loses control between successive hierar-
chical layers because of distortions in information flows. Given that an important
part of bank operations is local in nature (i.e. lending to information-intensive
borrowers) the level of decentralization of bank lending decisions becomes an
important mechanism for addressing information asymmetries and the resulting
agency problems between local information-collecting officers and the decision-
making centres. In order to minimize information distortions managers may
choose to delegate decision-making authority to lower hierarchical levels. As il-
lustrated in Figure 3.1 this reduces information asymmetries between banks and
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borrowers, but at the same time increases the within bank information asym-
metries (i.e. the hierarchical distance between loan officers and headquarters).
To the extent that this increased information asymmetry is offset by better in-
sight into the local market, headquarters will grant more lending discretion to
local loan officers. We posit that the need for local insight is higher in countries
with weaker institutions where information asymmetries are of a greater concern.
This would imply a negative relation between institutional quality and the level
of decentralization.
On the other hand the weaker the institutional environment the higher the in-
formational rent of local loan officers who can acquire specific knowledge of the
local economy and use it strategically (to make biased lending decisions), es-
pecially when dealing with soft information, unverifiable by higher bank levels.
To ensure that loans are evaluated properly and uncalculated risks not taken,
headquarters are inclined to adopt a more centralized organizational structure.
Because weak institutions make foreign affiliates less transparent (i.e. more diffi-
cult to monitor), informational and agency problems within the organization are
increased. To maintain control over the whole organization headquarters may
choose to centralize decision-making and impose formal accountability at the ex-
pense of losing local market knowledge. This implies a positive relation between
institutional quality and the level of decentralization. Uncovering which effect
dominates the other therefore remains an empirical question. The hypothesis we
test is the following:
H1: The institutional environment has a significant impact on bank organiza-
tional hierarchy.
The analysis makes use of the EBRD Banking Environment and Performance
Survey (BEPS) II conducted through face-to-face interviews with bank CEOs
across 32 EBRD countries of operation and a total of 611 banks16. The banking
16The EBRD countries of operation include: Central Europe and the Baltic states: Croa-
tia, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovak Republic and Slovenia; South-eastern
Europe: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Macedonia, Montenegro, Romania, Serbia
and Turkey; Eastern Europe and Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Moldova,
Ukraine and Russia; Central Asia: Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Turk-
menistan and Uzbekistan; SEMED: Egypt, Jordan, Morocco and Tunisia.
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sector of these countries is mainly owned by a handful of Western European banks
which have a network of foreign affiliates in several countries in the region making
it an ideal testing ground for the current analysis. We first examine the impact
of host country institutions on the level of decentralization of bank activities.
The results show a strong positive relation between institutional quality and
decentralization, suggesting that parent banks derive informational benefits from
strong institutions in host countries making the net effect of institutional quality
on decentralization positive and significant.
Building on this initial result and using the same theoretical framework as above,
we conjecture that decentralized organizational structures have an advantage in
lending to SMEs in strong institutional environments where both the within bank
and the bank-borrower distance are reduced. The ability of decentralized banks
to gather information specific to the local economy gives them an advantage
in effectively screening and monitoring potential borrowers which would imply
better lending terms compared to centralized banks. The more decision-making
authority given to lower hierarchical levels the more incentive they have to acquire
and act on soft information (Stein (2002)), thereby increasing the bank’s ability
to discriminate between good and bad borrowers. The second hypothesis we test
is therefore:
H2: SME loan terms improve with the decentralization of bank lending activities
driven by institutional quality.
We supplement the bank-level data with firm and loan-level information form
the Business Environment Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS) V, and as-
sess whether centralized and decentralized banks give different loan terms to
SMEs in different institutional environments. We find that strong institutional
environments (as measured by the quality of contract enforcement, availability
of credit information and the efficiency of the banking regulator) which favour
decentralized organizational structures lead to better lending terms for SMEs
- decentralized banks are less likely to require collateral, give longer maturity
loans and charge lower interest rates than their centralized counterparts. Fur-
thermore, we investigate whether these relationships vary across different types
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of firms. We find that it is the most informationally-intensive firms (smaller,
younger, non-audited), which are otherwise at a disadvantage when borrowing
from banks, that benefit the most from stronger institutions by receiving better
loan contracts from decentralized banks. This is consistent with previous studies
(Berger et al. (2005); Mian (2006); Canales and Nanda (2012)) who find that
decentralized organizational structures lend more to soft-information borrowers.
This paper adds to the literature on organizational structure and information
production. Theoretical work has emphasized the role of hierarchical distance
between managers and employees in shaping the incentives to acquire and use
various types of information. Hierarchical organizations reduce the incentives to
acquire soft unverifiable information as this information cannot be credibly shared
between hierarchical layers (Aghion and Tirole (1997); Stein (2002)). Information
collecting agents, therefore reduce their ex-ante effort as they cannot act on the
information acquired but instead have to pass it to higher decision-making levels.
Information flows between hierarchical layers, especially when information is soft,
is difficult because of strategic manipulation of information (Crawford and Sobel
(1982)) or ex-post communication costs (Radner (1993); Bolton and Dewatripont
(1994)). Empirically, studies have used intra-firm data (Liberti and Mian (2009);
Skrastins and Vig (2014)) or within country data (Cole et al. (2004); Berger
et al. (2005); Mian (2006); Canales and Nanda (2012); Beck, Ioannidou and
Schaefer (2014)) to provide evidence on the impact of internal distance within
organizations on the type of information used. We contribute to this literature
by introducing a new and direct measure of within bank hierarchical distance
and by showing that institutional quality has a strong positive association with
the decentralization of bank lending activities.
The results of the paper also contribute to the law and finance literature pio-
neered by La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997, 1998), which
supports the view that stronger institutional environments are correlated with
better financial and economic outcomes. Empirical studies in this line of research
have found that legal and institutional differences across countries not only im-
pact the total supply of credit i.e. the extensive margin (Djankov, Mc Liesh and
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Shleifer (2007), Haselmann, Pistor and Vig (2010)) but also shape financial con-
tracts - the intensive margin - for firms with access to credit. Qian and Strahan
(2007) for instance, using a sample of bank loans made to large firms across 43
countries, show that under strong creditor protection, loans have longer matu-
rities, lower interest rates and more concentrated ownership. We contribute to
this literature by revealing a channel through which the legal and institutional
environment impacts lending, namely, the hierarchy of bank lending decisions.
The paper proceeds as follows. The next section provides the theoretical frame-
work and reviews the related empirical literature. Section 3.3 presents the data
and descriptive statistics. The empirical methodology is provided in Section 3.4.
Section 3.5 presents the results and Section 3.6 concludes.
3.2 Related literature
There is a vast literature in organizational theory emphasising the role of organi-
zational structure in the acquisition, transmission and usage of information within
an organization. The separation of tasks across organizational layers with agents
from one layer relying on information produced by agents from another layer
gives rise to information asymmetries within an organization. The dichotomy
between centralized (i.e. hierarchical) and decentralized (i.e. delegated) orga-
nizational structures is at the centre of theories relating organizational design
to information production. In centralized organizational structures decisions are
taken at higher hierarchical levels using information produced by agents at lower
hierarchical levels. In decentralized organizational structures the decision-making
authority is delegated to agents at lower hierarchical layers responsible for gener-
ating the information. The advantage of decentralization is a better utilization of
information as decision-making is closer to information production. The disad-
vantage, on the other hand, is the loss of control between successive hierarchical
layers. The preferred organizational design therefore depends on the trade-off
between information and control.
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3.2.1 Organizational structure and information produc-
tion: Theory
Theories of the optimal delegation of authority can be classified into two broad
categories: incentive-based and communication cost theories. Incentive-based
theories argue that in hierarchical organizations the ex-ante incentive to acquire
and use information is diminished as information-collecting agents cannot uti-
lize the information instead have to pass it on to higher hierarchical levels for
decision-making. Aghion and Bolton (1997) develop a theory of the allocation
of authority within an organization distinguishing between formal authority (the
right to decide) and real authority (the effective control over decisions). Key to
their analysis is the existence of information asymmetries between the uninformed
principal who has formal authority and the informed agent. If the principal is
sufficiently uninformed relative to the agent and if their objectives are not too
divergent, the principal will never overrule the agent’s decision, i.e. will give the
agent real authority. The more real authority an agent has the higher his ini-
tiative to invest in information acquisition but at the same time the higher the
loss of control for the principal. Stein (2002) makes the distinction between hard
and soft information. Soft information by its nature is not directly verifiable by
anyone other than the agent that produces it. As such, it cannot be unambigu-
ously passed on to a different hierarchical layer. In contrast, hard information
is easily verifiable and can be transferred easily between hierarchical layers. An
implication of his model is that large hierarchical firms are at a disadvantage
when dealing with soft information. In the context of banks lending to SMEs the
model implies that large banks are not well suited for small-business lending as
it relies heavily on soft information.
Communication cost theories emphasise the role of communication and coordina-
tion across hierarchical levels in determining the optimal organizational design.
The focus here is on the delegation of information-processing rather than the
delegation of incentives. Emphasising the tendency of the informed party to
strategically manipulate his information Crawford and Sobel (1982) develop a
model of strategic communication where the informed agent (the sender) sends a
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noisy signal, based on his private information, to the uninformed principal (the
receiver). An implication of their model is that the less divergent the objectives
of the sender and the receiver are the more communication is likely to play an
important role, and that equilibrium signalling is more informative the more sim-
ilar their preferences are. Dessein (2002) focuses on delegation as an alternative
to communication within an organization. He argues that the principal delegates
authority in order to avoid communication with the agent which can be noisy and
used strategically by the agent because of their different objectives. The agent’s
superior information stems from his local knowledge of the business environment
and is assumed to be soft, i.e. it cannot be certified by the agent. The principal
can utilize the local knowledge of the agent either through delegation or commu-
nication. Delegation is preferred to communication when the divergence of incen-
tives is not too large relative to the principal’s uncertainty about the environment.
In the context of small business lending the uncertainty about the possible out-
comes of the decision is large which would favour decentralization rather than
centralization and communication. Other work has focused on ex-post commu-
nication costs. Becker and Murphy (1992) argue that while specialization (which
is more likely in hierarchies) increases productivity it also increases coordination
costs among specialized workers. Radner (1993) shows that hierarchical organiza-
tions are in fact more effective in decentralizing information-processing activities.
The large scale of hierarchies and the limited information-processing capability
of individuals make decentralization an efficient organizational form (where effi-
ciency is measured as the time between the receipt of information and the time
the decision is made). Similarly, Bolton and Dewatripont (1994) emphasise the
trade-off between specialization and communication giving particular importance
to returns to specialization. The question they address is how can organizations
minimize the costs of processing and communicating information. When returns
to specialization (which stem from the increased ability of workers over time to
process a particular type of information) outweigh the costs of communication,
it is efficient to delegate tasks to subordinates.
Overall, both the incentive and non-incentive based theories of organizational
structures suggest that centralization while maintaining control and allowing for
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greater specialization, because of agency and communication costs cannot fully
utilize the information generated by lower hierarchical levels. This is particularly
important for soft information which is subjective in nature and not easily trans-
ferred across organizational layers. As SMEs rely heavily on soft information the
organizational structure of banks is of paramount importance for the amount and
terms of lending.
3.2.2 Organizational structure and information produc-
tion: Evidence
Empirically, studies have used intra firm data or within country data to provide
evidence about the effect of organizational structures on information production
and use. Some studies use direct measures of allocation of authority, while others
use indirect measures such as bank size, complexity or foreign ownership.
3.2.2.1 Studies using indirect measures of bank organizational struc-
ture
Important insights about the effects of bank organizational structure can be
gained from studies using indirect measures. The literature has usually asso-
ciated large, organizationally complex or foreign-owned banks as having a hierar-
chical and centralized business model. Using a data set with information on over
900,000 loans made by a sample of US banks during the late 80s and early 90s
Berger and Udell (1996) examine the relation of bank size and complexity with
loan price and quantity. They posit that as banks become larger and more organ-
isationally complex they will reduce the supply of credit (i.e. increase price and
lower quantity) to small businesses because of Williamson-type organizational
diseconomies from the joint provision of multiple activities. As more activities
are added to bank’s operations it complicates the management of the banking
organization which has often resulted in increased layers of management. This
incentivizes large banks to abandon small business lending and instead focus their
resources on a narrower range of activities in order to avoid the organizational
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diseconomies associated with more complex organizations. They find support
for the hypothesis that large banks reduce lending to small businesses. Further-
more, they find that larger banks charge lower interest rates and less often require
collateral from small business borrowers. Results are less conclusive for organi-
zational complexity variables (measured as layers of bank management, number
of different bank units and different functions within a bank).
Strahan and Weston (1998) address a related question focusing on the trade-off
between organizational diseconomies and diversification benefits as the size of
the banking company increases. Organizational diseconomies resulting from the
increased complexity of a large bank may increase the relative cost of provid-
ing relationship lending to small businesses. On the other hand as bank size
increases diversification reduces the cost of monitoring and improves internal
capital markets which should decrease the cost of small business lending. They
test these hypotheses for US using the Call Report data and find support for the
diversification hypothesis. Specifically, as bank size increases so does the level of
small business lending, although for very large banks small business lending as a
percentage of total assets declines because lending to large businesses increases
faster, consistent with the idea that diversification enhances lending to both small
and large businesses. Using the same database DeYoung, Goldberg and White
(1999) provide further evidence by testing whether bank size impacts small busi-
ness lending after controlling for a number of age-related variables. They find
that the size of the bank is negatively associated with small business lending,
whereas the number of bank branches has no consistent impact on small business
lending.
Several studies have provided indirect evidence on the impact of bank size, com-
plexity and organizational structure on small business lending by examining bank
consolidation activities. Berger, Saunders, Scalise and Udell (1998) analyse the
effects of over 6,000 US bank M&As from the late 70s to the early 90s on the
lending of almost all US banks. They find that the aggregation of banking insti-
tutions is negatively associated with small business lending, although other banks
in the same local market offset this negative effect. Results are consistent with
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the idea that consolidated institutions may avoid relationship-based small busi-
ness loans because of their lack of comparative advantage in this market segment,
but as long as these loans are positive NPV investments they will be picked up
by other local lenders. Peek and Rosengren (1998) find that the small business
loan portfolio share of the consolidated bank reverts to the pre-merger portfolio
share of the acquirer. For large acquirers, which typically have a smaller port-
folio share of small business loans it means that mergers shrink small business
lending. Sapienza (2002) analyses the effects of banking consolidation on indi-
vidual borrowers. Using individual loan data between banks and companies they
analyse changes in loan terms of the consolidated institutions. They find that as
the local market share of the acquired bank increases the efficiency effect is offset
by monopoly power (i.e. an increase in interest rates). Furthermore, they find
that the probability of a small firm to borrow in the future from the consolidated
bank is lower when it is a client of the target bank than small borrowers of banks
that do not merge. The results are consistent with the idea that large and small
banks have different organizational structures and lending technologies.
In a similar vein, Cole et al. (2004) use survey data from a nationally representa-
tive sample of small businesses operating in US as of year-end 1992 to investigate
differences in the loan approval decisions made by banks of different sizes. They
provide supporting evidence for the hypothesis that small and large banks use dif-
ferent approaches when evaluating small business loan applications. Large banks
rely more on quantitative indicators when making their loan approval decisions.
They are more likely to grant loans to firms that are larger, with a longer track
record and those that keep formal financial records. In contrast, small banks look
beyond these formal financial indicators and rely more on pre-existing relation-
ships with the borrower which allows them to accumulate knowledge about the
character of the borrower. Berger et al. (2005) test the theory of Stein (2002)
that small banks provide greater incentives for the production and usage of soft
information as the decision-making authority is more likely to be closer to the
source of information collection, whereas large banks are better at dealing with
hard information. Using the Federal Reserve’s 1993 National Survey of Small
Business Finance (NSSBF) they find support for this theory - large banks tend
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to lend mostly to large firms with good financial history while small banks lend
to more financially opaque clients. Using survey data from a sample of US small
firms conducted by the National Federation of Independent Business (NFIB),
Scott (2004) constructs an index that proxies for the quality of soft information
production. Business owners are asked to rate the importance of a set of charac-
teristics that describe the interaction between them and their primary financial
institution on a scale of 1 to 5. These characteristics include: the knowledge of the
bank about the firm and its business, the industry, the local market/community
and the personal contact of the borrower with the loan officer which all capture
some aspects of soft information production. Businesses also rank the perfor-
mance of the bank they do business with along each of these dimensions. Banks
with a higher ranking generally do a better job at dealing with soft informa-
tion. He finds that community financial institutions (CFIs) are ranked higher by
their small business borrowers indicating their superior ability in soft information
production compared to other banks.
Another trend of literature uses geographical or cultural distance between bor-
rowers and banks to measure its impact on small business finance. The rationale
is that banks headquartered at a greater cultural or geographical distance to their
borrower are typically larger and more hierarchically organized which prevents
them from utilizing all the soft information generated at lower hierarchical levels.
This puts them at a disadvantage when lending to SMEs.
Using loan-level data for Pakistan Mian (2006) shows that foreign banks tend to
shy away from soft-information based loans such as loans made to small firms,
firms located in smaller cities, first-time borrowers which require relational con-
tracting. This is consistent with the hypothesis that foreign banks face informa-
tional and agency costs when making relational loans at a distance. Distance
could be defined either as geographical distance between foreign bank headquar-
ters and the local subsidiary, cultural distance, within-bank distance due to bank
size or legal/institutional distance between the country of origin of the foreign
bank and the host country. They find that geographical and cultural distance
are the most important attributes explaining lending differences between foreign
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and domestic banks. Alessandrini, Presbitero and Zazzaro (2009) examine the
impact of reduced operational distance (between banks and borrowers) and in-
creased functional distance (between decision-making centres and local branches
i.e. within bank distance) on firm’s financing constraints using a sample of Italian
manufacturing firms from 1995 to 2003. They find that a greater functional dis-
tance adversely affects local firms’ credit availability. In contrast, a reduced oper-
ational distance has an ambiguous impact on firm financing constraints. De Haas
et al. (2010) show that bank size and ownership are important determinants of
banks’ portfolio composition. Foreign banks are more active in lending to sub-
sidiaries of international firms. In addition, large banks lend relatively less to
SMEs and more to large corporates compared to small banks. Popov and Udell
(2012) using survey data for a sample of SMEs in emerging Europe find that
SMEs in localities dominated by branches or subsidiaries of foreign banks re-
ported higher credit constraints during the early stages of the 2007-2008 finan-
cial crisis. De Haas and Van Horen (2013) show that during the financial crisis
when cross-border banks had to reassess the attractiveness of lending abroad,
they were less likely to curtail lending to markets that were geographically close,
where they had established prior lending relationships, where they were present
via a local subsidiary and where they cooperated with local banks. This indicates
that bank-borrower closeness helps banks overcome information asymmetries es-
pecially so during crisis times when this closeness becomes more valuable. In a
similar vein Beck, Degryse, De Haas and Van Horen (2014) show that a higher
proportion of relationship banks in the vicinity of the firm is associated with less
credit constraints in 2008-2009 when the financial crisis had started but had no
significant impact in 2005 during the lending boom. Beck, Ioannidou and Schae-
fer (2014) compare loan terms of foreign and domestic banks holding constant
differences in their clienteles. Using loan-level data from the credit registry of
Bolivia for the period 1999-2003, they find that foreign bank loans are more likely
to have collateral and have shorter maturities than domestic bank loans. They
also find that foreign banks charge lower interest rates compared to domestic
banks. Furthermore, credit scores and collateral explain a much larger variation
of the pricing of foreign bank loans compared to domestic bank loans. Overall,
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the results show that foreign banks rely more on transaction-based technologies
to overcome information asymmetries in credit markets whereas domestic banks
on relationship lending.
Overall this strand of literature shows that greater distance between banks and
borrowers increases information asymmetries and worsens lending outcomes es-
pecially for small businesses for which soft information is very important for
designing loan contracts.
3.2.2.2 Studies using direct measures of bank organizational structure
Studies using direct measures of bank organizational structure focus on the direct
allocation of authority. As these data is more difficult to obtain all of these studies
focus either on survey data from a single country or on proprietary data from
a single bank allowing them to provide important insights about the impact of
bank organizational structure on lending outcomes.
Canales and Nanda (2012) using a loan-level dataset on SME loans in Mexico
for the period 2002-2006 find that small firms and firms that rely more on soft
information get larger loans from decentralized banks. Furthermore, they find
that the ability of decentralized banks to collect and act on soft information may
allow them to better exploit their market power in concentrated markets. In
concentrated banking markets, decentralized banks give smaller loans and charge
higher interest rates compared to their centralized counterparts. Overall, their
results indicate that the relative benefit of decentralized organizational structures
in terms of SME lending depends on the institutional and competitive environ-
ment in which banks operate. Qian et al. (2015) use the reforms implemented in
China’s banking sector following China’s entrance into the World Trade Organi-
zation which delegated authority to individual loan officers as an exogenous shock
to their incentives to produce information. Exploiting a proprietary loan-level
data from a large state-owned bank they find that better loan officer incentives
and reduced communication costs (measured as the length of time the loan of-
ficer - the information producer and the branch president - the decision-making
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authority have worked together) improve information production and use leading
to increased credit supply and better loan outcomes. Liberti and Mian (2009)
use data from the credit dossiers of above 400 large corporate loan applicants in
1998 of a multinational bank operating in Argentina. The data contains the loan
approval process and the type of information (subjective and objective) gath-
ered for each applicant. They exploit an exogenous variation of the hierarchical
distance travelled by a loan application for it to be approved, generated by a pre-
determined bank rule. While some loan applications are approved at lower hier-
archical levels others have to go at higher hierarchical levels for approval. They
find that the approved loan amount is more sensitive to objective information
at higher hierarchical levels, whereas the sensitivity to subjective information is
significantly lower. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010) use information from all small
business loan applications to a large US bank over a fifteen-month period as well
as the credit offers made by the bank. They find that there is a trade-off between
the availability and pricing of credit. Bank-borrower proximity facilitates access
to credit but increases loan rates. Higher subjective (proprietary) information
about the firm decreases loan rates, however this effect weakens for firms located
close to their branches consistent with the idea that banks enjoy local informa-
tional advantage which they use to carve out local captive markets only for nearby
firms. For peripheral firms the informational advantage of the bank erodes (due
to the diminishing quality of their private information) subjecting them to more
competition and more switching by firms. Similarly, Degryse and Ongena (2005)
using a proprietary dataset consisting of loans made by a large Belgian bank to
SMEs analyse the impact of geographical distance on loan interest rates. In line
with the spatial price discrimination hypothesis they find that bank-borrower dis-
tance decreases loan rates, whereas competing bank-borrower distance increases
them, indicating that banks derive location rents from nearby firms. Finally,
Skrastins and Vig (2014) use information from a large state-owned bank operat-
ing across India with over 2,000 branches. They exploit a branch restructuring
policy driven by pre-determined rules which gives more discretionary power to
branches which over the last two years have exceeded a fixed cut-off point in terms
of total loans and deposits. The branch organizational design is thus exogenous
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from the borrower perspective. Using a difference-in-difference research strategy
they find that an increase in organizational hierarchy reduces lending to new
borrowers, increases loan delinquencies and decreases the return on loans con-
sistent with the incentive-based theories predicting an information loss in more
hierarchical organizations. They also find that hierarchical structures perform
better in more corrupt states as it facilitates control. This is consistent with the
view that while delegation provides incentives for (soft) information production
it also enables rent extraction from more informed information-collecting agents
more so in corrupt environments where the tendency for strategic manipulation
of private information is more pervasive.
We contribute to the strand of literature using direct measures of bank organiza-
tional hierarchy by employing a large cross-section of countries to provide direct
evidence on the role of the institutional environment in shaping the internal or-
ganizational structure of banks.
3.2.3 Organizational structure and loan contracts
Banks use contractual features to overcome information asymmetries which in
turn are a function of their organizational structure and the environment in
which they operate. The literature on financial intermediation emphasises the
role of banks in producing information about borrowers (Diamond (1984, 1991);
Ramakrishnan and Thakor (1984)). The incomplete contracts theory (Aghion
and Bolton (1992); Hart and Moore (1994, 1998)) suggests that creditors will give
more favourable loan terms if they are better protected in the case of default.
Banks as opposed to public debt markets have a comparative advantage and
enjoy economies of scale in producing information about borrowers especially for
information-intensive ones (such as SMEs) which require close relationships with
the lending bank. Banks use the information generated to monitor borrowers
and design contract terms in a way that improves borrower incentives. Boot
and Thakor (1994) demonstrate that as the bank-borrower relationship matures
the loan interest rate and the amount of collateral pledged decline. In contrast,
Sharpe (1990) shows that interest rates increase over time as banks subsidize
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borrowers early in the relationship to be reimbursed in later periods. Berger and
Udell (1995) using data from the National Survey of Small Business Finances
(NSSBF) find that bank-borrower relationships reduce the probability of pledging
collateral and interest rates charged. We contribute to this literature by analyzing
loan contracts offered by banks of different organizational structures (centralized
vs. decentralized) in response to the institutional environment they operate.
3.2.4 Institutional environment
The institutional quality of a country shapes the incentives of borrowers and
lenders, hence the outcome of credit contracts. In their seminal papers (La Porta
et al. (1997, 1998)) show that stronger legal protection of investors are associated
with better financial and economic outcomes. Djankov et al. (2007) show that
better creditor rights and information sharing institutions increase the ratio of
private credit to GDP. At the micro level Haselmann et al. (2010) for a sample
of banks in twelve transition economies show that banks increase the supply of
credit after a legal change. Similarly, Haselmann and Wachtel (2010) find that
the better the legal environment the more willing a bank is to lend to informa-
tionally opaque borrowers such as SMEs, whereas the proportion of lending to
large enterprises and the government is lower. Qian and Strahan (2007) use a
sample of bank loans made to large borrowers across 43 countries to investigate
the impact of legal and institutional differences on loan terms. They find that
strong creditor rights protection is associated with longer loan maturities, lower
interest rates, more concentrated loan ownership and an increased participation
by foreign banks. Similarly, Bae and Goyal (2009) using a sample of bank loans
made to firms in 48 countries show that it is the enforceability of contracts, not
merely the existence of rights that is important for credit contract terms. They
find that better enforceability of contracts increases the loan amount, lengthens
loan maturity and reduces the loan spread. Finally, Liberti and Mian (2010) fo-
cus on a sample of small business loans issued by a multinational bank across 15
countries to investigate the impact of different levels of financial and institutional
environments on the collateral cost of capital. Using creditor rights, legal origin
89
Chapter 3. Organizational Hierarchy and Institutions
and information sharing institutions as instruments for financial development
they find that the collateral spread (defined as the difference in collateraliza-
tion rates between low and high risk borrowers) declines with improvements in
financial development driven by institutional quality.
We add to this line of research by revealing a channel through which law impacts
lending, namely, the hierarchy of bank lending decisions.
3.3 Data
To investigate the relation between bank organizational structure and loan terms
to firms operating in different institutional environments we combine two main
databases: bank-level data from the EBRD Banking Environment and Perfor-
mance Survey (BEPS) II17 with firm and loan level data from the EBRD-World
Bank Business Environment Enterprise Performance Survey (BEEPS)18. In addi-
tion, we supplement the data with indicators of institutional and macroeconomic
environment as well as bank ownership and financial statements data, which will
be described later in the section.
3.3.1 Bank Organizational Structure
To classify banks as either having a centralized or a decentralized organizational
structure we use BEPS II. The main purpose of this survey is to provide data
on bank lending activities, funding and risk management strategies, bank lend-
ing technologies, the competitive environment, the relation between parent and
foreign subsidiaries as well as the senior managers’ perceptions of the legal and
17BEPS II was jointly undertaken in 2012 by the EBRD and the European Banking Center
(EBC) at Tilburg University. A team of specialized consultants administered a common ques-
tionnaire through a face-to-face interview with the bank’s CEO across 32 countries in Eastern
Europe, Central Asia and southern and eastern Mediterranean and a total of 611 banks. Due
to confidentiality agreements with the participating banks the underlying data is not publicly
available.
18BEEPS is a joint initiative of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development
and the World Bank Group. The survey was first undertaken in 1999-2000 and subsequently
in 2002, 2005, 2008-2009 and the most recent fifth round in 2011-2013. The fifth round of the
survey (BEEPS V) covered around 15,600 enterprises in 30 countries.
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regulatory systems. The measure of organizational structure we use indicates the
hierarchical nature or the level of decision making authority within a bank. To
construct this variable we focus on the following question Where are SME Cus-
tomers’ applications typically (highest number of loans) finally approved? . The
respondents choose one of the options: (1) Headquarters (foreign), (2) Headquar-
ters (domestic), (3) Regional Office/Branch, (4) Local Office/Branch. Using the
responses to these questions we define the dummy variable Decentralized which
is one if lending decisions are made at either the regional or local office/branch
level, and zero otherwise.
Unlike previous studies that proxy hierarchical distance with bank size or for-
eign ownership, we have a direct measure of organizational structure allowing
us to differentiate between size or ownership effects and organizational structure
effects. Furthermore, these proxies implicitly assume that banks have a homo-
geneous organizational structure across the different market segments, i.e. SME,
large corporate and retail lending, which masks important differences on the in-
tensity of information required, hence the appropriate level of decision making
authority, when lending to different types of customers19. As the survey asked
the above question separately for the three market segments, it allows us to
focus on bank organizational structure related specifically to SME lending and
match it to information on loans granted to SMEs across countries with different
institutional environments. Table 3.2 reports country level summary statistics.
There is considerable variation in the proportion of decentralized banks operating
across countries. Banks in Albania and Serbia operate mainly with a centralized
business model. On the other hand above 65% of banks in Turkey, Morocco and
Kyrgyzstan adopt a decentralized business model.
19Indeed, unreported summary statistics for the same decentralization measure constructed
for large corporate and retail lending highlight this heterogeneity. Only 2.4% of interviewed
banks decentralize decision making for large corporate customers, whereas 40% of banks de-
centralize decision making for retail customers. This percentage is 22% for SME lending.
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3.3.2 Loan and firm data
To construct loan and firm-level variables we use the fifth round of BEEPS (2011-
2013). The purpose of this survey is to measure firms’ perceptions of the envi-
ronment in which they operate and the extent to which different aspects of the
business environment represent obstacles to enterprise growth. In addition, the
survey provides information on a number of firm characteristics such as firm age,
legal status, number of employees, location, industry etc. What is more impor-
tant for the current analysis is that the survey includes detailed questions on
firms’ financing arrangements. We focus only on firms that have a loan or line
of credit from a financial institution. For these firms we know the bank that
provided the most recent loan or line of credit which enables us to match firms to
the type of banks they borrow from, as measured by the Decentralized variable
constructed from BEPS II. More specifically, BEEPS provides information on
lending terms such as loan amount, annual nominal interest rate, loan maturity,
information on whether collateral was required as well as the type and value of
the collateral required, loan age and loan currency.
Table 3.3 compares loan terms of centralized and decentralized banks for all the
countries in the sample as well as divided by institutional environment. Looking
at the difference in loan terms across all the countries in the sample, decentralized
bank loans are less likely to have collateral, have shorter maturities and similar
(slightly higher) interest rates compared to centralized bank loans. These rela-
tionships however change when I split the countries into high and low institutional
environments (as measured by credit information availability, the quality of con-
tract enforcement or control of corruption). In countries with a weaker coverage
of credit information available through credit bureaus decentralized banks are
more likely to require collateral, grant loans with shorter maturities and charge
higher interest rates than centralized bank loans. In countries with more credit
information availability decentralized banks lend more favourably to SMEs com-
pared to centralized banks - are less likely to require collateral and do not give
significantly shorter loans or charge significantly higher interest rates. Similarly,
in countries with higher contract enforcement quality and control of corruption
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decentralized banks do not charge significantly higher interest rates or grant sig-
nificantly shorter loans and are less likely to require collateral. The descriptive
statistics is consistent with the hypothesis that decentralized banks derive in-
formational benefits from strong institutions and are better at processing soft
information.
3.3.3 Institutional and macroeconomic indicators
In addition to the organizational structure questions described above, and in
order to better understand the environment in which banks operate in different
countries BEPS II asked bank senior managers a number of questions relating
to their perceptions of the legal and regulatory systems in the countries they
operate. We use the responses to these questions to construct several bank level
variables: Pledges, Courts, Regulator and Corruption.
Pledges measures the quality of the law and its enforcement related to pledges (se-
curity rights over movable assets). In particular, it measures the extent to which
respondents agree that the laws related to pledges enable efficient enforcement
of security rights (simple, cheap, fast). The answers are given on a five-point
Likert scale ranging from 1 (Strongly disagree) to 5 (Strongly agree). Court Sys-
tem measures the extent to which the respondents agree that the court system
is quick and efficient in resolving business disputes, whereas Banking Regulator
measures the extent to which the respondents agree that the banking regulator is
able to enforce its decisions. They range between 1 (Almost never) and 5 (Very
frequently). Finally, Corruption measures the extent to which banks agree that
it is common for banks to have to pay some irregular payments/gifts to court
officials. It ranges between 1 (Never) to 6 (Always). Banks perceive the quality of
the laws on pledges, the court system, banking regulator and the absence of cor-
ruption on average to be the highest in countries like Estonia, Georgia, Hungary
and Turkey; and the lowest in Moldova, Mongolia, Ukraine and Tajikistan.
The institutional variables described above are based on banks’ own assessments
of the environment they operate in. In addition to these variables we also consider
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institutional indicators from the Doing Business and the Worldwide Governance
Indicators database. We use two indices from the Doing Business database:
the contract enforcement quality and the credit information availability. The
Contract Enforcement quality assesses the efficiency of the judicial system in
resolving a commercial dispute. The longer the time (recorded in calendar days)
from the moment the plaintiff decides to file the lawsuit in court until payment,
the lower the contract enforcement quality is. Credit Information availability
measures the coverage, scope and accessibility of credit information available
through credit reporting service providers. Credit bureau coverage reports the
number (as a percentage of the adult population) of individuals and firms covered
by the credit bureau with information on their borrowing history. Control of
corruption and rule of law are taken from the Worldwide Governance Indicators
database. Control of Corruption measures the extent to which public power
is exercised for private gain as well as the strength of a country’s institutional
framework to prevent and combat corruption, whereas Rule of Law measures the
extent to which agents have confidence in the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts.
The macroeconomic variables are from the World Development Indicators database
and include: GDP per capita and Bank Credit/GDP. Table 3.2 shows that there
is substantial variation among the countries in our sample. GDP per capita
ranges from $846 in Tajikistan to $23,760 in Slovenia. The Bank Credit to GDP
ratio as a measure of financial development also varies across countries, ranging
from 13% in Kyrgyzstan to 84% in Latvia.
In addition, bank balance sheet and income statement data such as: total assets,
liquidity, solvency, net income etc. are taken from the BankScope database20,
whereas bank ownership data are from the foreign ownership database of Claessens
and Van Horen (2014)21. The detailed definition of all the variables is given in
20BankScope is a product of Bureau van Dijk and is the most comprehensive global database
of banks’ financial statements with a coverage of over 32,000 banks (public and private) world-
wide. It contains detailed financial statements in various formats, including a universal format
to ensure global comparability. Consolidated and/or unconsolidated balance sheet and income
statement data are available for up to 16 years.
21This database provides time varying ownership information for more than 5,498 banks
operating in 138 host countries over the period 1995-2013.
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Table 3.1.
Table 3.4 reports sample statistics and correlations for the main variables. Banks
with a larger market share tend to operate with a decentralized model, whereas
foreign bank ownership is negatively correlated with decentralization. Among
foreign banks those that entered by acquiring existing banks tend to be more de-
centralized. Decentralization is also positively correlated with banks’ perceptions
of the legal and institutional environment in the countries they operate, such as
the quality of laws on security rights, court system and banking regulator. In-
stitutional indicators are also correlated with each other and therefore enter the
regression analysis one at a time.
3.4 Methodology
We start the empirical analysis by examining the drivers of bank organizational
structure. The summary statistics (Table 3.2) have shown a large cross-country
variation in the institutional environment and the proportion of banks that oper-
ate with a decentralized organizational structure. The correlation matrix (Table
3.4) between the decentralized measure and different institutional indicators also
shows significant correlations. We further examine these relationships by esti-
mating the following equation:
Decentralizedkc = α1 + β1Institutionsc + β2Bankkc + β3Countryc + εkc (3.1)
where, Decentralizedkc is a dummy variable which takes the value of one if bank
k, operating in country c follows a decentralized business model. Institutionsc in-
dicates one of the country-level (or bank-level) institutional indicators; Bankkc in-
cludes bank-level controls such as market share and foreign ownership; Countryc
is the natural logarithm of GDP per capita (in USD) and εkc is the error term.
The coefficient of interest is β1. A positive and significant coefficient would
indicate that a stronger institutional environment is associated with more decen-
tralized lending decisions. Standard errors are clustered at the country level to
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allow for correlations across banks within a country.
As the banking sector of the countries in the sample are majority foreign-owned,
with banking groups operating foreign affiliates in several of the countries in the
region, it offers an opportunity to sharpen the analysis by exploiting this fea-
ture of multinational banks which face different institutional environments in the
countries they operate. For instance, as illustrated in Figure 3.2, a large Italian
banking group follows a decentralized business model across half of its foreign
affiliate network and a centralized model in the rest of its foreign affiliates. Sim-
ilarly, a French banking group with a strong presence in the region decentralizes
decision making in every third foreign affiliate it operates in the region. We there-
fore augment equation (3.1) with parent bank fixed effects and assess whether
this variation in business models is significantly related with the host country
institutional environment. As before, β1 is the coefficient of interest. The vec-
tor Bankkc besides market share is now supplemented with additional controls
specific to foreign banks such as the geographical distance between the host and
the home country of the foreign bank, the number of years since the foreign bank
has entered/started operated in the host country as well as the mode of entry
(greenfield vs. acquisition), which could all impact the choice of foreign bank
organizational structure in host countries.
To investigate the impact on borrowers of different bank business models we com-
pare the lending terms given by decentralized and centralized banks. We initially
estimate the following specification, which we later augment with interaction
terms with the type of firm receiving the loan:
LoanTermsijklc = α1 + β1Decentralizedkc + β2Firmjlc + β3Loanijklc
+ β4Countryc + εijklc
(3.2)
where, i, j, k, l, c denote loan, firm, bank, industry and country, respectively.
LoanTermsijklc include three dependent variables: (i) a dummy variable indicat-
ing whether the loan or line of credit required collateral, (ii) the natural logarithm
of one plus the number of months between loan origination and maturity, (iii) the
natural logarithm of one plus the annual nominal interest rate of the loan or line
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of credit. As before Decentralizedkc indicates banks that follow a decentralized
model. Firmjlc includes firm controls: Employees, Opaque, Firm Age, Foreign
Firm Non-Exporter and Small City. Loanijklc includes other loan characteris-
tics such as: Loan Age and Loan Currency. Countryc is the natural logarithm
of GDP per capita; εijklc is the error term. We instrument Decentralizedkc
with Credit Information availability to find out if the institutional environment
impacts loan terms by promoting a certain bank organizational structure. A sta-
tistically significant β1 would indicate that banks that decentralize their lending
decisions in response to a strong institutional environment, give different loan
terms compared to their centralized counterparts.
We also test how the impact of bank organizational structure on lending terms
varies across different types of firms. Based on theory we expect smaller, younger
and more opaque firms to receive more favourable lending terms from decentral-
ized banks. Equation (3.2) takes the following form:
LoanTermsijklc = α1 + β1Decentralizedkc + β2Decentralizedkc ∗ Firmjlc
+ β3Firmjlc + β4Loanijklc + β5Countryc + εijklc
(3.3)
We estimate equations (3.1)-(3.3) with a linear probability model due to the diffi-
culty of including a large number of fixed effects with a non-linear probit or logit
model, also known as the incidental parameters problem. The interpretation of
marginal effects of interaction terms is also problematic in non-linear probability
models (Ai and Norton (2003)).
3.5 Results
3.5.1 Bank organizational structure and institutions
Results in Table 3.5 show a positive correlation between the perceived institu-
tional quality and the level of decentralization of bank lending activities within
the same country. A one unit increase in the perception of the quality of laws that
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enable efficient enforcement of security rights over pledges increases the probabil-
ity of decentralizing decision making by 3%. The economic magnitude is similar
for the quality of courts and somewhat larger for the quality of the banking reg-
ulator (5.2%) and perceived corruption (-4.1%). In terms of control variables,
foreign bank ownership is not significantly related to decentralization, whereas
banks with larger market share are 104 to 122 percentage points more likely to
decentralize decision making; a large effect given that about 23% of all banks in
the sample are decentralized. Column 5 does not include country fixed effects
(but controls for GDP per capita) as it assesses the level of decentralization of
bank lending activities across countries with different levels of contract enforce-
ment quality. Banks in countries with stronger contract enforcement quality are
8.4% more likely to decentralize decision-making.
Table 3.5 (columns 6-8) also presents results for the sample of foreign banks
only. In these specifications we include parent bank but not country fixed effects.
For the sample of foreign banks it is not so much the perceptions of the quality
of host country institutions that matter for the choice of bank organizational
structure, rather the country-level institutional indicator as well as the relative
economic development between the host and the home country of the foreign
bank. The same parent bank is 16% more likely to decentralize decision making in
countries where perceptions about the quality of the banking regulator are higher.
This economic effect is 34% for countries with stronger contract enforcement
quality. Finally, the greater the home-host country distance in terms of the level
of economic development, the less likely the foreign bank to adopt a decentralized
business model.
Overall, the results in this section point to the role of strong institutions in mit-
igating information and agency problems within an organization, making decen-
tralization the prevalent organizational form in strong institutional environments.
Consistent with the hypothesis developed in section 3.1 this also means a re-
duced bank-borrower distance, benefiting borrowers, especially more information-
intensive ones, such as SMEs. In the next section we examine whether and how
these benefits materialize through contract terms given to SMEs by centralized
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and decentralized banks in different institutional environments.
3.5.2 Bank organizational structure and loan terms
In this section we present results from estimating equation (3.2). Table 3.3 has
already shown that centralized and decentralized banks give different loan terms
to SMEs in different institutional environments. Table 3.6 formalizes these rela-
tionships. Results shows that in countries with strong institutional environments
which favour decentralized organizational structures, decentralized banks give
more favourable lending terms - lower interest rates, longer maturities and less
required collateral - to SMEs compared to their centralized counterparts. Decen-
tralized bank loans are about 70 percentage points less likely to have collateral;
a large effect given that 79% of all loans in the sample are collateralized. Fur-
thermore, loans granted by decentralized banks have 110-112 basis points longer
maturities than loans granted by centralized banks. Given the average loan ma-
turity of 37 months this difference is substantial - 40 to 41 months. With respect
to interest rates, decentralized banks charge 145-167% lower interest rates than
centralized banks. At an average interest rate of 11% this discount amounts to
16-18%.
Overall, these findings suggest that a strong institutional environment which
favours a decentralized organizational structure leads to better lending terms to
SMEs - decentralized banks grant loans with longer maturities, lower interest
rates and are less likely to require collateral compared to centralized banks.
3.5.3 Robustness
We subject the results to various robustness tests. First, we employ alternative
variable definitions. We use an alternative question, from BEPS II, to measure
the hierarchical nature of bank lending activities. Namely, the survey asked
bank managers For first time SME Customers: How many hierarchical layers are
involved in making a lending decision? . The responses vary from 1 to 8 layers,
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with a mean of 2.4 layers. Results, reported in Table 3.8, do not materially
change. Second, we use alternative firm level controls. Instead of the number of
employees as a proxy of firm size we use the log of total sales; we use Certification
,i.e. whether the firm has an internationally-recognized quality certification, as
an alternative measure of firm opaqueness; we add Domestic Firm (percentage of
the firm owned by domestic investors), Sole Proprietorship (whether the firm’s
current legal status is sole proprietorship) and Privatized (whether the firm is
established through privatization of a state-owned firm) which could all impact
how risky the firm is perceived by banks, hence the loan contract they receive. We
confirm the main results with these alternative combinations (Table 3.9). Third,
as shown in Table 3.10, we exclude Russia and Turkey from the sample to make
sure that the results are not driven by these two countries (Columns 1-3) and
cluster the standard errors at the industry level to allow for correlations across
firms within an industry (Columns 4-6). The main results continue to hold.
3.5.4 Firm heterogeneity
In Table 3.7 we present the results of estimating equation (3.3). We interact the
decentralization measure with several firm characteristics such as: firm size, age,
opacity and exporter status. The impact of decentralization on lending terms
remains significant but is attenuated for larger firms, older firms, firms with an
exporter status and those that are audited. The evidence in this section is consis-
tent with decentralized banks having less of a competitive advantage in lending to
these types of firms compared to centralized banks. Together with the previous
results, this evidence points to the beneficial impact of strong institutions in mit-
igating information asymmetries both within a bank and between the bank and
the borrower, thereby improving lending terms, especially for the most opaque
segments of the SME population, which are otherwise disadvantaged when bor-
rowing from financial institutions.
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3.6 Conclusion
While there is a vast theoretical literature emphasising the role of organizational
structure on information production and use far less is known empirically. We
use a unique bank-level survey dataset containing detailed information on bank
organizational hierarchy i.e. the level of decision-making authority across a sam-
ple of banks operating in 32 countries representing different levels of legal and
institutional development. We find that countries with strong institutional envi-
ronments are more likely to favour a decentralized organizational structure, sup-
porting the hypothesis that the functional distance between bank headquarters
where decisions are typically made and information collecting officers becomes less
of a constrain in strong institutional environments where the possibility for infor-
mation rent extraction and the strategic manipulation of information is limited.
To investigate what is the impact on the ground of these different bank business
models we combine the bank level data with firm-level survey data which also
contain detailed loan information. We find that delegation of decision making
authority driven by institutional quality leads to better lending terms to SMEs -
decentralized banks charge lower interest rates, lend at longer maturities and are
less likely to require collateral compared to their centralized counterparts. This
holds in particular for more information-intensive firms such as smaller, younger
or non-audited. Results are in line with information-based theories of financial
intermediation suggesting that banks use their private information about bor-
rowers to set loan terms that improve incentives especially in strong institutional
environments where they are more protected in the event of a borrower default-
ing. These findings taken together reveal that bank organizational structure is an
important channel through which the institutional environment affects lending.
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics by Country.
Country GDP per
capita
Credit
to
GDP
Control
of Cor-
rupt.
Rule
of
Law
Decent
ral-
ized
Banks Foreign Firms
Albania 4272.08 38.09 -0.61 -0.52 0.00 13 11 84
Armenia 3263.66 35.31 -0.56 -0.41 0.12 17 10 151
Azerbaijan 6637.64 19.96 -1.08 -0.80 0.41 17 2 43
Belarus 6348.93 33.39 -0.63 -0.99 0.33 15 9 94
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4540.72 63.03 -0.30 -0.29 0.06 17 12 141
Bulgaria 7121.02 69.16 -0.24 -0.12 0.14 25 19 114
Croatia 13804.20 70.06 -0.01 0.19 0.30 30 16 188
Czech Republic 20129.52 48.43 0.26 0.98 0.25 12 10 112
Egypt 2961.61 31.45 -0.56 -0.32 0.21 14 7 0
Estonia 16507.49 83.58 0.96 1.13 0.18 11 9 93
Georgia 3079.99 33.94 0.05 -0.12 0.11 13 6 137
Hungary 13223.88 55.86 0.30 0.68 0.07 18 12 49
Jordan 4632.08 73.49 0.11 0.30 0.07 17 9 0
Kazakhstan 10665.14 39.57 -0.92 -0.63 0.27 17 5 55
Kyrgyzstan 1067.11 13.19 -1.14 -1.22 0.67 10 5 44
Latvia 13346.00 83.62 0.17 0.77 0.19 19 10 68
Lithuania 13639.34 49.52 0.26 0.76 0.17 12 8 68
Macedonia 4735.43 45.32 -0.03 -0.25 0.14 14 10 149
Moldova 1883.63 38.02 -0.66 -0.40 0.36 14 6 116
Mongolia 3391.96 44.68 -0.63 -0.34 0.44 9 2 164
Montenegro 6842.96 61.71 -0.19 0.01 0.18 11 7 59
Morocco 2944.55 69.78 -0.33 -0.20 0.67 7 2 0
Poland 12922.50 49.93 0.48 0.71 0.35 29 20 75
Romania 8641.37 44.46 -0.23 0.05 0.08 28 24 245
Russian Federation 12225.56 46.79 -1.04 -0.78 0.27 83 21 265
Serbia 5933.94 46.64 -0.29 -0.38 0.00 30 21 180
Slovak Republic 17246.46 46.59 0.17 0.50 0.50 11 9 72
Slovenia 23760.29 79.33 0.86 1.01 0.06 17 9 151
Tajikistan 846.50 16.95 -1.17 -1.21 0.46 14 3 40
Tunisia 4238.83 71.74 -0.16 -0.03 0.21 14 5 0
Turkey 10202.77 53.48 0.09 0.08 0.65 18 8 447
Ukraine 3394.87 76.62 -1.02 -0.81 0.07 35 24 81
Total 8862.37 52.24 -0.34 -0.16 0.23 611 331 3485
This table reports the mean of the decentralization variable and key institutional and macroe-
conomic variables across countries. It also shows the total number of banks, foreign owned
banks and the total number of firms by country. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.3: Differences in loan terms.
Variables Centralized Mean Decentralized Mean MeanDiff
All countries
Collateral 1776 0.834 1526 0.742 0.093***
Maturity 1591 39.057 1340 35.311 3.746***
Interest rate 1378 10.964 1117 11.476 -0.512
Low credit information availability
Collateral 741 0.865 375 0.933 -0.068***
Maturity 635 40.800 346 33.740 7.060***
Interest rate 547 12.810 322 15.214 -2.404***
High credit information availability
Collateral 1035 0.813 1151 0.679 0.133***
Maturity 956 37.900 994 35.858 2.041
Interest rate 831 9.750 795 9.962 -0.212
Low contract enforcement
Collateral 1107 0.856 601 0.889 -0.032*
Maturity 979 39.061 546 33.293 5.768***
Interest rate 902 12.670 516 14.690 -2.020***
High contract enforcement
Collateral 669 0.798 925 0.646 0.152***
Maturity 612 39.051 794 36.699 2.352
Interest rate 476 7.733 601 8.717 -0.984**
Low control of corruption
Collateral 860 0.838 490 0.888 -0.049**
Maturity 748 36.222 441 31.719 4.503**
Interest rate 675 13.353 416 15.776 -2.424***
High control of corruption
Collateral 916 0.831 1036 0.673 0.158***
Maturity 843 41.573 899 37.073 4.500**
Interest rate 703 8.671 701 8.924 -0.253
This table compares mean values of Collateral, Maturity and Interest rate in countries with
different institutional environments. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics and Correlations.
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Loan-level variables
Collateral 3419 0.79 0.41 0 1
Maturity 3039 36.94 34.55 1 360
Interest rate 2593 11.19 8.43 0 100
Loan age 3317 3.00 2.18 0 24
Local currency 3479 0.69 0.46 0 1
Firm-level variables
Employees 3472 81.73 311.67 1 9850
Firm age 3469 16.56 12.96 0 153
Opaque 3420 0.54 0.50 0 1
Non-exporter 3451 0.66 0.47 0 1
Small city 3485 0.54 0.50 0 1
Foreign firm 3467 4.89 19.47 0 100
Bank-level variables
Decentralized 547 0.23 0.42 0 1
Foreign bank 611 0.54 0.50 0 1
Market share 518 0.06 0.08 0.0001 0.63
Acquisition 331 0.60 0.49 0 1
Year since entry 328 10.35 7.20 1 87
Geo Distance 330 1717.05 1931.50 59.62 10729.83
GDP Distance 328 27913.18 17482.08 293.34 140368.80
Pledges 593 2.60 1.00 1 5
Courts 597 2.29 0.93 1 5
Corruption 534 1.78 1.25 1 6
Regulator 599 4.34 0.70 1 5
Country-level variables
Contract Enforcement 32 501.36 221.96 237 1286
Rule of Law 32 -0.08 0.65 -1.22 1.13
Credit Information 32 30.44 29.75 0 98.84
Control of Corruption 32 -0.25 0.56 -1.17 0.96
Credit to GDP 32 51.05 19.08 13.19 83.62
GDP per capita 32 8264.13 5893.16 846.50 23760.29
Panel A. Summary Statistics.
This table reports the number of observations, means, standard deviation, minimum and max-
imum values for the key variables in Panel A, whereas Panel B reports pair-wise correlation
coefficients between variables. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** at the 5% level. ***
at the 1% level. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1.
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Table 3.6: Decentralization and Loan Terms.
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Collateral Maturity Interest Rate Collateral Maturity Interest Rate
Decentralized -0.692*** 1.104*** -1.671*** -0.702*** 1.118*** -1.446***
(0.188) (0.351) (0.589) (0.179) (0.324) (0.462)
Loan Age 0.050* 0.683*** 0.117** 0.051* 0.678*** 0.088*
(0.027) (0.056) (0.055) (0.026) (0.055) (0.051)
Local Currency 0.035 -0.387*** 0.364*** 0.040 -0.384*** 0.292***
(0.032) (0.059) (0.081) (0.029) (0.054) (0.064)
GDP per capita -0.043** -0.073** -0.174*** -0.038* -0.078** -0.138***
(0.019) (0.036) (0.047) (0.021) (0.039) (0.045)
Collateral -0.083 -0.026
(0.061) (0.053)
Maturity -0.106*** -0.094***
(0.029) (0.026)
Small City 0.031 0.126*** -0.201***
(0.022) (0.042) (0.042)
Firm Age -0.005 0.033 -0.086**
(0.018) (0.033) (0.037)
Employees 0.028*** -0.020 0.026
(0.008) (0.017) (0.021)
Opaque -0.042** 0.018 0.098**
(0.020) (0.039) (0.044)
Foreign Firm -0.001* 0.000 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-Exporter 0.023 0.097** 0.116**
(0.022) (0.046) (0.049)
Constant 1.404*** 2.842*** 4.553*** 1.268*** 2.742*** 4.280***
(0.119) (0.264) (0.328) (0.132) (0.290) (0.319)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Stat 2218.24 6071.65 122.88 51418.67 285.93 61.62
N 3155 2850 2330 3054 2771 2274
R-sq (First Stage) 0.0767 0.0691 0.0496 0.0916 0.0834 0.0619
This table reports second-stage regression results of the Instrumental Variables (IV) two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimation. The dependent variables are Collateral, Maturity and Interest
rate of loans granted to SMEs across 32 EBRD countries of operation. Credit Information
availability is used as an instrument for Decentralized. Variable definitions are provided in
Table 3.1. The estimation is based on cross-sectional data and includes a full set of industry
dummies. Robust standard errors appear in brackets. * indicates significance at the 10% level.
** at the 5% level. *** at the 1% level.
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3.6. Conclusion
Table 3.8: Alternative Decentralization measure
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Collateral Maturity Interest Rate Collateral Maturity Interest Rate
Layers -0.759*** 0.457** -1.017*** -0.857*** 0.567** -1.080***
(0.225) (0.230) (0.352) (0.265) (0.264) (0.410)
Loan Age 0.161*** 0.574*** 0.258*** 0.164*** 0.564*** 0.244***
(0.033) (0.043) (0.063) (0.037) (0.046) (0.070)
Local Currency -0.167*** -0.187*** 0.039 -0.146*** -0.195*** 0.025
(0.045) (0.049) (0.067) (0.048) (0.051) (0.068)
GDP per capita -0.067*** -0.018 -0.187*** -0.085*** -0.001 -0.177***
(0.021) (0.027) (0.043) (0.023) (0.028) (0.042)
Collateral 0.022 0.046
(0.055) (0.059)
Maturity -0.088*** -0.080***
(0.028) (0.029)
Small City 0.076** 0.064* -0.163***
(0.031) (0.036) (0.046)
Firm Age 0.056** -0.027 0.011
(0.029) (0.031) (0.041)
Employees 0.027* -0.008 0.005
(0.015) (0.017) (0.023)
Opaque 0.065 -0.077* 0.204***
(0.041) (0.047) (0.057)
Foreign Firm 0.001 -0.002** -0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Non-Exporter -0.060 0.175*** -0.075
(0.046) (0.051) (0.080)
Constant 2.958*** 1.851*** 5.996*** 3.035*** 1.490*** 6.064***
(0.459) (0.460) (0.579) (0.558) (0.541) (0.708)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Stat 312.62 306.85 16.08 88.58 912.63 81.38
N 3260 2951 2418 3159 2872 2362
R-sq(First Stage) 0.0218 0.0241 0.0289 0.0277 0.0302 0.0353
This table reports second-stage regression results of the Instrumental Variables (IV) two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimation. The dependent variables are Collateral, Maturity and Interest
rate of loans granted to SMEs across 32 EBRD countries of operation. Credit Information
availability is used as an instrument for Layers which is an alternative measure of decentraliza-
tion. Variable definitions are provided in Table 3.1. The estimation is based on cross-sectional
data and includes a full set of industry dummies. Robust standard errors appear in brackets.
* indicates significance at the 10% level. ** at the 5% level. *** at the 1% level.
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Table 3.9: Alternative controls
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Collateral Maturity Interest Rate Collateral Maturity Interest Rate
Decentralized -0.692*** 1.104*** -1.671*** -0.854*** 1.056*** -1.054**
(0.188) (0.351) (0.589) (0.215) (0.354) (0.445)
Loan Age 0.050* 0.683*** 0.117** 0.043 0.670*** 0.097**
(0.027) (0.056) (0.055) (0.031) (0.058) (0.045)
Local Currency 0.035 -0.387*** 0.364*** 0.048 -0.393*** 0.247***
(0.032) (0.059) (0.081) (0.035) (0.058) (0.058)
GDP per capita -0.043** -0.073** -0.174*** -0.033 -0.068* -0.166***
(0.019) (0.036) (0.047) (0.022) (0.038) (0.040)
Collateral -0.083 -0.028
(0.061) (0.047)
Maturity -0.106*** -0.089***
(0.029) (0.024)
Small City 0.026 0.107** -0.223***
(0.027) (0.045) (0.042)
Firm Age -0.004 0.031 -0.075**
(0.021) (0.034) (0.033)
Sales 0.010*** -0.001 -0.004
(0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Certification 0.010 -0.037 -0.048
(0.026) (0.046) (0.040)
Foreign Firm -0.003** 0.005* -0.005**
(0.001) (0.003) (0.003)
Domestic Firm -0.002** 0.005** -0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002)
Non-Exporter 0.003 0.103** 0.077*
(0.027) (0.048) (0.043)
Sole proprietorship 0.132** -0.235** 0.348***
(0.064) (0.100) (0.114)
Privatized -0.064 -0.019 -0.031
(0.040) (0.074) (0.071)
Constant 1.404*** 2.842*** 4.553*** 1.396*** 2.237*** 4.880***
(0.119) (0.264) (0.328) (0.202) (0.393) (0.382)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Stat 2218.24 6071.65 122.88 1079.45 1851.89 65.85
N 3155 2850 2330 2619 2423 2031
R-sq(First Stage) 0.0767 0.0691 0.0496 0.1009 0.0948 0.0741
This table reports second-stage regression results of the Instrumental Variables (IV) two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimation. The dependent variables are Collateral, Maturity and Interest
rate of loans granted to SMEs across 32 EBRD countries of operation. Credit Information
availability is used as an instrument for Decentralized. Variable definitions are provided in
Table 3.1. The estimation is based on cross-sectional data and includes a full set of industry
dummies. Robust standard errors appear in brackets. * indicates significance at the 10% level.
** at the 5% level. *** at the 1% level.
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Table 3.10: Alternative sample and clustering of standard errors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Excluding Russia and Turkey SE clustered at industry level
Collateral Maturity Interest Rate Collateral Maturity Interest Rate
Decentralized -0.610*** 1.021*** -0.943** -0.702*** 1.118*** -1.446***
(0.216) (0.385) (0.411) (0.199) (0.264) (0.523)
Loan Age 0.047** 0.666*** 0.054 0.051*** 0.678*** 0.088*
(0.022) (0.051) (0.041) (0.016) (0.050) (0.047)
Local Currency 0.012 -0.281*** 0.138*** 0.040** -0.384*** 0.292***
(0.022) (0.044) (0.038) (0.020) (0.046) (0.060)
GDP per capita -0.067*** 0.022 -0.277*** -0.038* -0.078 -0.138**
(0.014) (0.031) (0.026) (0.020) (0.051) (0.058)
Collateral -0.002 -0.026
(0.047) (0.042)
Maturity -0.080*** -0.094***
(0.024) (0.024)
Small City 0.076*** -0.006 -0.061 0.031 0.126*** -0.201***
(0.023) (0.046) (0.040) (0.022) (0.045) (0.048)
Firm Age -0.008 0.004 -0.026 -0.005 0.033 -0.086**
(0.019) (0.037) (0.031) (0.015) (0.035) (0.039)
Employees 0.028*** -0.022 -0.010 0.028*** -0.020 0.026
(0.009) (0.020) (0.018) (0.007) (0.021) (0.033)
Opaque -0.043** 0.032 0.080** -0.042* 0.018 0.098**
(0.021) (0.041) (0.037) (0.023) (0.035) (0.047)
Foreign Firm -0.001* -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 0.000 -0.003*
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
Non-Exporter 0.007 0.113** 0.075* 0.023 0.097 0.116***
(0.024) (0.050) (0.042) (0.017) (0.071) (0.036)
Constant 1.460*** 2.190*** 5.214*** 1.268*** 2.742*** 4.280***
(0.132) (0.310) (0.267) (0.136) (0.347) (0.415)
Industry FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-Stat 761.72 2880.58 658.99 51419.90 271.77 55.18
N 2475 2285 1926 3054 2771 2274
R-sq(First Stage) 0.0409 0.0390 0.0363 0.0916 0.0834 0.0619
This table reports second-stage regression results of the Instrumental Variables (IV) two-stage
least squares (2SLS) estimation. The dependent variables are Collateral, Maturity and Interest
rate of loans granted to SMEs across 32 EBRD countries of operation. Credit Information
availability is used as an instrument for Decentralized. Variable definitions are provided in
Table 3.1. The estimation is based on cross-sectional data and includes a full set of industry
dummies. Columns (1) to (3) report estimation results for the sample excluding Russia and
Turkey with robust standard errors. Columns (4) to (6) report estimation results for the entire
sample of countries but with industry-clustered standard errors. * indicates significance at the
10% level. ** at the 5% level. *** at the 1% level.
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Figures
Figure 3.1: Defining distance.
This figure shows Decentralized and Centralized organizational structures as well as the within
bank distance and the distance between the bank and the borrower. In centralized organiza-
tional structures decisions are taken at higher hierarchical levels using information produced
by agents at lower hierarchical levels. In decentralized organizational structures the decision-
making authority is delegated to agents at lower hierarchical layers responsible for generating
the information. As illustrated by the arrows in the figure decentralization reduces information
asymmetries between banks and borrowers, but at the same time increases the within bank
information asymmetries. The opposite is true for centralized organizational structures. The
preferred organizational design therefore depends on the trade-off between information and
control.
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Figure 3.2: A typical parent bank.
This figure shows a large banking group from Italy with a strong presence in Emerging Europe.
This bank gives different degrees of decision-making authority to its foreign affiliates abroad (1
indicates a decentralized business model, whereas 0 a centralized one).
115
Chapter 3. Organizational Hierarchy and Institutions
116
Chapter 4
Mobile Money and Traditional
Banking
4.1 Introduction
Competition in the banking industry is important for the efficiency of financial
institutions, the quality of financial services as well as the degree of innovation in
the industry. The changing landscape of the banking industry with telecommu-
nication companies offering financial services traditionally offered by banks has
introduced new sources of competition from non-traditional competitors. Com-
mercial banks have had to strategically respond to the changing external envi-
ronment in order to remain competitive and maintain market share. The aim
of this paper is to investigate the impact of a non-bank entrant on the service
provision of commercial banks. We focus on the mobile money technology M-
Pesa - a financial innovation which allows users to transfer money by simple short
messaging service (SMS) technology - offered by the Kenyan mobile network op-
erator Safaricom, which since its advent in 2007 has grown rapidly and has drawn
global attention22. While previous studies have examined the impact of mobile
money on household welfare (Jack and Suri (2014); Mbiti and Weil (2011)) or
firm-level performance (Beck, Pamuk, Ramrattan and Uras (2015)), we assess its
22M stands for mobile and PESA means money in Swahili. M-Pesa was subsequently
launched in other countries such as Tanzania, India, Egypt, Romania and a few others.
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impact on commercial bank’s behaviour. Specifically, we combine nationally rep-
resentative household surveys on access to and use of financial services conducted
before (2006) and after (2009, 2012) the advent of M-Pesa with commercial bank
financial statement and branch penetration data to provide micro-evidence on
the impact of the competition induced by a mobile money innovation on the
performance and outreach of formal financial institutions.
Understanding the link between mobile money innovations and the service pro-
vision of the formal financial sector has important policy implications. The spill-
over effects of mobile money innovations on commercial banks in term of their
performance and outreach have important implications for alleviating financial
exclusion and in turn increasing household welfare. Regulatory authorities need
to understand how efforts to reach the low-income and excluded market segments
such as mobile money innovations relate to the broader financial context so as
to design appropriate policies to promote a competitive banking system that
facilitates access to financial services, especially among the poor.
Theory makes ambiguous predictions on the impact of competition on bank per-
formance and access to finance. Theories predicting a positive relation between
competition and bank performance rely on general economic theory pointing to
inefficiencies arising from market power allowing banks to relax their efforts to
reduce costs and behave in a competitive manner (quiet life hypothesis). On
the other hand, market power may facilitate collusion among banks (structure-
conduct-performance hypothesis) or may stem from increased bank efficiency (ef-
ficient structure hypothesis) implying a negative relation between competition
and bank performance. The relation between competition and access to finance
is a priori not clear as well. The conventional industrial organisation view -
market power hypothesis - posits that increased competition in the banking sec-
tor reduces the cost of finance and increases the availability of credit. On the
other hand, the information hypothesis posits that in the presence of information
asymmetries between banks and customers increased competition makes it more
difficult for banks to internalize the benefits of investing in relationship building,
reducing the willingness of banks to lend, especially to opaque customers. Al-
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though these theories relate specifically to credit services it can be argued that
access to other financial services, such as deposit or payment services present
issues for financial inclusion as well. Price (the fees of maintaining an account,
minimum balances) and non-price barriers (lack of trust, documentation require-
ments) may be very severe and lead to financial exclusion especially in developing
countries. When faced with competitive pressure banks will either try to main-
tain market share and profitability by seeking out ways to lower access barriers
and serve the market segment they previously considered unbankable or will focus
on their existing niche market as they will find it difficult to invest in relationship
building and acquiring new (often more opaque) customers. Thus, theory offers
conflicting predictions on the behaviour of banks when faced with a new source of
competition. Empirical studies have found equally mixed results. Most of them
focus on US, EU or other developed countries and all of them consider interbank
competition as opposed to competition from a non-bank entrant that targets all
market segments even those traditionally excluded by commercial banks.
We combine three datasets - household-level survey data, bank financial state-
ment and branch penetration data at the county level - to examine the relation-
ship between commercial banks’ exposure to the advent of the mobile money
technology and their performance and outreach. Specifically, we construct a
bank-level exposure index which is zero for 2006 and varies in 2009 and 2013
for each bank. The more branches a bank has in counties with a higher number
of M-Pesa registered users the higher the level of exposure of the bank. Using
this new index we find that bank’s exposure to the competition induced by the
advent of M-Pesa is positively related with their profitability (ROA) and nega-
tively related with their overhead cost and income from fees and commissions. A
relevant feature of the data is that the household surveys classify each respondent
as either being banked or unbanked. Banked households were asked to provide
the name of the bank they currently hold an account in. This allows us to link
banks with the type of clients they serve. We find that banks with a higher ex-
posure index tend to expand their outreach towards more opaque households i.e
those with lower level of education, no permanent dwelling and lower asset hold-
ings. Overall, the results support theories predicting a positive relation between
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competition and bank performance and access to finance.
Focusing on unbanked households only, we provide further evidence on the link
between competition and financial inclusion. We analyse, at the county level,
whether the advent of M-Pesa has a differential impact on the relation between
banking sector outreach and different supply and demand side barriers to financial
access. We find that supply side barriers (the cost of opening and maintaining a
bank account) become less binding as banks expand in counties with more M-Pesa
registered users. Instead, lack of literacy as a demand side barrier becomes more
relevant. Combined with the bank-level results, these results provide evidence
that banks have become more inclusive as a result of the advent of M-Pesa. This
highlights the need for innovative solutions to the financial exclusion problem that
has been especially prevalent in developing countries with weak institutional and
contractual environment and lack of interbank competition.
This paper makes several contributions to the literature. First, to our knowledge
this is the first paper to investigate the effect of a mobile money innovation on
the performance and outreach of commercial banks. Previous studies have in-
vestigated the impact of competition in the banking sector on access to financial
services mainly for firms. We focus on households and a different kind of com-
petition to assess the impact of a financial innovation on the service provision of
formal financial institutions. Second, focusing on one country has the advantage
of eliminating institutional and regulatory heterogeneity, allowing us to isolate
the effect of local market competition only. Third, linking bank branch penetra-
tion data at the county level with household surveys before and after the advent
of M-Pesa together with bank financial statement data allows us to provide direct
evidence on the impact of mobile money innovation on household welfare. As the
market for basic banking services is local in nature using aggregate measures of
competition and outreach might mask important variation in access and use of
financial services at the local level.
A recent paper related to our analysis is Cull, Demirguc-Kunt and Morduch
(2014). Combining data on bank penetration from Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and
Martinez Peria (2007) with data on microfinance institutions from the Microfi-
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nance Information eXchange they investigate whether the presence of banks af-
fects the profitability and outreach of microfinance institutions. Across a sample
of 38 countries they find that greater bank penetration in the country is asso-
ciated with microfinance institutions pushing towards poorer market segments.
We look at the performance and outreach of banks as a result of the competition
induced by the advent of a mobile money innovation.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 discusses the
theoretical framework of the analysis. Section 4.3 gives a background of the
mobile money innovation M-Pesa. Section 4.4 describes the data. Section 4.5
presents the results and Section 4.6 concludes.
4.2 Related literature
4.2.1 Competition and bank performance
There are two opposing views on the relation between competition and bank
performance. The structure-conduct-performance hypothesis also known as the
market power or collusion hypothesis (Bain (1951)) argues that high concen-
tration (low competition) results in bank market power which enables them to
earn abnormal profits by offering low deposit rates and charging high loan rates,
implying a negative relation between competition and bank performance. In
other words, this hypothesis argues that bank profitability is derived from mar-
ket structure. The efficient structure hypothesis, however, interprets this relation-
ship between competition and bank performance in terms of enhanced efficiency
(Demsetz (1973)). More efficient firms have lower costs and in turn higher prof-
its. The causality in this case is reversed and runs from bank performance to
market structure. The most efficient firms are able to increase their market share
leading to higher market concentration. Alternatively, the quiet life hypothesis
argues that banks with market power have less incentive to maximize revenues
and minimize costs (Hicks (1935)), implying a positive relation between compe-
tition and bank performance. A related theory, the contestable market theory
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(Baumol (1982)), argues that even in concentrated markets the threat of compe-
tition from new entrants incentivizes banks to behave competitively. When there
are no barriers for new entrants, a concentrated industry can behave competi-
tively. In other words, in a market dominated by few large banks there is still a
high level of competition.
Empirically, studies have found both a positive and a negative relationship be-
tween competition and bank performance. Berger (1995) for US finds partial sup-
port for both the efficient structure and the market power hypotheses, whereas
Berger and Hannan (1998) find support for the quiet life hypothesis. They find
that banks in more concentrated markets exhibit lower cost efficiency. Schaeck
and Cihak (2008) for a large sample of European and US banks find a positive
effect of competition on profit and cost efficiency. Similarly, Delis and Tsionas
(2009) jointly estimating the efficiency and market power of individual banks
in the European Monetary Union find a negative relation between efficiency and
market power, supporting the quiet life hypothesis. In contrast, Maudos and Fer-
nandez de Guevara (2007) for a sample of EU-15 countries find a positive relation
between market power and cost efficiency, thus rejecting the quiet life hypothesis.
Similarly, Casu and Girardone (2009) investigating the relation between compe-
tition and efficiency in the banking sectors of five EU countries do not support
the quiet life hypothesis as they find that an increase in bank monopoly power
does not lead to lower cost efficiency. They cannot support the efficient structure
hypothesis either as they do not find a reverse causality from efficiency to compe-
tition. Koetter et al. (2012) for US find a consistently positive relation between
market power and cost efficiency. In contrast, they find a significant negative
relationship between profit efficiency and market power which supports the quiet
life hypotheses. They encourage the development of policies that increase the
contestability of banking markets. The hypothesis we test is the following:
H1: The competition induced by the advent of M-Pesa has a significant impact
on bank performance (as measured by overhead costs, ROA, Income from fees
and commissions and staff costs).
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4.2.2 Competition and access to finance
Theory is ambiguous on the relation between competition and access to finance.
The conventional market power hypothesis posits that market power is detrimen-
tal to consumer welfare by allowing banks to charge a price above marginal cost.
In contrast, in perfect competition banks are price-takers where costs and prices
are minimized. Traditional models such as Klein (1971) state that higher mar-
ket concentration increases interest rates and reduces the equilibrium supply of
loans. In a theoretical model, Besanko and Thakor (1992) analyse the alloca-
tional consequences of relaxing entry barriers and find that loan rates decrease
and deposit rates increase as more banks are added to the market. Guzman
(2000) confirms the detrimental effect of market power in a general equilibrium
model of capital accumulation. He finds that a monopoly banking system is more
likely to result in credit rationing and lower capital accumulation rate compared
to a competitive banking system.
In contrast, the information hypothesis takes into account information asymme-
tries and agency problems in a dynamic setting. Petersen and Rajan (1995) argue
that banks may engage in inter-temporal smoothing of contract terms, allowing
losses for the bank in the short run that will be recouped later in the relationship.
In a less competitive market the bank can rely on the fact that its most successful
customers will stay with the bank for an extended period of time. In a competi-
tive market, however, the bank bearing the initial cost of building the relationship
finds it more difficult to retain its successful customers leading to reluctance to
finance riskier ventures. Marquez (2002) presents a model in which increased
bank competition leads to more dispersion of borrower-specific information and
an increase in equilibrium lending interest rates. Hauswald and Marquez (2006)
show that competition may reduce lending to informationally opaque borrowers.
As competition increases, banks have less incentive to invest in information ac-
quisition leading to lower interest rates but also less efficient lending decisions.
However, the link between competition and relationship banking is not unam-
biguous. Relationship banking can be used strategically as an incumbent’s bank
comparative advantage over de novo entrants. Boot and Thakor (2000) argue
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that a more competitive banking system may encourage banks to become more
client-driven and engage more in relationship building. Similarly, Dinc (2000)
shows that competition may increase a bank’s incentive to engage in relation-
ship lending. Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2004) show that banks may lend more
to informationally opaque borrowers when competition increases from outside
lenders.
Empirical studies on the relationship between competition and access to finan-
cial services offer mixed results. Beck et al. (2004) find that bank concentration
increases financing obstacles for SMEs, providing support for the theories predict-
ing a negative effect of bank market power (market power hypothesis). Similarly,
using a sample of 209 banks in 62 countries Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Hono-
han (2008) find that barriers such as minimum balances to open a bank account
or obtain a loan, account fees and documentation requirements are higher in
countries with less contestable banking sectors i.e. more stringent restrictions
on bank entry and range of permissible bank activities. More recently, Love
and Martinez Peria (2014) using firm-level surveys for 53 countries find that low
competition decreases firm’s access to finance consistent with the market power
hypothesis. Other studies have found support for the information hypothesis. Pe-
tersen and Rajan (1994) using data from the National Survey of Small Business
Finance in US find that firms in areas with less bank competition are less likely
to be rationed consistent with the notion initially put forward by Mayer (1988)
that more bank market power increases the value of bank-firm relationships.
Berlin and Mester (1999) find that increased competition reduces relationship
lending by forcing banks to pay market rates on deposits, thereby complicating
the value-enhancing smoothing of lending rates. Cetorelli and Gambera (2001)
find that more concentrated banking systems promote the growth of those indus-
tries that are more dependent on external finance by facilitating credit access to
younger firms consistent with models predicting a positive effect of market power
on lending relationships and firms’ access to credit. The hypothesis we test is the
following:
H2: The competition induced by the advent of M-Pesa has a significant impact
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on bank outreach (as measured by the education level of banked households,
whether or not they have a permanent dwelling, asset holdings or a salaried job).
4.3 Background on mobile money
M-Pesa is one of the world’s most widely adopted mobile phone-based finan-
cial services. It enables individuals to exchange cash for e-money with any of
its agents distributed around the country. It was developed by Vodafone and
launched commercially in March of 2007 by its Kenyan affiliate Safaricom, the
main mobile network operator in Kenya. As shown in Figure 4.1, in March
of 2008, after only one year of operation it reached 2 million active customers,
whereas after five years of operation, in March of 2012, this number reached
around 15 million. By this time the deposit value of the service had reached
Kshs. 65.391 billion; withdrawals of Kshs. 58.857 billion and a value of Kshs.
66.010 billion was transferred over the system.23 The 2012 wave of the FinAccess
survey shows that around 77% of Kenya’s adult population report having used
M-Pesa, a substantial increase from around 39% reported in 2009.
In order to use M-Pesa, Safaricom users should create an account using their
national ID or passport. When they deposit cash in their accounts, Safaricom
issues e-float which is held in M-Pesa users’ accounts and is backed by three
commercial banks in Kenya, which donate the interest earned to charity allowing
Safaricom to avoid the heavy regulatory burden that banks face. Once money is
deposited in their account, users can make transfers to other people, can withdraw
the money or use it to pay bills. Users can deposit and withdraw money at one
of the agents distributed around the country, eliminating the need to visit bricks-
and-mortar bank branches and expanding the number of access points they can
use to conduct basic financial transactions. Agents are typically retail outlets
such as mobile phone retail outlets, airtime distribution stores, grocery stores,
bank branches and the like. Figure 4.1 shows the rapid increase of M-Pesa agents
and the customers they serve over the years. The large number of M-Pesa agents,
23Figures from Safaricom
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especially when compared to the number of bank branches or ATMs is one of the
reasons behind its success.
When launched, the system was initially used mainly for domestic remittances
due to the high labour migration from rural to urban areas which resulted in
a high demand for a safe channel to send money from urban areas to families
and friends living in rural areas (Jack and Suri (2011); Mbiti and Weil (2011).
Prior to the advent of M-Pesa people used various formal and informal channels
to transfer money. As shown in Figure 4.2 these included transferring money
through friends or family, bus companies, the post office, directly into a bank
account and to a lesser extent through money transfer companies such as Western
Union or MoneyGram, and by cheque. These methods were either expensive,
inconvenient due to their limited network of outlets or risky due to theft. M-
Pesa with its affordability, extensive network of agents and user-friendly features
dramatically changed the money transfer market. In 2009 and 2013 the use of
other money transfer methods have substantially declined in favour of M-Pesa.
Around 56% of respondents report using M-Pesa for sending or receiving money
within Kenya in 2009 and around 91% in 2013. Other transfer methods have
declined in importance. The use of bank accounts, for instance declined from
around 24% in 2006 to only 4% of respondents in 2009 and 2013 reporting sending
or receiving money directly into a bank account.
Although initially used mainly for money transfers, the mobile money system
quickly matured beyond person-to-person transfers into a payment platform for
utility bills, school fees, rent and other retail payments. Businesses and govern-
ments are also using it for payments and transfers although not as intensively as
households24. Figure 4.3 shows that the main use of M-Pesa in 2009 as measured
by the 2009 wave of the FinAccess Survey is buying airtime, where 42% of M-
Pesa users report having used M-Pesa for this purpose. About 27% of respondents
report having used M-Pesa to save. This is a relatively high figure given that
balances kept in M-Pesa accounts do not pay any interest, emphasising the latent
24Beck et al. (2015) using a novel enterprise survey from Kenya (FinAccess Business Survey
2014) show that 35% of firms report accepting M-Pesa as a common method of payment from
their customers and 32% of firms report using M-Pesa as a common method of payment to
their suppliers.
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demand for affordable, reliable and easy to reach financial services. Around 18%
of users report buying M-Pesa when travelling so they don’t have to carry cash,
most likely for safety reasons as described in Morawczynski (2009). Only 6% of
users received payments through M-Pesa and an even lower percentage (about
2%) report having received or paid salaries through M-Pesa. Even though these
figures are low almost half of the respondents report they would like to receive
their main income by M-Pesa, mainly due to the ability to access their money
fast and easy. Among those that wouldn’t prefer receiving their income by M-
pesa the main reasons were a preference for cash (30%), fear of losing the phone
(25%), concern about accessing the money too easily and spending it fast (17%)
and the need to go to a proper financial institution like a bank as their salary
won’t fit into M-Pesa (14%). The 2013 wave of the FinAccess survey shows that
the service has evolved from a pure money transfer system into a widely used
payment platform and a formal financial service. Buying airtime, saving money
and depositing into the M-Pesa account when travelling continue to be the top
three reasons of using M-Pesa. In 2013 there was an increase in the use of M-
Pesa for buying goods and services, paying bills, receiving and paying salaries
as well as receiving payments from customers. This is a reflection of numerous
strategic partnerships initiated by Safaricom to allow customers to use M-Pesa
for various financial transactions. In 2013 a small proportion of users (around
1%) report using M-Pesa to pay or receive MFI or bank loans. Although the
number is modest, as more banks integrate M-Pesa into their service offerings, it
is expected to increase.
Financial institutions have capitalized on the rapid expansion of mobile money
systems to increase the geographical reach of their services. Initially, the ad-
vent of M-Pesa was seen as a form of disruptive innovation from commercial
banks’ perspective. The competition from telecommunication companies offering
financial services was eroding the potential revenue pool especially in consumer
banking and payments. As banks saw the rapid growth of M-Pesa as a threat to
their operations, tensions grew between them and telecommunication companies
pressuring the Central Bank in different directions. Banks expressed their con-
cerns about the creation of an uneven playing-field and lobbied the Central Bank
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to regulate M-Pesa (and other mobile money platforms) under the commercial
banking regulation. Safaricom, on the other hand, emphasized the innovative na-
ture of the service and its impact on serving the base of the pyramid, traditionally
neglected by formal financial institutions. After ensuring that all the necessary
controls, management functions and reporting mechanisms were in place M-Pesa
secured the full backing of the regulatory authority - the Central Bank of Kenya
which allowed M-Pesa to launch. In fact, the supportive regulatory environment
is considered as the main reason M-Pesa was so successful in Kenya. Other
factors that made M-Pesa a success were the socio-economic and demographic
characteristics of the Kenyan population, the nature of the Kenyan banking in-
dustry as well as the ubiquity of Safaricom - the company responsible for rolling
out M-Pesa. At the time the service was launched in 2007 financial exclusion
was pervasive in Kenya. The 2006 wave of the FinAccess survey shows that only
17% of the Kenyan adult population were currently banked. Due to the high
rural-urban migration the need for an affordable and safe money transfer method
was high. The banking sector of Kenya was not designed to serve all market
segments. In 2006 there were around 600 bank branches in Kenya with a pop-
ulation of around 37 million people (Table 4.3). Moreover, bank branches were
mainly concentrated in urban and densely populated areas. Finally, Safaricom
(40% owned by the UK-based Vodafone) as the mobile operator in Kenya with
the largest market share had already earned the trust of Kenyans prior to the
launch of M-Pesa. The familiar brand name together with the extensive agent
network facilitated the adoption of the service by over 70% of the Kenyan adult
population in 2013.
Gradually, commercial banks began seeing M-Pesa as an opportunity rather than
a competitor. Today, most financial service providers in Kenya are using mobile
platforms as a channel for their clients to make deposits and withdrawals from
their bank accounts and other financial products. Since the inception of M-Pesa
in 2007, Safaricom has partnered with more than 30 banks to allow customers to
move funds from their bank accounts to their M-pesa accounts. M-Kesho is an
initiative developed through the partnership between Equity Bank and Safaricom
in 2010. It is a bank account linked to the M-Pesa account and has no opening
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fees, monthly charges or minimum balances. The account can be opened at
Equity Bank branches or any of the M-Pesa agents. It offers three services to
M-Pesa users: a micro-savings account, short-term credit and insurance (Mbiti
and Weil (2011)). Another example is M-Shwari, launched in 2012, a partnership
between Commercial Bank of Africa and Safaricom which is an improved version
of M-Kesho offering customers a way to earn interest and obtain small loans
(Mbiti and Weil (2013)). These and other initiatives are perfect examples of the
convergence between mobile phones and banking as a powerful lever to increase
the banking penetration rate. The aim of this paper is to focus on the initial phase
of the mobile money innovation, namely, the impact of the increased competition
caused by the advent of M-Pesa on commercial banks in Kenya. As more survey
rounds become available it would be interesting to examine the second phase,
namely the effect of the cooperation between M-Pesa and the commercial banks,
which we leave for future research.
4.4 Data
We combine three data sources to construct the variables used in the analysis:
household-level data, bank branch penetration and bank financial statement data.
Household-level data come from the FinAccess surveys conducted in Kenya in
2006, 2009 and 2013. FinAccess is a nationally representative household-level
survey implemented by the Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) and the Financial
Sector Deepening Trust of Kenya (FSD Kenya). The aim of the survey is to pro-
vide information about access and usage of financial services, the main barriers
to financial access as well as to offer insights about types of financial products
and delivery channels that are demanded by different market and population
segments. Sampling was conducted by the Kenya National Bureau of Statistics
(KNBS) using a stratified three-stage design. At the first level, in order to en-
sure representation at national, regional and urbanization level 710 clusters were
sampled. At the second level of selection, 12 households were selected in each
of the sampled clusters. At the third level of selection, a respondent aged 16
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years and above was randomly selected using the KISH grid approach25. In 2006,
4333 interviews were completed; 5443 in 2009 and 6773 interviews in 2013. An
important feature of the data is that banked households were asked to provide
the name of the bank they currently hold an account in. This allows us to con-
struct variables regarding the type of clients banks serve. As our goal is to test
whether banks reach out to more underserved market segments in response to the
advent of M-Pesa we construct several variables to proxy for the quality (degree
of opacity) of the banked households. Households with lower levels of education,
no permanent dwelling, lower asset holdings and no regular income are generally
considered by banks as being less profitable to serve and have been traditionally
neglected by the formal financial sector. Our dependent variables that proxy
for the depth of outreach: Education, Permanent dwelling, Asset holdings and
Salaried job measure the share of bank customers with secondary or tertiary ed-
ucation, living in a permanent dwelling, owning assets and having a salaried job,
respectively.
The second data source is the bank branch information for all commercial banks in
Kenya in 2006, 2009 and 2013. As shown in Table 4.2 there has been an expansion
of bank branches over time for almost all banks operating in Kenya. There were
583 bank branches operating in Kenya in 2006. This number increased to 1046 in
2009 (around 80% increase) and 1355 in 2013 (about 132% increase from 2006).
The expansion has been more pronounced among private locally owned banks,
followed by foreign banks and banks with government participation. Table 4.3
reports summary statistics at the county level. There is substantial variation in
the number of bank branches both across counties and over time. Urban counties
have the highest number of bank branches compared to rural ones, however the
branch expansion in the period 2006-2013 was strongest in rural counties, possibly
reflecting the lower initial level of rural bank branches. Similarly, the proportion
of registered M-Pesa users varies substantially across counties. In 2009 only
3% of interviewed households were registered M-Pesa users in Samburu county
compared to 62% in Nairobi county. The number of registered M-Pesa users has
25The KISH grid is an approach for selecting individuals to be interviewed within a household
using a pre-assigned table of random numbers.
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more than doubled; from 28% in 2009 it increased to 59% in 2013. This increase
has been more pronounced among rural counties. This is consistent with previous
studies (Jack and Suri (2011, 2014)) who find that early adopters of M-Pesa
were wealthier, more educated and more likely to be banked than late or never
adopters. To examine which banks are more exposed to the competition induced
by the advent of M-Pesa we construct a bank-level Exposure index, calculated
as:
Exposureit =
j∑
c=1
Nict ·MPesact
max
j∑
c=1
Nict ·MPesact
(4.1)
where, Nict is the total number of branches of bank i in county c at time t.
MPesact is the proportion of M-Pesa registered users in county c at time t.
The denominator is the panel maximum i.e. the maximum exposure that any
bank faced over the entire observation period. The numerator is similar to the
interaction term (MPesact ∗ Branchesct) used in specification (4.3), however
(as indicated by the subscripts) our aim here is to study the impact on bank
performance and outreach and therefore look at the number of branches each
bank has in a given county and year and sum over counties to obtain a bank
level exposure index. Specification (4.3) in contrast measures the impact from
household’s perspective where the interaction term is at the county-level and
measures how households fare in counties with different degrees of M-Pesa and
total bank branch presence. The exposure index is constructed to range from 0
to 1 consistent with the other variables used in the analysis. The index takes the
value of 0 for the period before 2007 (before the launch of M-Pesa).
The construction of the index is based on the idea that banking activities are local
in nature and the actual influence occurs at the local level. The advantage of
this spatially disaggregated measure relative to aggregate country-level measures
(such as the number of M-Pesa agents over time, M-Pesa registered users or a post
M-Pesa launch dummy) is that it offers more accurate information on the impact
of M-Pesa presence on individual banks. As shown in Table 4.3 bank branch
networks and the M-Pesa network are not spread out evenly across the country
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causing some banks to have more overlap with the M-pesa network than others.
This determines the level of exposure the bank has to the competitive pressure
induced by the advent of M-Pesa. For instance, a bank with most of its branches
located in urban counties where a high proportion of the local population are M-
Pesa registered users will be exposed to a completely different impact from the
advent of M-Pesa compared to a bank with branches located in both urban and
rural counties where on average a lower proportion of the local population they
target are M-Pesa registered users. Furthermore, relying on aggregate measures
might make it difficult to disentangle the effect of M-Pesa presence over time
from other relevant macro-factors. The exposure index which varies across banks
allows us to abstract from macro-factors common to all banks and focus on the
effect of M-Pesa presence only.
Finally, we have detailed financial statement information for all commercial banks
in Kenya provided by the Central Bank of Kenya. We want to examine whether
efforts to make banks more inclusive and tilt their portfolio composition towards
more opaque market segments have impacted their performance as well. Our
dependent variables measuring bank performance are ROA, Overhead costs, In-
come from fees and commissions and Staff costs. If the competition induced by
the advent of M-Pesa have made banks operate more efficiently we should ex-
pect a negative association between our exposure index and overhead costs and
staff costs, and a positive association with ROA. We have also included income
from fees and commissions as a dependent variable to examine if the competi-
tion from a non-bank entrant focused on the low-income market segment have
impacted the ability of banks to generate non-traditional sources of income. If
banks have started targeting the low-income market segment we should find a
relative decline in non-traditional sources of income (such as income generated
from investment and brokerage services) which are typically demanded by more
wealthy customers.
We also control for bank market share, total equity and bank age. Well-established
banks may have a different profile in terms of performance and outreach than
younger banks which seek to gain market share and have less information about
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the market. Similarly, larger banks are better able to take advantage of scale
economies, but because of organizational diseconomies may be less inclined to
reach out to less transparent market segments. The level of equity of a bank has
also been shown to impact bank performance and their ability to expand their
outreach.
Table 4.4 shows descriptive statistics for the main variables of interest over time,
whereas the definition of all the variables is given in Table 4.1.
4.5 Results
To examine the impact of the advent of M-Pesa on bank performance and out-
reach we estimate the following specification:
Bankoutcomeit = α + βi + γExposureit + δX
′
ti + εit (4.2)
where, Bankoutcomeit indicates either the performance or outreach measure of
bank i in year t as defined in the previous section. The main independent variable
is Exposureit indicating the M-Pesa exposure of bank i at time t. X
′
ti is a vector
of time-variant bank variables that are shown to impact bank performance and
outreach such as bank market share, total equity, bank age. βi are bank fixed
effects that control for time invariant bank-specific factors such as ownership,
location or business model. εit is the error term. Standard errors are clustered at
the bank-level to allow for both heteroskedasticity and correlation across multiple
observations of the same bank.
Results are presented in Table 4.5. Panel A shows that competition is fostering
broader outreach. As banks’ exposure to M-Pesa increases so does the proportion
of their borrowers with no permanent dwelling and lower asset holdings. This
indicates that the competitive pressure induced by the advent of M-Pesa has en-
couraged banks to serve the lower-end of the market and become more inclusive.
Results are in line with the conventional industrial organization view which em-
phasises the benefits of competition for increasing consumer welfare by reducing
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prices and in turn increasing the availability of funding. Similarly, we find sup-
port for the hypothesis that more competition encourages banks to become more
client-driven and reach out to excluded market segments in order to maintain
profitability and remain competitive. Gine, Martinez Cuellar and Keenan Mazer
(2014) for instance also find that in markets where consumers have less outside
alternatives local bank managers provide little information, offer more expensive
products and provide a lower quality of service than they do in more competitive
markets. The results are also consistent with anecdotal evidence that the success
of M-Pesa have had positive spillover effects on the formal financial institutions by
demonstrating that the lower income population represents an untapped market
segment with potential for increasing bank profitability and market share.
Next, we investigate if banks maintained a good performance in the process
of expanding their outreach to more opaque market segments. Panel B shows
that competition is enhancing bank’s profitability and efficiency. Higher M-Pesa
exposure index is associated with higher levels of bank profitability and lower
overhead costs. A one unit increase in the exposure index increases profitability
by 1.2 per cent and decreases overhead expenses and staff costs by 3.1 and 0.7
per cent, respectively. It is also associated with lower levels of income from fees
and commissions possibly reflecting the fact that banks are penetrating into mar-
ket segments where non-traditional banking services such as investment banking
or brokerage services are in low demand. The results are in line with theories
predicting a positive relation between competition and bank performance.
4.6 Additional results
In this section we provide further evidence about the impact of M-Pesa on finan-
cial inclusion by looking at barriers to financial access. The FinAccess surveys
ask unbanked households about the reasons why they do not currently have a
bank account. The responses range from access barriers related to the cost of
opening and maintaining a bank account to households choosing voluntarily not
to have a bank account either because they do not need one or because they
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prefer other options rather than a bank. We use this information to categorize
the responses into five groups indicating different reasons for not having a bank
account, including both supply and demand side barriers. Supply side barriers
consist of those related to access barriers due to geographical distance to the
nearest financial service provider, due to the cost of opening and maintaining a
bank account as well as due to the documentation and other requirements for
opening a bank account. Demand side barriers consist of those related to the lack
of literacy for opening a bank account as well as reasons related with respondents
choosing voluntarily not to have a bank account either due to behavioural reasons
or the lack of need for a bank account. This detailed information allows us to
examine the effect the advent of M-Pesa has had on different demand and supply
side barriers reported by unbanked households. If the competitive pressure in-
duced by the advent of M-Pesa has encouraged banks to become more inclusive
we should expect households to report lower supply side barriers. The impact of
bank branch expansion should have a greater impact in lowering access barriers
in counties with a larger number of M-Pesa registered users. We estimate the
following specification:
Barriersict = α + βc + γt + δMPesact + ρBranchesct
+ θMPesactBranchesct + µXict + εict
(4.3)
where, i denotes households, c denotes counties and t denotes time; Barriers is a
dummy variable representing one of the reasons for not having a bank account:
Cost, Choice, lack of Documentation, lack of Literacy or barriers due to Geog-
raphy. The definition of all the variables, including the survey questions used
to construct each of the variables is provided in Table 4.1. β is a set of county
fixed effects which control for unobservable time-invariant county characteristics;
γ denotes time fixed effects which control for macroeconomic fluctuations and
other year-specific effects that may influence access barriers; X is a matrix of
individual control variables (education, gender, age, wealth). MPesa is the pro-
portion of M-Pesa registered users at the county level at time t (it is zero for the
year 2006). Branches is the total number of bank branches in county c at time
t. The coefficient of interest is θ which tests whether the presence of M-Pesa
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has a differential impact on the relationship between bank branch expansion and
access barriers. Standard errors are clustered at the county level to allow for
correlations across households within a county. We estimate the equation using
a linear probability model due to the difficulty of interpreting interaction terms
in non-linear logit or probit models. Furthermore, non-linear models with a large
number of fixed effects are subject to the incidental parameters problem.
Results are presented in Table 4.6. The evidence suggests that the advent of
M-Pesa weakens the positive relation between bank branch expansion and access
barriers related to the cost of opening and maintain a bank account. This is con-
sistent with the prediction that the competitive pressure by a non-bank entrant
encourages banks to become more competitive in order to maintain market share.
Bank-level results in the previous section that banks more exposed to the advent
of M-Pesa have moved down-market seem to be explained by the fact that they
have made opening and maintaining a bank account more affordable. Column
5 shows that the advent of M-Pesa weakens the negative relation between bank
branch expansion and barriers related to literacy. The result indicates that lit-
eracy as a demand side barrier becomes more relevant in counties with branch
expansions with more M-Pesa users reflecting the fact that competition in the
banking sector can help alleviate access barriers related with the supply of bank-
ing services and less so for demand barriers such as lack of literacy or financial
exclusion due to choice (voluntary excluded).
4.7 Conclusion
Combining household-level data with branch penetration data at the county level
as well as bank financial statement information we examine the impact of a fi-
nancial innovation on the service provision of commercial banks. We use the
advent of M-Pesa - a mobile-phone based money transfer and financing platform
initially launched in Kenya in 2007 - as an interesting laboratory to investigate
the impact of a non-bank entrant on the activities of formal financial institutions.
Consistent with theories predicting a positive relation between competition and
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bank performance and outreach we find that banks more exposed to the advent
of M-Pesa (as measured by an exposure index) experienced an increase in their
profitability and a decrease in overhead expenses. With regards to banking sector
outreach we find that banks with a higher exposure index tilted their portfolio
composition towards more opaque market segments: lower levels of education, no
permanent dwelling and lower asset holdings. These results highlight the need
for innovative solutions to the financial exclusion problem that has been espe-
cially prevalent in developing countries with weak institutional and contractual
environment. Another important policy implication is to encourage governments
to increase the contestability of banking sectors in order to ensure a more inclu-
sive and stable financial system. The results of this paper provide micro-level
evidence that increased competition can be beneficial for both customers and
financial service providers.
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Table 4.2: Bank branches over time by bank name and ownership type.
Nr. Banks locally owned Branches 2006 Branches 2009 Branches 2013
1 African Banking Corporation Ltd. 8 10 11
2 CharterHouse Bank Ltd. 10 10 10
3 Chase Bank Kenya Ltd. 2 12 22
4 City Finance Bank Ltd. 1 1 0
5 Co-operative Bank of Kenya Ltd. 52 83 139
6 Commercial Bank of Africa Ltd. 18 20 28
7 Credit Bank Ltd. 4 5 8
8 Dubai Bank Ltd. 3 4 5
9 Equatorial Commercial Bank Ltd. 3 5 13
10 Equity Bank 34 112 155
11 FINA Bank Ltd. 5 14 15
12 Family Finance Bank 23 50 66
13 Fidelity Commercial Bank Ltd. 5 7 12
14 Giro Commercial Bank Ltd. 6 8 7
15 Guardian Bank Ltd. 6 7 9
16 Imperial Bank Ltd. 6 13 26
17 Investments and Mortgages 9 17 29
18 Jamii Bora Bank Hse 0 0 19
19 Middle East Bank Kenya Ltd. 2 3 4
20 National Industrial Credit Bank Ltd. 16 16 27
21 Oriental Commericial Bank Ltd. 4 8 7
22 Paramount Universal Bank Ltd. 4 7 6
23 Prime Bank Ltd. 9 14 18
24 Southern Credit Banking Corporation Ltd 9 10 0
25 Trans-National Bank Ltd. 9 13 19
26 Victoria Commercial Bank Ltd. 1 1 3
Total 249 450 658
Nr. Foreign owned banks Branches 2006 Branches 2009 Branches 2013
1 Bank of Africa Kenya Ltd. 4 10 28
2 Bank of Baroda Kenya Ltd. 6 9 11
3 Bank of India Ltd. 4 5 5
4 Barclays Bank of Kenya Ltd. 49 119 108
5 Citibank N.A. 3 4 4
6 Diamond Trust Bank of Kenya Ltd. 6 32 46
7 ECO BANK 9 19 31
8 Faulu Kenya MFI 0 6 6
9 First Community Bank 0 18 18
10 Gulf African Bank Ltd 0 14 16
11 Habib Bank A.G. Zurich 4 5 5
12 Habib Bank Ltd. 6 4 4
13 K-Rep Bank Ltd. 19 30 37
14 Standard Chartered Bank Kenya Ltd. 30 35 41
15 UBA 0 4 4
Total 140 314 364
Nr. Banks with government participation Branches 2006 Branches 2009 Branches 2013
1 CFC Bank Ltd. 7 17 20
2 CFC STANBIC 0 18 24
3 Consolidated Bank of Kenya Ltd. 12 13 18
4 Development Bank of Kenya Ltd. 1 2 3
5 Housing Finance Company of Kenya Ltd. 10 11 15
6 Kenya Commercial Bank Ltd. 117 169 182
7 National Bank of Kenya Ltd. 31 43 71
8 Savings & Loans Kenya Ltd. 9 9 0
9 Stanbic Bank Kenya Ltd. 7 0 0
Total 194 282 333
50 Grand Total 583 1046 1355
This table reports the number of bank branches in 2006, 2009 and 2013 for all Kenyan banks
classified by ownership type. Source: Central Bank of Kenya, bank websites, annual reports
and government publications.
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Table 4.3: Descriptive Statistics, County Level.
Nr. County Branches
2006
Branches
2009
Branches
2013
M-Pesa
2009
M-Pesa
2013
Area
(km2)
Population
(2009
Census)
1 BARINGO 3 5 8 0.387 0.69 1,970 555,561
2 BOMET 2 4 7 0.283 0.444 1,630 724,186
3 BUNGOMA 8 13 16 0.193 0.486 3,123 1,630,934
4 BUSIA 3 9 13 0.234 0.581 1,171 488,075
5 ELGEYO MARAK-
WET
2 2 5 0.105 0.484 1,107 369,998
6 EMBU 7 10 11 0.17 0.686 1,296 516,212
7 GARISSA 1 8 9 0.062 n.a. 861 623,060
8 HOMA BAY 2 8 11 0.151 0.563 1,754 749,331
9 ISIOLO 2 5 6 0.579 0.27 397 143,294
10 KAJIADO 6 22 34 0.457 0.659 1,105 687,312
11 KAKAMEGA 7 14 16 0.189 0.58 3,343 1,660,651
12 KERICHO 7 12 12 0.221 0.664 1,886 758,339
13 KIAMBU 25 52 71 0.376 0.799 4,946 1,623,282
14 KILIFI 8 26 36 0.11 0.43 2,343 1,109,735
15 KIRINYAGA 6 10 13 0.257 0.622 1,401 528,054
16 KISII 5 13 18 0.144 0.534 2,588 1,152,282
17 KISUMU 23 32 37 0.308 0.605 2,407 968,909
18 KITUI 3 11 14 0.136 0.541 3,587 1,012,709
19 KWALE 3 9 12 0.069 0.514 1,265 649,931
20 LAIKIPIA 6 10 12 0.412 0.747 1,023 399,227
21 LAMU 2 4 8 0.091 0.513 265 101,539
22 MACHAKOS 9 16 19 0.206 0.674 3,052 1,098,584
23 MAKUENI 4 9 11 0.2 0.523 2,344 884,527
24 MANDERA 1 2 2 0.061 n.a. 1,038 1,025,756
25 MARSABIT 2 5 6 0.083 0.19 653 291,166
26 MERU 14 26 35 0.127 0.542 3,196 1,356,301
27 MIGORI 6 7 13 0.205 0.481 489 256,086
28 MOMBASA 58 85 113 0.359 0.708 3,079 939,370
29 MURANGA 15 20 20 0.216 0.617 2,517 942,581
30 NAIROBI 236 413 540 0.62 0.827 10,323 3,138,369
31 NAKURU 29 48 57 0.436 0.741 4,650 1,603,325
32 NANDI 3 9 11 0.244 0.597 1,777 752,965
33 NAROK 5 7 11 0.222 0.339 1,852 850,920
34 NYAMIRA 3 7 6 0.346 0.594 1,291 598,252
35 NYANDARUA 5 8 9 0.415 0.757 1,259 596,268
36 NYERI 18 24 28 0.331 0.812 2,077 693,558
37 SAMBURU 1 2 4 0.032 0 542 223,947
38 SIAYA 3 6 8 0.138 0.488 2,183 842,304
39 TAITA TAVETA 3 11 10 0.135 0.61 971 284,657
40 TANA RIVER 1 2 3 0.093 0.375 626 240,075
41 THARAKA NITHI 4 6 6 0.143 0.595 1,102 365,330
42 TRANS NZOIA 9 13 14 0.188 0.572 1,611 818,757
43 TURKANA 2 3 4 0.041 0.044 1,520 855,399
44 UASIN GISHU 17 25 41 0.458 0.667 2,112 894,179
45 VIHIGA 2 6 7 0.191 0.429 1,271 554,622
46 WAJIR 1 4 5 0.056 n.a. 815 661,941
47 WEST POKOT 1 3 3 0.057 0.255 1,407 512,690
Total/Average 583 1,046 1,355 0.276 0.587 93,225 37,734,550
This table reports descriptive statistics at the county level. Source: Bank branch data from the
Central Bank of Kenya, bank websites, annual reports and government publications. Proportion
of M-Pesa registered users from the 2009 and 2013 FinAccess households surveys and county
population and area from the 2009 Kenyan census.
141
Chapter 4. Mobile Money and Traditional Banking
T
ab
le
4.
4:
D
es
cr
ip
ti
v
e
S
ta
ti
st
ic
s,
B
a
n
k
,
H
o
u
se
h
o
ld
a
n
d
C
o
u
n
ty
L
ev
el
.
20
06
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
3
V
ar
ia
b
le
O
b
s
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
O
b
s
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
O
b
s
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
B
an
k
L
ev
el
N
r.
O
f
b
an
ke
d
H
H
N
r.
O
f
b
an
k
s
N
r.
O
f
b
a
n
ke
d
H
H
N
r.
O
f
b
a
n
k
s
N
r.
O
f
b
a
n
ke
d
H
H
N
r.
O
f
b
a
n
k
s
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
88
9
10
0.
83
37
0
.1
3
1
7
1
9
4
1
3
4
0
.8
6
2
1
0
.1
86
8
2
1
9
0
3
7
0
.6
7
0
2
0
.3
2
5
1
P
er
m
an
en
t
d
w
el
li
n
g
88
9
10
0.
76
34
0
.1
8
6
3
1
9
4
1
3
4
0
.8
7
5
6
0
.1
49
3
2
1
9
0
3
7
0
.5
8
6
4
0
.2
7
3
2
A
ss
et
h
ol
d
in
gs
88
9
10
7.
20
17
3
.4
2
7
5
1
9
4
1
3
4
8
.0
8
2
7
3
.7
45
7
2
1
9
0
3
7
3
.9
8
2
0
2
.0
3
8
9
S
al
ar
ie
d
jo
b
88
9
10
0.
55
48
0
.1
9
4
7
1
9
4
1
3
4
0
.4
7
4
5
0
.2
9
8
3
2
1
9
0
3
7
0
.4
0
1
1
0
.2
4
7
4
E
x
p
os
u
re
in
d
ex
44
0.
00
00
0
.0
0
0
0
4
8
0
.0
7
9
5
0
.0
98
9
4
6
0
.1
8
1
5
0
.2
2
9
3
R
O
A
41
0.
02
33
0
.0
1
9
2
4
3
0
.0
1
2
3
0
.0
48
8
4
3
0
.0
3
0
0
0
.0
2
6
8
O
ve
rh
ea
d
co
st
s
41
0.
06
71
0
.0
3
1
6
4
3
0
.0
7
8
2
0
.0
54
6
4
3
0
.0
5
7
0
0
.0
3
0
2
In
co
m
e
fe
es
co
m
m
is
io
n
s
41
0.
02
03
0
.0
1
6
2
4
3
0
.0
1
9
1
0
.0
1
4
6
4
3
0
.0
1
5
8
0
.0
1
1
1
S
ta
ff
co
st
s
41
0.
02
61
0
.0
1
1
2
4
3
0
.0
3
1
3
0
.0
20
2
4
3
0
.0
2
3
9
0
.0
1
1
8
M
ar
ke
t
sh
ar
e
(d
ep
os
it
s)
41
0.
02
44
0
.0
3
5
9
4
4
0
.0
2
2
7
0
.0
3
3
4
4
4
0
.0
2
2
7
0
.0
2
8
7
T
ot
al
E
q
u
it
y
41
0.
17
67
0
.1
1
4
9
4
3
0
.1
8
4
4
0
.1
40
4
4
3
0
.1
6
3
0
0
.0
5
8
8
B
an
k
A
ge
42
30
2
1
.0
7
7
1
4
3
3
1
.3
7
2
1
2
1
.8
8
3
9
4
2
3
5
.7
8
5
7
2
1
.9
7
8
4
(C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
142
4.7. Conclusion
T
a
b
le
4
.4
-
(C
o
n
ti
n
u
ed
)
20
06
2
0
0
9
2
0
1
3
V
ar
ia
b
le
O
b
s
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
M
in
M
a
x
O
b
s
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
M
in
M
a
x
O
b
s
M
ea
n
S
td
.
D
ev
.
M
in
M
a
x
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
L
ev
el
G
eo
gr
ap
h
y
36
90
0.
04
15
0.
19
94
0
1
4
9
9
1
0
.0
8
6
6
0
.2
8
1
2
0
1
3
3
6
1
0
.0
5
5
6
0
.2
2
9
3
0
1
C
os
t
36
90
0.
20
11
0.
40
09
0
1
4
9
9
1
0
.1
1
4
6
0
.3
1
8
6
0
1
3
3
6
1
0
.0
7
4
7
0
.2
6
2
9
0
1
C
h
oi
ce
36
90
0.
16
56
0.
37
18
0
1
4
9
9
1
0
.2
0
7
0
0
.4
0
5
2
0
1
3
3
6
1
0
.1
0
2
1
0
.3
0
2
8
0
1
D
o
cu
m
en
ta
ti
on
36
90
0.
22
22
0.
41
58
0
1
4
9
9
1
0
.2
4
5
2
0
.4
3
0
3
0
1
3
3
6
1
0
.1
2
2
6
0
.3
2
8
0
0
1
L
it
er
ac
y
36
90
0.
05
15
0.
22
10
0
1
4
9
9
1
0
.1
1
9
2
0
.3
2
4
1
0
1
3
3
6
1
0
.0
3
5
1
0
.1
8
4
1
0
1
H
ou
se
h
ol
d
si
ze
44
18
2.
66
68
1.
40
65
1
8
6
5
9
8
4
.9
6
1
7
2
.6
0
1
2
1
2
0
6
4
4
9
4
.4
3
0
8
2
.5
4
1
4
1
2
4
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
:
p
ri
m
ar
y
44
18
0.
45
31
0.
49
79
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.4
6
8
2
0
.4
9
9
0
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.4
8
8
6
0
.4
9
9
9
0
1
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
:
se
co
n
d
ar
y
44
18
0.
27
82
0.
44
82
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.2
7
0
1
0
.4
4
4
0
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.2
7
5
1
0
.4
4
6
6
0
1
E
d
u
ca
ti
on
:
te
rt
ia
ry
44
18
0.
08
87
0.
28
44
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.0
8
4
9
0
.2
7
8
7
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.0
8
0
2
0
.2
7
1
6
0
1
F
em
al
e
44
18
0.
56
04
0.
49
64
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.5
8
7
0
0
.4
9
2
4
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.5
9
1
4
0
.4
9
1
6
0
1
A
ss
et
h
ol
d
in
gs
44
18
2.
05
12
2.
71
67
0
1
7
6
5
9
8
2
.2
2
9
2
2
.6
2
4
0
0
1
7
6
4
4
9
1
.8
5
4
7
2
.0
0
8
2
0
1
5
P
er
m
an
en
t
d
w
el
li
n
g
44
18
0.
30
67
0.
46
12
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.3
8
7
1
0
.4
8
7
1
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.3
1
7
6
0
.4
6
5
6
0
1
In
co
m
e:
ag
ri
cu
lt
u
re
44
18
0.
49
50
0.
50
00
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.5
0
5
9
0
.5
0
0
0
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.5
0
2
9
0
.5
0
0
0
0
1
In
co
m
e:
em
p
lo
ye
d
44
18
0.
31
37
0.
46
41
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.3
1
3
4
0
.4
6
3
9
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.3
9
2
3
0
.4
8
8
3
0
1
In
co
m
e:
se
lf
-e
m
p
lo
ye
d
44
18
0.
28
16
0.
44
98
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.2
7
9
3
0
.4
4
8
7
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.2
3
3
1
0
.4
2
2
8
0
1
A
ge
:
18
-2
4
44
18
0.
20
30
0.
40
23
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.1
7
8
4
0
.3
8
2
9
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.1
7
6
3
0
.3
8
1
1
0
1
A
ge
:
25
-3
4
44
18
0.
28
45
0.
45
12
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.2
5
8
4
0
.4
3
7
8
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.2
9
7
6
0
.4
5
7
2
0
1
A
ge
:
35
-4
4
44
18
0.
19
83
0.
39
87
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.2
0
7
3
0
.4
0
5
4
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.1
8
6
7
0
.3
8
9
7
0
1
A
ge
:
45
-5
4
44
18
0.
12
31
0.
32
86
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.1
3
3
8
0
.3
4
0
5
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.1
1
2
4
0
.3
1
5
9
0
1
A
ge
:
55
ov
er
44
18
0.
14
49
0.
35
20
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.1
8
3
4
0
.3
8
7
0
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.1
8
6
2
0
.3
8
9
3
0
1
L
an
gu
ag
e:
S
w
ah
il
i
44
18
0.
48
10
0.
49
97
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.6
4
8
5
0
.4
7
7
5
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.4
5
6
7
0
.4
9
8
2
0
1
M
in
or
it
y
la
n
gu
ag
e
44
18
0.
42
30
0.
49
41
0
1
6
5
9
8
0
.2
3
0
4
0
.4
2
1
1
0
1
6
4
4
9
0
.3
5
4
2
0
.4
7
8
3
0
1
C
ou
n
ty
le
ve
l
T
ot
al
n
r.
of
b
ra
n
ch
es
47
12
.4
0
34
.7
8
1
2
3
6
4
7
2
2
.2
6
6
0
.1
7
2
4
1
3
4
7
2
8
.8
3
7
8
.7
7
2
5
4
0
M
p
es
a
re
gi
st
er
ed
u
se
r
4
7
0
.2
2
0
.1
4
0
.0
3
0
.6
2
4
4
0
.5
4
0
.1
8
0
0
.8
3
T
h
is
ta
b
le
re
p
or
ts
th
e
n
u
m
b
er
of
ob
se
rv
at
io
n
s,
m
ea
n
s
an
d
st
a
n
d
a
rd
d
ev
ia
ti
o
n
s
o
f
th
e
m
a
in
va
ri
a
b
le
s.
B
a
n
k
fi
n
a
n
ci
a
l
d
a
ta
a
re
fr
o
m
th
e
C
en
tr
a
l
B
a
n
k
o
f
K
en
ya
w
h
er
ea
s
th
e
h
ou
se
h
ol
d
ch
ar
ac
te
ri
st
ic
s
ar
e
fr
om
th
e
20
06
,
20
0
9
a
n
d
2
0
1
3
h
o
u
se
h
o
ld
su
rv
ey
s.
T
h
e
d
efi
n
it
io
n
o
f
a
ll
th
e
va
ri
a
b
le
s
is
g
iv
en
in
T
a
b
le
4
.1
.
143
Chapter 4. Mobile Money and Traditional Banking
Table 4.5: The impact of M-Pesa: Bank’s Perspective.
Panel A
Education Permanent
Dwelling
Asset Holding Salaried Job
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Education Permanent Dwelling Asset Holding Salaried Job
Exposure In-
dex
-0.114 -0.187* -1.769* -0.085
(0.097) (0.098) (1.040) (0.093)
Market share -1.292 -0.277 9.530 1.001
(1.051) (1.076) (11.583) (1.260)
Total Equity 1.029 1.228 2.185 0.978
(1.284) (0.828) (7.818) (1.236)
Bank Age -0.292** -0.341 -6.749** 0.041
(0.140) (0.261) (3.002) (0.118)
Constant 1.664*** 1.727* 28.697*** 0.134
(0.507) (0.891) (10.189) (0.425)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 72 72 72 72
R-sq 0.133 0.109 0.191 0.043
Panel B
Overhead
Costs
ROA Income from fees
and comm.
Staff Costs
Exposure In-
dex
-0.031*** 0.012* -0.028*** -0.007**
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.003)
Market share -0.227*** 0.044 -0.210** -0.215***
(0.071) (0.069) (0.097) (0.022)
Total Equity 0.067 0.033 0.007 0.036**
(0.044) (0.063) (0.021) (0.014)
Bank Age -0.017** 0.021** 0.000 -0.008**
(0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.004)
Constant 0.118*** -0.053* 0.024** 0.053***
(0.025) (0.030) (0.011) (0.012)
Bank FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 117 117 117 117
R-sq 0.176 0.124 0.498 0.236
This table reports regression results of the impact of M-Pesa on bank performance (Panel B)
and outreach (Panel A) while controlling for other bank characteristics and including bank fixed
effects. Each column uses a different dependent variable corresponding to different measures of
bank performance and outreach. The definition of all the variables is given in Table 4.1. The
model is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered at the bank level and appear in
brackets. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** at the 5% level. *** at the 1% level.
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Table 4.6: The impact of M-Pesa: Households’ Perspective.
Geography Costly Choice Documentation Literacy
Bank branches -0.003*** 0.005*** -0.000 -0.001 -0.006***
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
M-Pesa registered
users
-0.245*** -0.091** -0.106** -0.216*** -0.188***
(0.034) (0.045) (0.050) (0.053) (0.035)
Bank
Branches*Mpesa
registered users
0.002*** -0.004*** 0.000 0.001 0.004***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Household size 0.004*** -0.001 -0.003** 0.006*** -0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Education: primary -0.002 0.019** 0.004 0.006 -0.112***
(0.008) (0.010) (0.010) (0.011) (0.009)
Education: secondary -0.003 0.023** 0.026** 0.026** -0.126***
(0.008) (0.012) (0.013) (0.013) (0.010)
Education: tertiary -0.011 0.019 0.071*** -0.007 -0.142***
(0.013) (0.021) (0.025) (0.023) (0.011)
Female -0.014*** -0.018*** -0.019*** 0.019*** 0.019***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.005)
Asset holdings -0.002** -0.001 0.012*** -0.001 -0.003**
(0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001)
Permanent dwelling -0.009* 0.018** 0.006 0.008 -0.005
(0.005) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005)
Income: agriculture 0.042*** 0.024*** 0.046*** -0.058*** 0.015***
(0.005) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.005)
Income: employed 0.000 0.015** 0.022*** -0.050*** 0.007
(0.005) (0.007) (0.008) (0.008) (0.005)
Income: self-
employed
0.020*** 0.028*** 0.074*** -0.082*** -0.014**
(0.006) (0.008) (0.009) (0.008) (0.005)
Age: 18-24 0.023** 0.055*** 0.059*** -0.274*** -0.022*
(0.009) (0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.012)
Age: 25-34 0.024** 0.060*** 0.080*** -0.395*** -0.032***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.022) (0.012)
Age: 35-44 0.017* 0.061*** 0.108*** -0.429*** -0.034***
(0.010) (0.014) (0.014) (0.022) (0.013)
Age: 45-54 0.018 0.058*** 0.114*** -0.422*** -0.030**
(0.011) (0.015) (0.016) (0.022) (0.014)
Age: 55 over 0.009 0.047*** 0.114*** -0.434*** -0.027**
(0.011) (0.015) (0.015) (0.022) (0.014)
Language: Swahili 0.000 -0.004 -0.017 0.006 0.004
(0.008) (0.012) (0.014) (0.015) (0.007)
Language: minority 0.009 0.006 -0.027* -0.026 0.021**
(0.009) (0.013) (0.015) (0.016) (0.008)
Constant 0.070** 0.133*** 0.141*** 0.592*** 0.214***
(0.029) (0.035) (0.042) (0.039) (0.029)
County FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
N 12042 12042 12042 12042 12042
R-sq 0.065 0.051 0.062 0.128 0.101
This table reports regression results of the impact of M-Pesa on barriers to financial access while controlling for
an array of household characteristics and including year and county fixed effects. Each column uses a different
dependent variable, corresponding to different reported reasons for not having a bank account. The definition
of all the variables is given in Table 4.1. The model is estimated using OLS. Standard errors are clustered at
the county level and appear in brackets. * indicates significance at the 10% level. ** at the 5% level. *** at
the 1% level.
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Figures
Figure 4.1: Mobile Payment Statistics.
This figure shows the number of mobile money customers, agents as well as
the amount and value of transactions carried out through the mobile platform.
Source: Central Bank of Kenya.
Figure 4.2: Money transfer methods.
This figure shows different methods used by respondents to send or receive money
within Kenya. The data is based on the 2006, 2009 and 2013 waves of the
FinAccess surveys.
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Figure 4.3: Use of M-Pesa.
This figure shows the different reasons for using mobile money. Data is based on
the 2009 and 2013 wave of the FinAccess surveys.
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Chapter 5
Concluding remarks
As the banking sectors of many developing countries have undergone considerable
transformations aiming at reversing the negative consequences of government-
controlled repressive regimes, a number of questions arise about the costs and
benefits of these reforms for banks, borrowers and the governments. This thesis
has presented the findings of three essays examining different aspects of financial
sector developments starting from the widespread entry of foreign banks in the
first essay, the institutional and regulatory reforms in the second essay and fi-
nancial innovations aiming at facilitating access to financial services in the third
essay. This last chapter will summarize the main findings, give policy implications
of the findings and highlight the limitations and areas for future research.
5.1 Main findings
The first essay has analysed the impact of foreign bank entry on the cost of fi-
nancial intermediation in host countries. Using time-varying ownership data for
a sample of 265 banks operating in nine South-East European countries charac-
terised by one of the largest foreign bank presence among developing countries,
we find that foreign banks operate with lower NIMs compared to domestic banks
during the initial years of financial sector liberalization. At later stages of foreign
bank entry foreign banks start operating with higher NIMs. This shift of be-
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haviour is more pronounced for foreign greenfield banks which have an efficiency
advantage compared to domestic and foreign acquisition banks as they do not
acquire existing institutions which often have inefficient organizational structures
and low quality loan portfolios. Greenfield banks, however, have an informational
disadvantage as they do not inherit a customer base with all the related infor-
mation about them, rather start building a new customer base. With time, as
they start acquiring proprietary information about customers they may tilt their
portfolio composition from transparent towards more opaque market segments.
Finally, incorporating home country factors into the analysis we find evidence
about cross-border spill-over effects of bank regulation through the behaviour of
foreign banks in host countries. Foreign banks coming from countries with stricter
regulations operate with higher NIMs in host countries. These results advance
the foreign bank entry and the multinational bank profitability literature by an-
alyzing the cost of financial intermediation as a function of both domestic and
multinational factors and by treating foreign banks as a heterogeneous group in
terms of home country characteristics and parent bank conditions.
The second essay examines the impact of the institutional environment on bank
organizational hierarchy and the implications for SME loan contracts. Using a
bank-level survey dataset with unique information on bank internal organiza-
tional structures for a sample of 32 EBRD countries of operation we find that
banks tend to decentralize decision making more in countries with a stronger in-
stitutional environment. Furthermore, combining the bank-level with firm-level
data containing detailed information on their financing arrangements we find that
strong institutions which favour a decentralized organizational structure lead to
better lending terms to SMEs decentralized banks grant loans with longer ma-
turities, lower interest rates and are less likely to require collateral compared
to their centralized counterparts. These findings contribute to the literature on
organizational structure and information production and the law and finance lit-
erature by introducing a new and direct measure of bank organizational hierarchy
across a large sample of countries and by analysing bank organizational structure
as a function of the institutional environment they operate in.
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In the third essay we have investigated the link between the advent of mobile
money and the service provision of traditional banks. Using the advent of M-
Pesa in Kenya in 2007 as an interesting laboratory and micro-level data on the
household use and access to financial services, bank branch penetration data at
the county level as well as bank financial statement information we find that the
advent of the mobile money innovation has made the banking sector more inclu-
sive. Banks more exposed to the advent of M-Pesa (as measured by a bank-level
exposure index) tilted their portfolio composition towards more opaque market
segments, while maintaining a good performance in the process (as measured by
their ROA and cost to income ratios). These results add to the competition-
access to finance and competition-bank performance literature by investigating,
for the first time in the literature, the effect of the competition induced by a
non-bank entrant on the outreach and performance of traditional commercial
banks.
5.2 Policy Implications
Besides advancing the academic literature, the findings presented above have
important policy implications and can help inform the debate about ways to
make the financial system more inclusive and affordable for all market segments.
The policy implication of the first essay is that countries dealing with major-
ity foreign-owned banking sectors should closely follow the regulatory changes
in foreign banks’ home countries as their foreign-owned banking sectors act as
transmitters of such regulatory changes. In order to reduce negative externalities
from stricter home-country regulation, host countries should direct regulatory
reforms towards increasing the level of cross-border cooperation and levelling the
playing field with foreign bank home countries so as to reduce the opportunity
for regulatory arbitrage. The results provide useful policy recommendations in
light of the recent discussions (after the 2007/2008 financial crisis) to strengthen
bank regulation and supervision in the EU. These regulatory changes can have
an impact on smaller less developed countries, which are host to large EU bank-
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ing groups, and if not done in coordination can lead to negative externalities.
Furthermore, the way foreign banks are allowed to enter the host countries is im-
portant as the results show that greenfield banks behave differently from foreign
acquisition banks.
The results of the second essay clearly show that countries seeking to improve
the quality of financial services provided to SMEs should aim at improving the
quality of institutions that reduce information asymmetries between banks and
borrowers. This will enable banks to adopt an organizational structure that
facilitates the utilization of local information and allows them to offer better
loan contracts to SMEs which by being more opaque and with a lack of credit
history rely heavily on soft information. Another implication of the results is that
bank size or foreign ownership per se do not determine the quality of lending,
rather the internal organizational structure that banks choose is what matters
for loan contract terms. The dichotomy usually associating foreign and large
banks with centralized organizational structures and domestic and small banks
with decentralized ones, is over simplistic and does not allow for more nuanced
policy recommendations. What is obvious from our results is that even within the
group of foreign banks for instance, both organizational structures are prevalent
leading to different lending outcomes. Large and foreign banks, if adopting the
right level of decentralization, can enjoy the best of both worlds economies of
scale and diversification from their size and a utilization of local information due
to their decentralized organizational structures.
The results of the third essay show that initiatives such as M-Pesa a mo-
bile phone-based money transfer, financing and micro-financing service initially
launched in Kenya in 2007 - can have not only direct effects in terms of allowing
(unbanked) individuals to deposit, transfer, withdraw money as well as pay for
goods and services fast and more conveniently, but also has positive spill-over
effects in terms of introducing a new source of competition in the Kenyan finan-
cial landscape and demonstrating that low-income unbanked market segments
can be a profitable customer base to target. Developing countries with a weak
institutional environment and lack of infrastructure for access to basic financial
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services that seek to expand access to financial services to a wide range of cus-
tomers can benefit from innovative solutions to the financial exclusion problem
such as the case of M-Pesa in Kenya. Our results show that increasing the con-
testability of the banking market by allowing non-bank entrants to provide a
range of financial services traditionally offered by banks can have positive effects
by encouraging banks to behave more competitively and re-consider what they
previously considered an un-bankable market segment. A final policy implication
is that regulators should be careful not to discourage efforts to increase financial
inclusion by placing heavy regulatory burden on these and similar initiatives. At
the same time a prudent regulatory approach is required so as not to expose
customers to unwanted risks and the banking system to potential instabilities.
5.3 Limitations
In this section we will highlight some limitations which need to be taken into
account when interpreting the findings of this thesis.
When studying the impact of foreign bank entry on NIMs in host countries it
should be taken into account the sample used to draw our conclusions. Although
the coverage ratio in terms of total banking assets is high we analyze the banking
sectors of only nine SEE countries. Extending the analysis to include more devel-
oping countries from different parts of the world can help generalize the results.
Even within the group of developing countries there are differences in terms of
the institutional and macroeconomic environment which may lead to a different
impact of foreign bank entry for host countries. Another limitation of the study
is that it does not investigate the specific channels through which foreign bank
entry affects NIMs in host countries. As such, we cannot differentiate between
the performance hypothesis and the portfolio composition hypothesis usually put
forward in the literature when examining the behaviour of foreign and domestic
banks.
The second essay of the impact of the institutional environment on the decentral-
ization of bank lending activities and loan terms granted to SMEs in 32 EBRD
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countries of operation uses cross-sectional data at one point in time, i.e. year
2012. This does not allow us to exploit the time dimension of the reforms given
that these countries have experienced considerable institutional reforms during
their transition period from centrally planned to market-oriented economies.
Finally, a limitation of the third essay analyzing the impact of the competition
induced by the advent of M-Pesa on the performance and outreach of formal
financial institutions is the lack of data on the roll-out of M-Pesa agents across
Kenya which would provide an additional source of exogenous variation in banks
exposure to the financial innovation. Consistent with the location data of com-
mercial bank branches we would like to have location data for M-Pesa agents
as well, but rely on M-pesa registered users instead to measure the presence of
the financial innovation at the county level. The use of M-Pesa agent location
data would strengthen the results and alleviate any concerns due to endogenous
M-Pesa adoption. In addition, as with the first essay, generalizing the results
to other countries experiencing the same or similar financial innovations is diffi-
cult when focusing the analysis on a single representative country. Conducting
a similar analysis in other countries where M-Pesa or similar initiatives have
been launched will help make the results more informative about the impact of
a financial innovation on formal financial institutions in different institutional
settings.
Notwithstanding these limitations we believe the results of this thesis provide
useful and novel insights about ways to make the financial system more inclusive
and affordable for all market segments and provide policy recommendations for
reforming the macroeconomic and legal infrastructure of a country to facilitate
achieving these goals.
5.4 Further research
The results presented in this thesis can be extended in several ways which we
leave for future research.
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When examining the impact of foreign bank entry on the cost of financial inter-
mediation it would be informative to investigate deeper the reasons why foreign
banks operate with different NIMs compared to domestic banks at different stages
of foreign bank entry. A more detailed loan portfolio composition data would al-
low a thorough investigation of welfare implications of our results. If foreign
banks initially cherry pick the most transparent clients because of their infor-
mational disadvantage compared to domestic banks and later as they gain more
proprietary information serve less transparent clients, a shift of NIMs relative
to domestic banks would reflect this portfolio composition effect rather than the
efficiency advantage of foreign banks. Distinguishing between the portfolio com-
position and the performance hypothesis would allow a better understanding of
the effects of foreign bank entry for host countries.
With regards to the second essay some interesting issues left unexplored are
whether the institutional environment impacts the degree of decentralization of
bank lending activities for the household market segment as well. Retail lending
presents an important part of credit growth in our sample of countries and is im-
portant for household welfare. Financial exclusion is prevalent not only among
the SME market segment but also among households and can have negative con-
sequences for investments in productive activities such as entrepreneurship and
education. How different bank organizational structures impact the availability
of financial services to households is important for informing the debate on ways
to foster financial inclusion. Given firm financial statement data it would also be
informative to investigate whether the improved loan contracts have real impact
on firm performance and be able to make welfare statements. This would give
direct evidence on the real impact of the legal and institutional environment in
developing countries.
Finally, as more data become available the third essay could be extended to in-
vestigate the recent co-operations that were established between Safaricom and
commercial banks using the M-Pesa platform as an alternative delivery channel.
What started as a competition and rivalry between commercial banks on one
hand and telecommunication companies wanting to offer financial services on the
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other hand, ended up in several joint initiatives to offer financial services through
the M-Pesa platform. In 2010, for example, Safaricom introduced M-Kesho, a
partnership with Equity Bank which makes three services available to M-Pesa
users: a micro-savings account, short-term credit and insurance. These partner-
ships have also induced other banks in Kenya to try to compete by improving
their products and services. In 2012, M-Shwari was launched as a partnership
with Commercial Bank of Kenya, which offers customers a way to earn interest
on their savings and also obtain small loans through Commercial Bank of Kenya.
Users can now use M-Pesa to access their bank accounts in 36 different banks in
Kenya. These examples show that M-Pesa is not a mechanism to replace tradi-
tional banks rather a supplemental platform that has encouraged banks to find
new ways to serve the previously unbankable. Banks that have integrated mobile
money into their service offerings aim to expand their outreach at lower cost per
transaction by eliminating the need of physical infrastructure required to service
poor clients in rural and remote areas, whose low balances and unpredictable
cash flows make them an otherwise unprofitable market segment to serve via
traditional bricks-and-mortar branches. From the households’ perspective the
integration of banks with mobile money increases the number of points they can
access their bank accounts and transact at lower costs compared to having to
visit bank branches or ATMs which are often less in number and concentrated in
wealthy or urban areas. Understanding how these new delivery channels can im-
pact banks and households is important for countries that seek to expand access
to financial services to as wide a spectrum of the population as possible.
156
References
Abiad, A., Detragiache, E. and Tressel, T. (2010). A new database of financial
reforms, IMF Staff Papers .
Agarwal, S. and Hauswald, R. (2010). Distance and private information in lend-
ing, Review of Financial Studies 23: 2757–2788.
Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. (1992). An incomplete contracts approach to financial
contracting, Review of Economic Studies 59: 473–494.
Aghion, P. and Bolton, P. (1997). A theory of trickle-down growth and develop-
ment, Review of Economic Studies 64: 151–172.
Aghion, P. and Tirole, J. (1997). Formal and real authority in organizations,
Journal of Political Economy 105: 1–29.
Ai, C. and Norton, E. (2003). Interaction terms in logit and probit models,
Economics Letters 80: 123–129.
Alessandrini, P., Presbitero, A. F. and Zazzaro, A. (2009). Banks, distances and
firms’ financing constraints, Review of Finance 13: 261–307.
Allen, L. (1988). The determinants of bank net interest margins: A note, Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 23: 231–235.
Andrews, D. (2003). Tests for parameter instability and structural change with
unknown change point: A corrigendum, Econometrica 71: 395–397.
Angbazo, L. (1997). Commercial bank net interest margins, default risk, interest-
rate risk and off-balance sheet banking, Journal of Banking and Finance
21: 55–87.
157
REFERENCES
Bae, K.-H. and Goyal, V. K. (2009). Creditor rights, enforcement and bank loans,
Journal of Finance 64: 823–860.
Bain, J. S. (1951). Relation of profit rate to industry concentration: American
manufacturing, 1936-1940, Quarterly Journal of Economics 65: 293–324.
Baker, G., Gibbons, R. and Murphy, K. J. (1999). Informal authority in organi-
zations, Journal of Law, Economics and Organization 15: 56–73.
Barajas, A., Steiner, R. and Salazar, N. (2000). The impact of liberalization
and foreign investment in colombia’s financial sector, Journal of Development
Economics 63: 157–196.
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2001). Banking systems around the
globe: Do regulations and ownership affect performance and stability?, Pruden-
tial Supervision: What works and what doesn’t, University of Chicago Press,
Chicago.
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2004). Bank regulation and supervision:
what works best?, Journal of Financial Intermediation 13: 205–248.
Barth, J. R., Caprio, G. and Levine, R. (2013). Measure it, improve it; bank
regulation and supervision in 180 countries 1999-2011, Milken Institute .
Baumol, W. J. (1982). Contestable markets: An uprising in the theory of industry
structure, American Economic Review 72: 1–15.
Beck, T. (2008). Bank competition and financial stability: Friends or foes?,
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 4656.
Beck, T., Degryse, H., De Haas, R. and Van Horen, N. (2014). When arm’s length
is too far. relationship banking over the business cycle, CentER Discussion
Paper No. 2014-042, Tilburg University .
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Honohan, P. (2008). Finance for all? policies
and pitfalls in expanding access, Policy Research Report. World Bank .
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Levine, R. (2006). Bank supervision and cor-
ruption in lending, Journal of Monetary Economics 53: 2131–2163.
158
REFERENCES
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Maksimovic, V. (2004). Bank competition
and access to finance: International evidence, Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 36.
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Martinez Peria, M. S. (2007). Reaching out:
Access to and use of banking services across countries, Journal of Financial
Economics 85: 234–266.
Beck, T., Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Martinez Peria, M. S. (2008). Banking services
for everyone? barriers to bank access and use around the world, The World
Bank Economic Review 22.
Beck, T. and Hesse, H. (2009). Why are interest spreads so high in uganda?,
Journal of Development Economics 88: 192–204.
Beck, T., Ioannidou, V. and Schaefer, L. (2014). Foreigners vs. natives: Bank
lending technologies and loan pricing, Working Paper Series Cass Business
School No.28.
Beck, T., Levine, R. and Loayza, N. (2000). Finance and sources of growth,
Journal of Financial Economics 58: 261–300.
Beck, T., Pamuk, H., Ramrattan, R. and Uras, B. R. (2015). Mobile money, trade
credit and economic development: Theory and evidence, CentER Working
Paper No. 2015-023.
Becker, G. S. and Murphy, K. M. (1992). The division of labor, coordination
costs and knowledge, Quarterly Journal of Economics 107: 1137–1160.
Berger, A. N. (1995). The profit-structure relationship in banking-tests of market-
power and efficient-structure hypotheses, Journal of Money, Credit and Bank-
ing 27: 404–431.
Berger, A. N., DeYoung, R., Genay, H. and Udell, G. F. (2000). Globaliza-
tion of financial institutions: Evidence from cross-border banking performance,
Brookings-Wharton Papers on Financial Services 3: 23–120.
159
REFERENCES
Berger, A. N. and Hannan, T. H. (1998). The efficiency cost of market power in
the banking industry: A test of the ”quiet life” and related hypotheses, Review
of Economics and Statistics 80: 454–465.
Berger, A. N., Miller, N. H., Petersen, M. A., Rajan, R. G. and Stein, J. C. (2005).
Does function follow organizational form? evidence from the lending practices
of large and small banks, Journal of Financial Economics 76: 237–269.
Berger, A. N., Saunders, A., Scalise, J. M. and Udell, G. F. (1998). The effects of
bank mergers and acquisitions on small business lending, Journal of Financial
Economics 50: 187–229.
Berger, A. N. and Udell, G. F. (1995). Relationship lending and lines of credit
in small firm finance, Journal of Business 68: 351–381.
Berger, A. N. and Udell, G. F. (1996). Universal banking and the future of
small business lending, Financial system design: the case for universal banking,
Irwin, Burr Ridge, IL.
Berlin, M. and Mester, L. J. (1999). Deposits and relationship lending, Review
of Financial Studies 12.
Bernanke, B. and Gertler, M. (1989). Agency costs, net worth and business
fluctuations, American Economic Review 79: 14–31.
Besanko, D. and Thakor, A. V. (1992). Banking deregulation: Allocational con-
sequences of relaxing entry barriers, Journal of Banking and Finance 16.
Bolton, P. and Dewatripont, M. (1994). The firm as a communication network,
Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 809–839.
Bonin, J. P., Hasan, I. and Wachtel, P. (2009). Banking in transition countries,
The Oxford Handbook of Banking, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
Boot, A. W. A. and Thakor, A. V. (1994). Moral hazard and secured lending
in an infinitely repeated credit market game, International Economic Review
35: 899–920.
160
REFERENCES
Boot, A. W. A. and Thakor, A. V. (2000). Can relationship banking survive
competition?, Journal of Finance 55: 679–713.
Boyd, J. H., Chang, C. and Smith, B. D. (1998). Moral hazard under commercial
and universal banking, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 30: 426–468.
Brock, P. L. and Rojas Suarez, L. (2000). Understanding the behavior of bank
spreads in latin america, Journal of Development Economics 63: 113–134.
Brown, M., Maurer, M. R., Pak, T. and Tynaev, N. (2009). The impact of
banking sector reform in a transition economy: Evidence from kyrgyzstan,
Journal of Banking and Finance 33: 1677–1687.
Bruno, V. and Hauswald, R. (2014). The real effect of foreign banks, Review of
Finance 18: 1683–1716.
Canales, R. and Nanda, R. (2012). A darker side to decentralized banks: Market
power and credit rationing in sme lending, Journal of Financial Economics
105: 353–366.
Casu, B. and Girardone, C. (2009). Testing the relationship between competition
and efficiency in banking: A panel data analysis, Economics Letters 105: 134–
137.
Cetorelli, N. and Gambera, M. (2001). Banking market structure, financial de-
pendence and growth: International evidence from industry data, Journal of
Finance 56.
Cetorelli, N. and Goldberg, L. S. (2011). Global banks and international shock
transmission: Evidence from the crisis, IMF Economic Review 59: 41–76.
Chen, S.-H. and Liao, C.-C. (2011). Are foreign banks more profitable than
domestic banks? home- and host-country effects of banking market structure,
governance and supervision, Journal of Banking and Finance 35: 819–839.
Chirwa, E. W. and Mlachila, M. (2004). Financial reforms and interest rate
spreads in the commercial banking system in malawi, IMF Staff Papers 51: 96–
122.
161
REFERENCES
Chow, G. (1960). Tests of equality between sets of coefficients in two linear
regressions, Econometrica 28: 591–605.
Claessens, S., Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Huizinga, H. (2001). How does foreign en-
try affect domestic banking markets?, Journal of Banking and Finance 25: 891–
911.
Claessens, S. and Van Horen, N. (2012). Being a foreigner among domestic banks:
asset or liability?, Journal of Banking and Finance 36: 1276–1290.
Claessens, S. and Van Horen, N. (2014). Foreign banks: Trends and impact,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 46: 295–326.
Claeys, S. and Hainz, C. (2014). Modes of foreign bank entry and effects on lend-
ing rates: Theory and evidence, Journal of Comparative Economics 42: 160–
177.
Claeys, S. and Vander Vennet, R. (2008). Determinats of bank interest margins
in central and eastern europe: A comparison with the west, Economic Systems
32: 197–216.
Coase, R. H. (1937). The nature of the firm, Economica 4: 386–405.
Cole, R. A., Goldberg, L. G. and White, L. J. (2004). Cookie cutter vs. character:
the micro structure of small business lending by large and small banks, Journal
of Financial and Quantitative Analysis 39: 227–251.
Crawford, V. P. and Sobel, J. (1982). Strategic information transmission, Econo-
metrica 50: 1431–1451.
Cull, R., Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Morduch, J. (2014). Banks and microbanks,
Journal of Financial Services Research 46.
Dabla-Norris, E. and Floerkemeier, H. (2007). Bank efficiency and market struc-
ture: What determines banking spreads in armenia?, IMF Working Paper
WP/07/134 pp. 1–28.
162
REFERENCES
De Haas, R., Ferreira, D. and Taci, A. (2010). What determines the composi-
tion of banks’ loan portfolios? evidence from transition countries, Journal of
Banking and Finance 34: 388–398.
De Haas, R. and Van Horen, N. (2013). Running for the exit? international bank
lending during a financial crisis, Review of Financial Studies 26: 244–285.
De Haas, R. and Van Lelyveld, I. (2010). Internal capital markets and lending by
multinational bank subsidiaries, Journal of Financial Intermediation 19: 1–25.
Degryse, H., Havrylchyk, O., Jurzyk, E. and Kozak, S. (2012). Foreign bank entry,
credit allocation and lending rates in emerging markets: Empirical evidence
from poland, Journal of Banking and Finance 36: 2949–2959.
Degryse, H. and Ongena, S. (2005). Distance, lending relationships and compe-
tition, Journal of Finance 60: 231–266.
Delis, M. D., Molyneux, P. and Pasiouras, F. (2011). Regulations and productiv-
ity growth in banking: Evidence from transition economies, Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 43: 735–764.
Delis, M. D. and Tsionas, E. G. (2009). The joint estimation of bank-level market
power and efficiency, Journal of Banking and Finance 33: 1842–1850.
Dell’Ariccia, G. and Marquez, R. (2004). Information and bank credit allocation,
Journal of Financial Economics 72: 185–214.
Demirguc-Kunt, A. and Huizinga, H. (1999). Determinants of commercial bank
interest margins and profitability: Some international evidence, The World
Bank Economic Review 13: 379–408.
Demirguc-Kunt, A., Laeven, L. and Levine, R. (2004). Regulations, market struc-
ture, institutions and the cost of financial intermediation, Journal of Money,
Credit and Banking 36: 593–622.
Demsetz, H. (1973). Industry structure, market rivalry and public policy, Journal
of Law and Economics 16: 1–9.
163
REFERENCES
Dessein, W. (2002). Authority and communication in organizations, Review of
Economic Studies 69: 811–838.
Detragiache, E., Tressel, T. and Gupta, P. (2008). Foreign banks in poor coun-
tries: Theory and evidence, Journal of Finance 63: 2123–2160.
Dewatripont, M. and Tirole, J. (2005). Modes of communication, Journal of
Political Economy 113: 1217–1238.
DeYoung, R., Goldberg, L. G. and White, L. J. (1999). Youth, adolescence, and
maturity of banks: credit availability to small business in an era of banking
consolidation, Journal of Banking and Finance 23: 463–492.
Diamond, D. W. (1984). Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring,
Review of Economic Studies 51: 393–414.
Diamond, D. W. (1991). Monitoring and reputation: the choice between bank
loans and directly placed debt, Journal of Political Economy 99: 689–721.
Dinc, I. S. (2000). Bank reputation, bank commitment and the effects of compe-
tition in credit markets, Review of Financial Studies 13: 781–812.
Djankov, S., Mc Liesh, C. and Shleifer, A. (2007). Private credit in 129 countries,
Journal of Financial Economics 84: 299–329.
Giannetti, M. and Ongena, S. (2009). Financial integration and firm perfor-
mance: evidence from foreign bank entry in emerging markets, Review of Fi-
nance 13: 181–223.
Gine, X., Martinez Cuellar, C. and Keenan Mazer, R. (2014). Financial (dis-
) information: Evidence from an audit study in mexico, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 6902.
Goldberg, L. S. (2007). Financial sector fdi and host countries: New and old
lessons, FRBNY Economic Policy Review March: 1–17.
Gormley, T. A. (2010). The impact of foreign bank entry in emerging markets:
Evidence from india, Journal of Financial Intermediation 19: 26–51.
164
REFERENCES
Guzman, M. G. (2000). Bank structure, capital accumulation and growth: a
simple macroeconomic model, Economic Theory 16.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1994). A theory of debt based on the inalienability of
human capital, Quarterly Journal of Economics 109: 841–879.
Hart, O. and Moore, J. (1998). Default and renegotiation: a dynamic model of
debt, Quarterly Journal of Economics 113: 1–41.
Haselmann, R., Pistor, K. and Vig, V. (2010). How law affects lending, Review
of Financial Studies 23: 549–580.
Haselmann, R. and Wachtel, P. (2010). Institutions and bank behavior: legal
environment, legal perception, and the composition of bank lending, Journal
of Money, Credit and Banking 42: 965–984.
Hauswald, R. and Marquez, R. (2006). Competition and strategic information
acquisition in credit markets, Review of Financial Studies 19.
Havrylchyk, O. and Jurzyk, E. (2011). Profitability of foreign banks in central
and eastern europe; does the mode of entry matter?, Economics of Transition
19: 443–472.
Hicks, J. (1935). Annual survey of economic theory: the theory of monopoly,
Econometrica 3: 1–20.
Ho, T. S. Y. and Saunders, A. (1981). The determinants of bank interest margins:
Theory and empirical evidence, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
16: 581–600.
Houston, J. F., Lin, C. and Ma, Y. (2012). Regulatory arbitrage and international
bank flows, Journal of Finance 67: 1845–1895.
Jack, W. and Suri, T. (2011). Mobile money: The economics of m-pesa, NBER
Working Paper Nr. 16721.
Jack, W. and Suri, T. (2014). Risk sharing and transactions costs: Evidence from
kenya’s mobile money revolution, American Economic Review 104: 183–223.
165
REFERENCES
Jayaratne, J. and Strahan, P. E. (1996). The finance-growth nexusevidence from
bank branch deregulation, Quarterly Journal of Economics pp. 639–670.
King, R. G. and Levine, R. (1993). Finance and growth: Schumpeter might be
right, Quarterly Journal of Economics 108(3): 717–737.
Klein, M. A. (1971). A theory of the banking firm, Journal of Money, Credit and
Banking 3: 205–218.
Koetter, M., Kolari, J. W. and Spierdijk, L. (2012). Enjoying the quiet life under
deregulation? evidence from adjusted lerner indices for u.s. banks, Review of
Economics and Statistics 94: 462–480.
Kosmidou, K., Pasiouras, F. and Tsaklanganos, A. (2007). Domestic and multina-
tional determinants of foreign bank profits: The case of greek banks operating
abroad, Journal of Multinational Financial Management 17: 1–15.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1997). Legal
determinants of external finance, Journal of Finance 52: 1131–1150.
La Porta, R., Lopez-de Silanes, F., Shleifer, A. and Vishny, R. (1998). Law and
finance, Journal of Political Economy 106: 1113–1155.
Laeven, L. and Levine, R. (2009). Bank governance, regulation and risk taking,
Journal of Financial Economics 93: 259–275.
Lanine, G. and Vander Vennet, R. (2007). Microeconomic determinants of ac-
quisitions of eastern european banks by western european banks, Economics
of Transition 15(2): 285–308.
Lehner, M. and Schnitzer, M. (2008). Entry of foreign banks and their impact
on host countries, Journal of Comparative Economics 36: 430–452.
Lensink, R., Meesters, A. and Naaborg, I. (2008). Bank efficiency and foreign
ownership: Do good institutions matter?, Journal of Banking and Finance
32: 834–844.
Levine, R. (1997). Financial development and economic growth: Views and
agenda, Journal of Economic Literature 35: 688–726.
166
REFERENCES
Levine, R. (2005). Finance and growth: Theory and evidence, Handbook of
Economic Growth, Elsevier Science, The Netherlands.
Liberti, J. M. and Mian, A. (2010). Collateral spread and financial development,
Journal of Finance 65: 147–177.
Liberti, J. M. and Mian, A. R. (2009). Estimating the effect of hierarchies on
information use, Review of Financial Studies 22: 4057–4090.
Love, I. and Martinez Peria, M. S. (2014). How bank competition affects firm’s
access to finance, The World Bank Economic Review 29.
Marquez, R. (2002). Competition, adverse selection and information dispersion
in the banking industry, Review of Financial Studies 15: 901–926.
Martinez Peria, M. S. and Mody, A. (2004). How foreign participation and market
concentration impact bank spreads: Evidence from latin america, Journal of
Money, Credit and Banking 36: 511–537.
Matutes, C. and Vives, X. (1996). Competition for deposits, fragility and insur-
ance, Journal of Financial Intermediation 5: 184–216.
Maudos, J. and Fernandez de Guevara, J. (2007). The cost of market power
in banking: social welfare loss vs. cost inefficiency, Journal of Banking and
Finance 31: 2103–2125.
Mayer, C. (1988). New issues in corporate finance, European Economic Review
32.
Mbiti, I. and Weil, D. N. (2011). Mobile banking: The impact of m-pesa in kenya,
NBER Working Paper No. 17129.
Mbiti, I. and Weil, D. N. (2013). The home economics of e-money: Velocity, cash
management and discount rates of m-pesa users, American Economic Review:
Papers and Proceedings 103: 369–374.
McShane, R. W. and Sharpe, I. G. (1985). A time series-cross section analysis
of the determinants of australian trading bank loan-deposit interest margins:
1962-1981, Journal of Banking and Finance 9: 115–136.
167
REFERENCES
Mian, A. (2006). Distance constraints: The limits of foreign lending in poor
economies, Journal of Finance 61: 1465–1505.
Morawczynski, O. (2009). Exploring the usage and impact of ”transformational”
mobile financial services: the case of m-pesa in kenya, Journal of Eastern
African Studies 3(3): 509–525.
Ongena, S., Popov, A. and Udell, G. F. (2013). ”when the cat’s away the mice
will play”: Does regulation at home affect bank risk taking abroad?, Journal
of Financial Economics 108: 727–750.
Peek, J. and Rosengren, E. S. (1997). The international transmission of financial
shocks: The case of japan, American Economic Review 87: 495–505.
Peek, J. and Rosengren, E. S. (1998). Bank consolidation and small business
lending: it’s not just bank size that matters, Journal of Banking and Finance
22: 799–819.
Perry, P. (1992). Do banks gain or lose from inflation?, Journal of Retail Banking
16: 25–30.
Petersen, M. A. and Rajan, R. G. (1994). The benefits of lending relationships:
Evidence from small business data, Journal of Finance 49.
Petersen, M. A. and Rajan, R. G. (1995). The effect of credit market competition
on lending relationships, Quarterly Journal of Economics 110.
Petersen, M. A. and Rajan, R. G. (2002). Does distance still matter? the infor-
mation revolution in small business lending, Journal of Finance 57: 2533–2570.
Poghosyan, T. (2013). Financial intermediation costs in low income countries:
The role of regulatory, institutional and macroeconomic factors, Economic Sys-
tems 37: 92–110.
Poghosyan, T. and de Haan, J. (2010). Determinants of cross-border bank ac-
quisitions in transition economies, Economics of Transition 18(4): 671–696.
Popov, A. and Udell, G. F. (2012). Cross-border banking, credit access, and the
financial crisis, Journal of International Economics 87: 147–161.
168
REFERENCES
Qian, J. and Strahan, P. E. (2007). How laws and institutions shape financial
contracts: the case of bank loans, Journal of Finance 62: 2803–2834.
Qian, J., Strahan, P. E. and Yang, Z. (2015). The impact of incentives and
communication costs on information production and use: evidence from bank
lending, Journal of Finance 70: 1457–1493.
Quandt, R. (1960). Tests of the hypothesis that a linear regression system obeys
two separate regimes, Journal of the American Statistical Association 55: 324–
330.
Radner, R. (1993). The organization of decentralized information processing,
Econometrica 61: 1109–1146.
Ramakrishnan, R. T. S. and Thakor, A. V. (1984). Information reliability and a
theory of financial intermediation, Review of Economic Studies 51: 415–432.
Sapienza, P. (2002). The effects of banking mergers on loan contracts, Journal
of Finance 57: 329–367.
Saunders, A. and Schumacher, L. (2000). The determinants of bank interest rate
margins: an international study, Journal of International Money and Finance
19: 813–832.
Schaeck, K. and Cihak, M. (2008). How does competition affect efficiency and
soundness in banking? new empirical evidence, European Central Bank Work-
ing Paper No. 932.
Schnabl, P. (2012). The international transmission of bank liquidity shocks:
evidence from an emerging market, Journal of Finance 67: 897–932.
Schumpeter, J. A. (1912). The theory of economic development, Harvard Univer-
sity Press, Cambridge, MA.
Scott, J. A. (2004). Small business and the value of community financial institu-
tions, Journal of Financial Services Research 25: 207–230.
169
REFERENCES
Sharpe, S. A. (1990). Asymmetric information, bank lending and implicit con-
tracts: a stylized model of customer relationships, Journal of Finance 45: 1069–
1087.
Skrastins, J. and Vig, V. (2014). How organizational hierarchy affects information
production, Working Paper, London Business School .
Stein, J. C. (2002). Information production and capital allocation: Decentralized
versus hierarchical firms, Journal of Finance 57: 1891–1921.
Stock, J. and Watson, M. (2012). Introduction to econometrics, third edition edn,
Pearson Education Limited.
Stock, J. and Yogo, M. (2005). Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regres-
sion, Cambridge University Press, New York, pp. 80–108.
Strahan, P. E. and Weston, J. P. (1998). Small business lending and the changing
structure of the banking industry, Journal of Banking and Finance 22: 821–
845.
Van Tassel, E. and Vishwasrao, S. (2007). Asymmetric information and the mode
of entry in foreign credit markets, Journal of Banking and Finance 31: 3742–
3760.
Williams, B. (2003). Domestic and international determinants of bank profits:
Foreign banks in australia, Journal of Banking and Finance 27: 1185–1210.
Williamson, O. E. (1967). Hierarchical control and optimum firm size, Journal
of Political Economy 75: 123–138.
170
